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Abstract
The Great War was a formative event for men who came of age between 1914
and 1918. They believed the experience forged them into a distinct
generation. This collective identification more than shaped a sense of self; it
influenced understanding of the conflict’s meaning. Canadian historians,
however, have overlooked the war’s generational impact, partly because they
reject notions of a disillusioned Lost Generation. Unlike European or
American youths, it is argued that Canadian veterans did not suffer postwar
disillusionment. Rather, they embraced the war alongside a renewed
Canadian nationalism. This generation was proud of their nation’s wartime
achievements, notably those of the Canadian Corps, but the conflict’s
meaning was rooted in more than battlefield history. Its validity was
inseparable from the postwar life for which veterans believed they had fought
for. Yet, despite hopes to return home to a ‘square deal’, economic and
international instability marred life in interwar Canada, dashing the
generation’s confidence in the future.
This discontent is obscured by histories heavily focused on memory
and a corresponding reliance on cultural sources, such as war books, to
explain the conflict’s social history. While an important part of the war’s
legacy, retrospective focus on commemoration is a poor guide to the lived
realities of the postwar present. In the war’s aftermath many young veterans
struggled to find work. Combined with the prospect of renewed war in
Europe, their unemployment added to a growing list of postwar grievances,
including failure to secure adequate assistance for wounded and traumatized
veterans. These unresolved complaints about the pension system, the soldier

settlement schemes, and the mishandling of postwar canteen funds
(particularly in Ontario) more than undermined the war generation’s belief in
the war, it left them deeply disillusioned with its meaning.

Keywords
Great War, First World War, Canada, Ontario, generation, disillusionment,
Canteen Fund, veterans.
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Introduction

On 3 June 1916, private A.Y. Jackson huddled in a trench with shells
exploding all around. He was a member of the 60th Battalion, Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF). The future Group of Seven member was
witnessing the battle of Mount Sorrel, near Ypres. The day before, the
German army detonated four mines under the British lines and the result
was chaos. By morning, a “hurricane of fire” erupted in the trenches that
left the Canadians stunned, deaf, and unable to retaliate.1 Major-General
Malcolm Mercer, commander of the newly formed Canadian 3rd Division,
was killed, along with most who held the front lines. Reserve and
communication trenches were in disarray. There were conflicting messages
about whether the battalion should proceed and the German shelling made
it “impossible to get the men in position.”2 Jackson’s battalion formed part
of the Canadian counter-attack. “They just simply plastered us,” he
recalled, as the remaining troops were forced to advance among the

1 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916
(Toronto: Viking, 2007), 350.
2 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 9, III-D-3, Vol. 4942, 60th Battalion War
Diary, 3 June 1916.
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corpses. He further remembered how “You’d look down and see a little kid
of about fifteen.”3
The shellfire increased. Suddenly another barrage came crashing
down, covering the troops with “dirt, dust, and pieces of brick.” A shell
burst a few feet away with a “wicked sound,” followed by a “green yellow
ball of smoke.” Next came the “cries and groans.” Jackson’s lieutenant
turned pale and fell “in a huddled heap.” A comrade looked “in dismay at
a great spurt of blood coming from his arm, which was only hanging by a
few shreds of flesh.”4 By day’s end, Jackson was wounded with a shrapnel
ball in his shoulder.
The fighting left A.Y. Jackson disillusioned. With little desire to
return to the front, he wrote his cousin, Florence Clement, telling her that
he had lost all “illusions” about war. “I don't care how long I take to get
ready for the trenches,” he confessed. He would do as ordered “but not
much more.” In Jackson’s mind, the war had become mass slaughter. There
was no place for individual distinction. “Glory and decorations are not for
the private soldiers,” he wrote. He commented to Florence that individual
men were less important than “a box of jam.”5 Ironically, the average

3 LAC, RG 41 [Hereafter Flanders’ Fields], Vol. 16, 85th Battalion (misfiled), A.Y.
Jackson, tape 3/3.
4 LAC, MG 30, D 111 [Hereafter MacDonald papers], Vol. 1, folder 2, Jackson to
MacDonald, 10 September 1916.
5 LAC, MG 30, D 351 [Hereafter Jackson papers], Vol. 95, folder 6, Jackson to
Florence Clement, 26 August 1916.
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soldier only stood out when he resisted. A “private is nothing, unless he
disobeys orders.” Then a “big fuss” ensues and he “gets shot.”6
Jackson rarely spoke about the war in the years that followed and his
autobiography glosses over his time in the trenches.7 Despite this silence,
however, his sense of the war’s futility lasted long after the conflict ended.
In the early 1960s, he sat down with the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) to record an interview as part of its First World War
series, Flanders’ Fields.8 The program marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
war and its producers interviewed hundreds of veterans about their
experiences. Jackson explained that he considered the war “sheer murder.”

6 LAC, MacDonald papers, Vol. 1, folder 2, Jackson to MacDonald, 31 May 1916.
7 The autobiography focuses almost exclusively on his time as a war artist. His
experiences prior to this, including his enlistment and time spent in the 60th Battalion, are
relegated to two brief paragraphs. These say nothing about how the war affected him and
limit comment of the war to the weather, Jackson’s inability to paint in the trenches, and
the “weird, ruined landscapes” of Ypres.
He describes the experience as follows: “Our first day in France was not auspicious.
We marched through Le Havre in snow and slush, with no one taking any notice of us. A
five-mile march brought us to an empty camp in the dark; the flaps had not been tied up
and the tents were full of wet snow. And, army fashion, our field kitchens had gone astray.
We crawled into the tents and huddled together for warmth, having had nothing to eat
since breakfast.
But Flanders in early spring was beautiful, as we Ypres by moonlight and the
weird ruined landscapes under the light of flares or rockets. Apart from a few diagrams,
enlargements from maps and plans of the sectors we were in, I had no chance of doing any
sketching.” See A.Y. Jackson, A Painter’s Country: The Autobiography of A.Y. Jackson
(Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, & Co., 1967 [1958]), 36-37.
8 See Teresa Iacobelli, “A Participant's History?: The CBC and the Manipulation of
Oral History," Oral History Review 38.2 (Fall-Winter 2011): 331-348 for a discussion of this
series. While Iacobelli points out that the interviewers asked leading questions to manage
the answers they received, the interviews themselves, rather than the broadcast transcript,
are more revealing about what veterans recalled during these interviews.
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Passchendaele, for example, was a “perfectly useless” battle.9 The Group of
Seven artist was in his early eighties at the time of the interview but it was
clear that his wartime disillusion remained. And yet, he did not regret
serving. Jackson was proud of his experiences, both because of what they
taught him about humanity and for what he and his comrades experienced
overseas. Together, they built “a wonderful army” that was “Canadian and
independent.”10 He was thankful that his experiences had given him a
“great respect for human beings.”11
Greg Clark was another veteran to the Great War. As a young
journalist, he enlisted with the Canadian Mounted Rifles in 1916 and served
more than two years overseas. At Vimy Ridge, he took command of his unit
when the battalion’s officers were killed, an action that earned the young
lieutenant the Military Cross. Clark diaried some of these experiences in
1919 and 1920. Combat, he wrote, was an experience “too vast, too
unknown for conception,” filled with “terror” and a “paralyzing, terrific
tumult.”12 Other recollections were more graphic. During one artillery
barrage, Clark was struck by his friend’s leg, which was “severed at the
hip” and hurled through the air. Seconds later, Clark wrote, “over our

9 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 16, 85th Battalion, A.Y. Jackson, 2/3.
10 LAC, MacDonald papers, Vol. 1, folder 2, Jackson to MacDonald, 6 April 1918.
11 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 16, 85th Battalion, A.Y. Jackson, 1/3.
12 LAC, R8258 [Hereafter Clark papers], Vol 2, Diary and Memoir (Dec 1919-1920).
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heads sailed the rest of Johnson, landing 40 yards from where he was first
hit.”13
Such experiences inevitably affected Clark’s psyche: “Two years [of]
continuous service with the [Battalion], with no relaxation whatever, just
endless indolence fringed with a petty fussing activity, did something
serious to my mind and spirit.”14 Yet whatever horrors he endured, Clark
maintained that he had “a decent time … compared with so many others.”
Decades later, in the 1960s, he took solace that his experiences had shaped
him as a man. “I was a bookworm, a quiet little bookworm when I went [off
to war],” Clark explained, “and I came home a rather tough character.”
Clark’s experience as a journalist, combined with his memories of his
service, made him an ideal subject for the CBC’s Flanders’ Fields, the same
program that interviewed A.Y. Jackson in the 1960s. Clark’s memories of
the conflict, however, did not conform to the program’s preconceived
narrative that portrayed the war as futile. While some veterans (including
A.Y. Jackson) held this view, Clark did not.15 He believed the war
experience had matured him as a man and he bristled at suggestions to the
contrary. Nonetheless, his sense of the conflict’s wider meaning was less
certain. Many veterans struggled in the aftermath of the war and Clark

13 LAC, Clark papers, Vol. 2, Diary and Memoir (Dec 1919-1920).
14 LAC, Clark papers, Vol. 2, Diary and Memoir (Dec 1919-1920).
15 French veterans held similar views to Canadians. See Leonard V. Smith, The
Embattled Self: French Soldiers’ Testimony of the Great War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2007), 201.
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believed their plight was as much a part of the conflict’s legacy as his
maturation.16
The war that these men endured was a tragedy. It exposed them to
unimaginable horrors, often with little discernible sense of purpose, either
on the battlefield or at the diplomatic tables. When it finally ended, the
armistice and resulting peace proved a pyrrhic victory, achieving little
except halting the war’s slaughter. Peacetime proved an even greater
disappointment. In place of the ideal world they had hoped for, veterans
returned to economic uncertainty, declining health, and the prospect of
another war. As Lester Pearson, future Prime Minister and Great War
veteran, recalled, war’s end “saved … my generation and gave the world,
not peace, but a reprieve.”17
By 1919, it was already clear that the war transformed the lives of
those who lived it. The conflict was a shocking experience and many men,
including A.Y. Jackson and Greg Clark, considered it the formative event in
their lives. The war remolded Jackson’s views of Canada; it recast his
approach to art; it reshaped his identity.18 So important was the experience
that he, like countless men of his generation, considered it the central
dividing line for the rest of their lives. As Jackson explained, the war’s

16 LAC, RG41, Vol. 17, 4th C.M.R., Flanders’ Fields: Greg Clark, tape 2/3, n.d.
17 Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Person, Vol. 1
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 38.
18 Laura Brandon, Transformations: A.Y. Jackson & Otto Dix (Ottawa: Canadian
Museum of History, 2014). See too Brandon, “Shattered Landscape: The Great War and
the Art of the Group of Seven,” Canadian Military History, 10:1 (Winter 2001): 58-66.
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impact was such that “before the war” and “after the war” became a
chronological divide, as important as “B.C. and A.D.”19 His experience was
not unique. Countless veterans considered the war a defining moment. It
demarcated their lives into distinct periods: “before the war, during the
war, and after the war.”20 These men came of age during the conflict and
the fact that they could be intensely proud and at the same time deeply
disillusioned by the experience reflects a central paradox of the generation’s
understanding of the Great War.
This dissertation attempts to explain this paradox. But how powerful
and influential was this sense of disillusionment? How did it manifest in
the generation that fought the war as this group of men struggled to find
meaning in the postwar world? What role did it play in shaping the
interwar period in Canada? The unique approach offered in this study rests
on Lester Pearson’s reference to “my generation.” Men who joined up to
serve between 1914 and 1918 were predominantly young. With survival
came a sense of transformation that reshaped their collective sense of self.
While postwar life in the 1920s and 1930s was difficult for most people in
Canada, the war generation maintained that it was uniquely affected,
indeed shaped, by this tragic conflict. Those who went to war grappled
with haunting memories and restlessness, as well as the physical,
psychological, and emotional traumas that clearly set them apart. They

19 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 16, 85th Battalion, A.Y Jackson, 1/3.
20 Dan Vernon’s interview with the War and Canadian Society Project’s oral
history is found in Daphne Read, ed., The Great War and Canadian Society: An Oral History
(New Hogtown Press, 1978), 215. Dan Vernon is a pseudonym.
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came to identify ‘generationally’, an identification that bound them
together for the rest of their lives.
Canadians at home lived a very different war. It was every bit as real
but, being more distant and abstract than life in the trenches, the experience
did not forge a comparable collective identity. Even those who lost loved
ones could never understand what their sons, brothers, or fathers, went
through. These ‘different wars’ in turn shaped reactions to the conflict’s
aftermath.21 When the war ended, commemoration of the conflict was
widely embraced and Canadians celebrated their victory while mourning
the nation’s fallen. These public displays of grief helped the nation come to
terms with its staggering losses and bridged divisions that spanned the
frontlines and the home front. Few veterans disagreed with a desire to
enshrine remembrance at the forefront of public discourse. But, for the war
generation, the conflict’s meaning amounted to more than its memory.
Postwar life was a world for which they had fought and sacrificed. Its
challenges also influenced their understanding of the conflict and, as they
endured countless setbacks in the years and decades that followed, men’s
criticisms of the war and life in Canada increased.
Between 1914 and 1918, men ‘joined up’ for different reasons. While
these motivations varied, by the time the war ended, they shared common
expectations for the future. Often, these remained little more than vague
notions of a better life, what many described simply as a ‘square deal’. As
time passed, however, veterans’ struggle to create this future fell on deaf

21 Janet K. Watson, Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World
War in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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ears. Canadians, veterans complained, were more concerned with
remembering the dead than embracing the plight of the living. Faced with
rising unemployment, beset by war-related injuries, and denied their
pensions, support, and life they believed they had earned, men started to
question the meaning and value of their sacrifices.
This wave of postwar disillusionment was not unique to Canada. It
swept through Germany, Britain, and the United States. Veterans identified
as a Lost Generation. Yet, despite the widespread nature of their discontent,
a disillusioned war generation does not fit the general interpretation of
postwar Canada. Histories of the era highlight the growth of nationalism,
not the existence of a Canadian lost generation. Disillusionment did not fit
the national narrative. Accounts of the war’s memory are dismissive of
disillusioned veterans, a group also ignored in examinations of postwar
economic discord. Even histories of the veterans’ movement manage to shy
away from discussion of the war’s wider meaning or how it was shaped by
life in postwar Canada.
Public commemoration was a sacred cow, which men found difficult
to critique without risking rebuke. A lack of postwar debate about veterans’
grievances does not, however, mean that debate did not exist. Rather it
occurred in a different context to public commemoration. Such criticisms
were often private and deeply rooted in the war experience. To these
veterans, their position honoured, rather than insulted, the war’s memory.
If anything, it was postwar Canada that failed to ensure that the nation’s
sacrifices were properly valued.
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Outside of Canada, veterans from other nations reacted bitterly to
the war. German Dadaists, such George Grosz and Otto Dix, produced
grotesque artwork that critiqued the worst of the war’s horrors. Others
found a voice for their discontent in the written word. This international
literature, which included novels such as Ernst Maria Remarque’s All Quiet
on the Western Front, was highly personal, reflecting the transformative
power the conflict had on young men. It took many forms, from poetry and
novels to memoirs, as well as political, social, and cultural critiques.
Collectively, it was identified as the work of a lost generation—a term that
encompassed postwar disappointment and the importance youth played in
shaping these veterans’ place in postwar society.
Canadians, however, did not produce war books in comparable
numbers to British, American, or German writers. These works are perhaps
the most important cultural record of this generation’s discontent, but
without a tradition of ‘lost’ dissent, Canadians have looked elsewhere to
study the war’s aftermath. Historians turned their attention to the war’s
public commemoration to argue that Canada did not experience postwar
discontent. As a result, Canada’s lost generation remains overlooked. While
many of the nation’s veterans—including Greg Clark—were proud of their
part in the war, they could not divorce its experience from the challenges
veterans faced. To these men, its legacy was inseparable from its aftermath.
Continued focus on the public’s reaction to the war, however, overlooks the
relationship between its meaning and men’s wartime and postwar lives. It
does not explain how the nation’s veterans responded generationally; it
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does not indicate that they were as critical of postwar life as veterans from
other nations.
Canada’s war generation was young. It came of age with the war but
despite identifying generationally with the conflict, it did not openly
discuss its private views of this formative event. Nonetheless, the men’s
efforts to shape their postwar future demonstrate how the war’s aftermath
influenced their understanding of the conflict. This generational response
also highlights how disparate groups willingly identified with each other
and makes the link between the war’s aftermath and postwar disillusion.
Yet, the understanding of men’s war experience was never static. It began
during the war and continued to evolve as their lives moved forward. The
events men experienced during the conflict took on new and often altered
meanings in light of the challenges and opportunities of the 1920s, 1930s,
and beyond. And, while each veteran’s recollection of his wartime
experience was legitimate, this dissertation privileges the private
discussions men shared with each other and with the organizations that
made up the expanding veterans health and financial bureaucracies
emerging during and after the war. The letters and statements made in
these contexts were rarely concerned with how the war was publicly
remembered. Instead, they focused on the central questions of this
dissertation: what were the war’s consequences and how did they affect
men’s understanding of the conflict in its aftermath?
What follows is not an exhaustive history of a Canadian generation
or of Canada’s Great War. Rather, it is a study of the consequences of war,
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revealed by a group of men who identified generationally.22 The concept of
a generation appealed to them because it captured their sense of shared
experience and collective difference. Although often reluctant to speak
publicly, collectively they did do so in ways that cut across a spectrum of
sources. These range from art to poetry, to writings on economics, politics,
and the war itself. Their understanding of the conflict was, nonetheless,
unique to each man and cannot be told chronologically. Despite this
understanding, their sense of the war’s meaning shared common themes,
including an embrace of a generational identity, empathy with other
returned men, a desire to ensure veterans received a fair postwar deal, and
the importance of the war’s memory.
Chapter One introduces the relationship between age and different
understandings of the war’s meaning. It makes a demographic case for reconsidering the existence of a Canadian war generation. It further argues
that Canadians did identify generationally and that analysis of their
collective identity helps us to better understand how veterans made sense
of their Great War experience. In addition, the chapter contextualizes the
history of the lost generation to explain why Canadian historians have
shied away from generational analyses of the war and its impact.

22 Women, as Grace Morris Craig pointed out, could take ownership of the war
experience as much as men. Over 3,000 nursing sisters took part in the First World War
and women at home unquestionably experienced the war’s impact. Nonetheless, this study
focuses on the male response. Experience was a critical part of the war generation’s selfidentity, particularly for veterans. Women were not in the trenches, their experiences were
different, and so they could not understand what the men suffered. Despite this, the focus
on men does not mean that female sources or perspectives are ignored. Indeed, the letters
from women to provincial aid agencies, often written on behalf of their husbands (and
sometimes without their husband’s knowledge), are revealing. See Grace Morris Craig, But
This Is Our War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
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Chapter Two argues that a focus on the war’s literary legacy has
overshadowed the war’s generational impact. Canadians knew what the
war cost but there were stark divisions between generations over how to
understand these costs. To those who came of age with the conflict, it
seemed as if their elders did not appreciate the transformative aspect of the
war. Such differences played out in the era’s literature, but the distinctions
between Canada’s literary market and those in England and the U.S.
obscure how formative an event the Great War was for Canada’s young
men and reflect the disillusionment of the war generation.
Canada’s interwar fiction may not have addressed the generational
disillusionment but some writers certainly did. Although disparate, their
critiques of postwar life demonstrate how men’s youth, rather than politics
or profession, defined their understanding of the conflict. Chapter Three
examines how the men who came of age with the war discussed its
aftermath in Canada. The generation’s leading voices were varied. They
included conservative politicians, such as George Drew and Robert
Manion, historians such as Frank Underhill, book reviewers such as Bill
Deacon, and writers such as Will Bird and Frank Parker Day. The papers of
Bird and Deacon also include correspondence from ‘average’ Canadians
whose views aligned closely to these more public men. Collectively, this
diverse group analyzed the war’s memory, the direction of postwar
Canada, and the state of international affairs. Their concerns over another
European conflict were also echoed in the halls of power, but bureaucrats
such as Clifford Clark and O.D. Skelton limited their criticisms to private
memoranda and ministerial advice. The debate Canadians were having
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outside the halls of power reveals the levels of disenchantment of the war
generation with postwar society.
Although maintaining peace remained an overarching goal for the
war generation throughout the interwar period, an inability to prevent
another war was not the leading cause of disillusionment. Rather, the most
disheartened of veterans were disillusioned because postwar Canada failed
to live up to wartime ideals. Returned men fought the war for a ‘square
deal’, but recession and then depression crippled efforts at economic reintegration. Canadian officials continued to promise support for veterans
but, despite such commitments, the veterans felt let down.
Notwithstanding this ongoing political engagement, commitments to
address the problem of the returned man remained vague. These solutions
also failed to address the challenge of postwar unemployment, a leading
cause of the generation’s disenchantment.
Chapter Four discusses how the difficulties in finding jobs impacted
veterans. While any examination of returned men and their failure to find
work during the 1920s and 1930s is hampered by a lack of statistical data,
the available records, particularly those from provincial Soldiers’ Aid
Commissions, reveal that veterans faced a more dire employment situation
than is generally acknowledged. The tendency to cast the interwar era as a
period of boom and bust, framed by the Roaring Twenties and the Dirty
Thirties has masked how unemployment proved an ongoing issue. Yet, for
countless veterans the struggle to find work was real and, by the time of the
Depression, it had systematically undermined belief in the war’s meaning.
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An inability to find work was only one contributing factor to the war
generation’s postwar disillusionment. The system of veterans’ assistance
also challenged men’s sense of the war’s purpose. Chapter Five considers
the relationship between the economic challenges veterans faced and their
relationship to wider problems of demobilization and re-establishment.
Between 1914 and 1918, Canada’s leaders made sweeping promises of
support to the country’s soldiers —including a commitment to provide
viable postwar employment. Apart from a rehabilitative program for
invalided soldiers, however, a pension was often the extent of available aid.
Yet, during the 1920s and early 1930s, the vast majority of returned men did
not qualify for a federal pension. For these ‘able-bodied’ men, the only
option for employment assistance was the soldier settlement plans in the
Canadian West and at Kapuskasing, in northern Ontario. While support for
these farming schemes remained strong, they proved ill suited to the needs
of veterans. Their failure was made worse by the veterans’ sense that they
had become lost and abandoned amidst the maze-like layers of the postwar
re-establishment system.
When historians in Canada have considered the ‘problem of the
returned man’, they often focus on the role of the federal government.
Ottawa’s soldier settlement schemes, the pension system, and the
government’s relationship with organized veterans’ associations are all
important parts of this history. Yet, the provinces were just as involved in
programs of re-integration and rehabilitation. Provincial control over health
and education meant that the majority of able-bodied men interacted as
readily with their respective province as they did with Ottawa. Ontario’s
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academic and provincial archives provide critical sources for this
dissertation. Nearly one-third of all soldiers hailed from Ontario and the
sheer size of this contribution forced Queen’s Park to take an active role in
the lives of returned soldiers. It was one of only two provinces that
established a soldier settlement plan (the other was in B.C.), and the only
one to call a royal commission to investigate why a settlement scheme
failed. Ontario’s Soldiers’ Aid Commission was also at the forefront of the
country’s response to re-establishing returned men. The scope of records
that survive from these institutions is second only to those created by the
federal government. In the case of the provincial canteen funds, the records
for Ontario exceed anything surviving in Ottawa or the rest of Canada.
The Ontario source base complements the federal records and those
from individual veterans. The inter-relationship between the federal
government, the provinces, and returned men is further demonstrated by
the case of Canada’s canteen funds. Chapters Six and Seven present a case
study of Ontario’s fund in particular to illustrate how the problem of the
returned man, veterans’ organizations, and failed efforts by federal and
provincial governments were inextricably linked.
The canteen funds comprised the profits of soldiers’ canteen
purchases while overseas. After the war, they were divided between the
provinces and used to supplement the federal pension system. Chapter Six
traces the history of the fund from its wartime inception to its eventual
disbursement in the late 1920s. Chapter Seven picks up the story in Ontario
specifically and focuses on how men used the fund in the subsequent
decades. The province contributed the largest number of men to the war
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effort and, as a result, received the lion’s share of the fund’s profits. The
surviving records from its canteen files contain thousands of letters written
by returned men and their families which detail how failure to address
veterans’ economic and health challenges affected the family economy,
men’s belief in their position as breadwinner, and their broader
understanding of their generation’s place in society and its relation to the
war’s meaning. Their letters indicate how this generation did not limit its
postwar engagement with the war to commemoration and remembrance.
The war was intimately related to their postwar world and their
correspondence with the canteen fund trustees demonstrates their anger at
its failure to meet their expectations.
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Chapter 1
A Generation of Men
“I knew those at home would never understand … [and we], of the
brotherhood, could understand the soldier but never explain him. All
of us would remain a separate, definite people, as if branded by a
monstrous despotism.”1
- Will Bird, And We Go On (1930)

“Age and differences of age,” the sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt wrote, “are
among the most basic and crucial aspects of human life and determinants of
human destiny.”2 This was the case for those who came of age with the Great
War. The war generation was profoundly shaped by this cataclysmic event.
The experience set it apart from society and influenced its understanding of
the conflict well into old age.
The Lost Generation and its postwar disillusionment is one description
of this generational reaction. Others include the ‘generation of 1914’ and the

1 Will R. Bird, And We Go On: A Memoir of the Great War (Montreal-Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2014), 231.
2 S.N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure (New
Jersey: Transaction, 2009), 21.

19
‘front generation.’3 Whatever the term, the conflict’s transformative power
was widely recognized during and after the war, so much so that British
journalist Philip Gibbs believed the idea influenced “millions of men” across
the Western world. This notion that the Great War forged a distinct
generation took fullest form shortly after the conflict ended, particularly in
the era’s literature and sociological study. It was then that theorists such as
Karl Manheim, who authored a pioneering essay on the formation of
generations in 1923, began to investigate generation as a social category.
Authors, including Ernest Hemingway and Erich Maria Remarque, also
employed the concept in their work, much of which analyzed the war and its
aftermath.4 In the 1920s and 1930s veterans were increasingly troubled by the

3 See for example Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambride: Harvard
University Press, 1979) and Richard Bessell, “The ‘Front Generation’ and the Politics of
Weimar Germany,” in Mark Roseman, ed., Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation
Formation in Germany, 1770-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
4 Karl Manheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Paul Kecskemeti, ed., Karl
Manheim: Essays (London: Routledge, 1952), 276-322. Manheim, along with others such as
José Ortega y Gasset, devoted considerable study to this new interest in generations, helping
to popularize it as a concept. He combined generation with class to demonstrate that
generational groups were framed by more than birth years. Such groupings were formed by
common life-stages as well as historical events. When combined, these two categories were
recognized as critical to the formation of the individual. Such theories appealed to the war
generation because it acknowledged that historic events, such as war, could shape a
generation’s outlook. Manheim’s work gave voice to what this group already sensed: they
were different because of their war experience. The popularity of generation increased as a
result of the war. In the postwar era, generation was understood as more than an historical
force. According to Cynthia Comaccio, it was a “theory of social change as well as a means of
identification.” See Cynthia Comacchio, The Dominion of Youth: Adolescence and the Making of
Modern Canada, 1920 to 1950 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 7.
Hemingway opened his breakthrough novel, The Sun Also Rises, with the epitaph “You are all
a lost generation,” which he attributed to Gertrude Stein. See Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises
(New York: Scribner, 2006 [1926]). He discussed the conversation that led to this comment in
greater detail in A Moveable Feast (New York: Scribner’s, 1964), 25-31. Robert Graves, Goodbye
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absence of a “clear line of thought or conviction” that explained why the
conflict had been fought or what its effects would be. They found themselves
“thinking hard” over the conflict’s meaning, especially since the war’s
outcome lacked the certainty of purpose that originally led them to arms.
And, as their expected postwar lives failed to materialize, they became ever
more critical of its outcome.5
Disillusionment set in, a legacy now embodied in the notion of a Lost
Generation. Whether in Germany, Britain, the U.S., or Canada, after the war
disaffected youths struggled to make sense of the conflict. The British officer
T.E. Lawrence, best known as Lawrence of Arabia, tried for years to distance
himself from his wartime experience. He complained that he could not “get
away” from the war. There was no escape. His friend—the poet and classicist
Robert Graves—suffered similar postwar distress. Lawrence realized that
Graves was “riddled” like an “old table-leg with worms.” Their
contemporary—the writer and poet Siegfried Sassoon—was also troubled
and seemed to Lawrence to be “yawing about like a ship ablack.” He posed a
germane question: “What’s the matter with us all?” Lawrence lamented that
the war infected his generation with a malarial-like disease, which kept
“coming out months and years after in recurrent attacks.”6

to All That (London: Penguin, 1960 [1929]). Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western
Front (New York: Ballantyne, 1982 [1929]).
5 Philip Gibbs, Now It Can Be Told (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920), 513, 519.
6 T.E. Lawrence to Robert Graves, n.d. [possibly 1924], David Garnett, ed., The Letters
of T.E. Lawrence of Arabia (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), 463.
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In his war novel, All Quiet on the Western Front, perhaps the most
famous piece of war literature written by an ex-combatant, Remarque
grappled with a similar sense of disenchantment. He linked the war and the
idea of generation directly. As the epitaph explained, his book intended to
“tell of a generation of men who, even though they may have escaped shells,
were destroyed by the war.”7 This sense that even the survivors were
destroyed by the war resonated deeply for those reeling from loss.
Individuals, families, and communities had all suffered. A lost generation,
whatever its individual definition, served as an all-encompassing idea that
helped society share in the trauma of the war.
For years after the conflict ended, the war generation found itself
haunted by memories. Strive as they might, these men struggled to give their
recollections meaningful shape. Lawrence remained troubled by how the
memory of the Great War dwarfed those of all “other wars, so that they seem
trivial, half-amusing incidents.” By 1923, he admitted that his war experience
was a “nightmare.” He tried in vain to exorcize the demons by writing a
memoir, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1922), but the process led him to go “off
[his] head.” As he explained to Graves, he failed to find “peace of mind.”8
While Lawrence never succeeded in coming to terms with his war
experience, other writers, including Robert Graves, had more success. His
memoir, Goodbye to All That, resonated with his peers because it said
“something that all our generation is trying to say.” Even Lawrence was able

7 Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (New York: Ballantine, 1987), n.p.
8 Lawrence to Graves, 8 September 1923, Letters of T.E. Lawrence, 430-431.
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to identify with Graves’ book.9 But, while some writers produced work that
spoke to the war generation, most published material which presented a
distorted view of the conflict. The desire for explanations of the war increased
after 1918 and publishing houses attempted to feed demand with accounts
and depictions of all types. The resulting histories and overviews, however,
added little clarity. They tried to explain the conflict’s causes, conduct, and
strategy, but offered little about what the war was like as a human
experience. These accounts lacked the sense of personal perspective required
to understand its impact on the men who lived it.
The novels and memoirs of the war generation provided an antidote to
strategic histories. But they were about more than an individual’s war
experience. They personalized the conflict at the expense of discussion of the
war’s wider context or causes. Remarque’s All Quiet, for example, is not a
novel about Germany at war. Rather, it begins and ends with the life of its
main character, Paul Bäumer. The same is true of Edmund Blunden’s
Undertones of War. It opens with Blunden joining the war and ends not with
11 November, but when he returns to England in March 1918.10 Canadian
works followed a similar pattern. James Pedley’s memoir, Only This (1927),
begins in France and ends with the Hundred Days, after Pedley is wounded.11
Charles Yale Harrison’s Generals Die in Bed (1930) starts with its main
character’s enlistment in Montreal and ends with his wounding in 1918. Will

9 Lawrence to Graves, 5 May 1929, Letters of T.E. Lawrence, 658.
10 Samuel Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (London:
Random House, 1990), 426.
11 James Pedley, Only This: A War Retrospect (Ottawa: Graphic, 1927).
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Bird’s memoir, And We Go On (1930), is similarly focused on his war
experience. It opens with Bird’s attempt to enlist and ends aboard a troop
ship as he returns to Canada.12 These books did not explain what the war was
about. They described what it was like to experience.
This literary exploration of the war highlighted the importance of
youth to veterans’ understanding of the conflict. Harrison dedicated his book
to “the bewildered youths—British, Australian, Canadian, and German—who
were killed in that wood a few miles beyond Amiens on August 8, 1918.”13
His intentions were similar to those of Remarque, who felt critics
misunderstood All Quiet by mistakenly interpreting the book as a study of the
war rather than its intended purpose—an examination of the war’s impact on
the young men who lived it. In Germany, Remarque was so riled by this
misinterpretation that he wrote a sequel, The Road Back, which clarified his
original intention: “I merely wanted to awaken understanding for a
generation that more than all others had found it difficult to make its way
back from four years of death, struggle, and terror, to the peaceful fields of
work and progress.”14
The driving force behind this generational identity was an
interconnected relationship that hinged on age, memory, and experience. The
majority of men who went to war between 1914 and 1918 were young and

12 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed (London: Noel Douglas, 1930).
13 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, n.p.
14 Remarque, quoted in Modris Eksteins, The Rites of Spring: The Great War and the
Birth of the Modern Age (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), 283.
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their youth was integral to their future self-identification as the generation of
1914. In Canada, most men who enlisted were under thirty, and the majority
of these (nearly fifty percent) were between eighteen and twenty-four years of
age.15 These are critical ages in the development of an adult’s sense of self
because, as Howard Schuman and Amy Coring argue, they constitute a key
period for the “formation of long-term memories.”16 They also coincide with
the peak reference points for collective memories. For these men, the war
experience had a unique and powerful impact on their development.17 It
primed them to understand the war’s importance differently than those older
or younger. While young men were not the only group to draw lessons from
the experience, their age meant that the war retained a unique position as a
remembered event in their adult lives. This shared experience simultaneously
united and separated the war generation from the rest of society.

15 See Figure 1. Data derived from the LAC CEF Service File open data set and
figures from the Canadian Great War Project. See www.canadiangreatwarproject.com
16 Howard Schuman and Amy Coring, “Collective Memory and Autobiographical
Memory: Similar But Not the Same,” Memory Studies 7:2 (2014): 146. See too Schuman’s
earlier work with Jacqueline Scott, “Generations and Collective Memory,” American
Sociological Review 54 (June 1989): 359-81.
17 Schuman and Coring, “Collective Memory and Autobiographical Memory,” 151.
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The relationship between early adulthood and the formation of an
individual’s identity was not exclusive to the war generation. What set it
apart, however, was a collective inability to explain the war to the rest of
society. From the time they returned home, veterans argued that those who
were not there could “never understand” the conflict.18 “You in Canada with
your reading of the war,” Canadian Group of Seven painter F.H. Varley
maintained, “cannot realize at all what war is like.” Varley only reached
France in the latter stages of 1918, but he was a keen observer and his
accounts make it clear that he was not spared the conflict’s horrors.19 The

18 Will R. Bird, And We Go On (Toronto: Hunter-Rose, 1930), 342.
19 His letters home contain vivid descriptions of ghastly scenes. Some of the most
disturbing describe “turned up graves,” with “freakishly mutilated” dead, some “[h]eadless,
legless, [or] stomachless,” and others a “perfect body and a passive face,” save for a “broken
empty skull.” See LAC, MG 30 D401 [Hereafter Varley papers], Vol. 1, folder D, Varley to
Maud, n.d. These observations date from Varley’s time as an official war artist. His baptism
of fire came during the carnage of the Last Hundred Days, which were witness to some of the
most difficult fighting of the entire conflict. During that period the Canadian Corps suffered
42,600 casualties, most of which, Tim Cook points out, would have been sustained by the
infantry “at the sharp end,” who numbered 50,000 men. See Tim Cook, Shock Troops:
Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918 (Toronto: Viking, 2008), 552. Jack Granatstein cites
similar figures, noting that the Corps suffered 45,83 killed, wounded, or missing between 8
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sights he witnessed convinced him of the relationship between direct
experience and a detached understanding of the war. Anybody wishing to
make sense of the experience, he told his wife Maud, had to both “see it &
live it.” Otherwise, “you cannot know.”20 Varley’s descriptions of the brutal
realities of trench warfare were as detailed as any personal account, but even
vivid details were incapable of conveying what the war was truly like.21
Veterans brought this belief in an experiential gulf home with them.22
It was not only painful to relive and attempt to relay to others; it was also
futile. “[He] talked about the experience of those four years to nobody,” John
Berger recalled about his father’s postwar silence.23 Will Bird’s daughter
remembered her father refusing to talk about the war. Instead, he dealt with it

August 1918 and 11 November. See J.L. Granatstein, The Greatest Victory: Canada’s One
Hundred Days, 1918 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2014), 174. See too Shane Schreiber,
Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War (St.
Catharine’s: Vanwell, 2004).
20 LAC, Varley papers, Vol. 1, folder D, Varley to Maud, n.d. Such observations were
not limited to Canadians, or to the ground war. In his well regarded memoir, V.M. Yeates
wrote about the air war that “‘It’s no use telling the truth … They won’t believe it. They have
to find it out for themselves.’” Yeates, Winged Victory (London: Grub Street, 2005 [1934]), 13.
21 Varley’s literary descriptions carry special weight during this period because,
although officially in France as a war artist, he was seriously considering writing as a new
career. See his letters to Maud for 1918 for multiple examples of his belief in his literary
prospects, LAC, Varley papers, Vol. 1, letters to Maud, 1918.
22 Will Bird described how men worried about talking to their families on his boat
ride home. “I had been trying to imagine how I would express my feelings when I got home,”
he wrote, “and now I knew I never could, none of us could.” See Bird, And We Go On, (Rose),
342.
23 John Berger, “Preface” to Gabriel Chevalier, Fear: A Novel of World War I (New
York: New York Review Books, 2011), xiv.
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internally and “sometimes shouted in his sleep.”24 Charles Yale Harrison
suffered “depression, alcohol and drug abuse, and writer’s block in later
life.”25 Varley told Maud that he felt “handicapped” when it came to telling
her about the war.26 Bird, who was perhaps the most prolific of Canada’s war
writers, summed up his generation’s inability to describe its experiences
when he explained that returned men were doomed to live “in a world apart,
prisoners, in chains that would never loosen.”27
Each veteran’s isolation was different. Some distanced themselves
when writing letters home from the front. Others did so once they returned to
Canada. But no matter when their alienation occurred, it became an accepted
and common trait that the veterans refused to talk about their war
experiences.28 This reluctance was interpreted as a product of a generation

24 David Williams, “Introduction” to Bird, And We Go On (MQUP), xviii.
25 Peter Webb, “Occupants of Memory: War in Twentieth-Century Canadian Fiction”
(Ph.D. diss., Ottawa, 2007), 89.
26 LAC, Varley papers, Vol. 1, Varley to Maud, n.d., “Usual address in London.”
Canadians were not alone in their inability to describe the war. British writer Richard
Aldington wrote about a similar inability to write about the war: “Those who have attempted
to convey any real war experience … must have felt the torturing sense of something
incommunicable.” Aldington quoted in Hynes, A War Imagined, 424.
27 Bird, And We Go On (Rose), 342.
28 A.Y. Jackson is an example of the many men who began to self-censor as soon as
they began corresponding with their families. His letters to his family are long and often
detailed aspects of life overseas, but they omit the worst of his experiences in favour of
recycled stories and assurances that he was doing well. In reality, however, the war was
taking a serious toll, both physically and psychologically. He admitted as much to his friend
and mentor J.E.H Macdonald in 1916, telling him how “You feel at times so very insignificant”
and that trench warfare was “exasperating, it rouses no martial ardour within you. You may
get blown to bits five miles back from the trenches, and be quite safe in the trenches, a
hundred yards from the Hun. I don’t know what effect it is having on me. My emotions are
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and era in which men did not communicate their feelings. For others, it was
viewed as a coping mechanism. According to Ted Barris, men could “never
tell the rough stories, the remembrances of destruction,” or “revisit the
moments of death and dying” which risked bringing back the horrors. They
needed to remain stoic and “under no circumstances” could they let loved
ones see them “break down and cry.” Men protected their families “from the
truth” by recalling only the war’s antics, quirky tales, or “the odd near
miss.”29
The silence of the war generation made it easier to bury the “fear,
hardship and suffering.” According to General E.M.L. Burns, nobody
“want[ed] to remember that he was afraid; to remember the death of
comrades, the man beside one cut off from life in a second by a rifle or
machine-gun bullet, an exploding shell’s conversion of the human body from
the image of God to offal.” It was a “merciful dispensation,” Burns explained
in his memoir, General Mud, that humans were capable of remembering the
good in place of the bad.30 Manipulating memories helped men dwell on

not stirred very much by it. I don’t feel heroic in the least. … It’s all so complicated and far
away as it is. We have not heroes, and we don’t know nothing except what we see in the
newspapers, and we know that’s not true.” See LAC, MacDonald papers, Vol 1, folder 2,
Jackson to MacDonald, 31 May 1916.
29 Ted Barris, Breaking the Silence: Veterans’ Untold Stories from the Great War to
Afghanistan (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2009), 11.
30 Lt-Gen. E.M.L. Burns, General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto: Clarke,
Irwin & Co., 1970), 7. During his distinguished career, Burns served as a signal officer and
staff captain in the First World War, as Commander of the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy during
the Second World War, and finally as Commander of the United Nations forces during the
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) mission to the Suez in 1957. Leslie Frost had
similar recollections and described men’s ability to suppress the war’s worst memories as
follows: “It is a normal human reaction to avoid the painful descriptions and concentrate on
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happier, “funny incidents” and recollections of “better times.” These coping
strategies, however, further obscured the links between experience and
understanding.
Attempts to understand this generation and its sense of
disillusionment have produced considerable scholarship.31 Much of this work,
including Samuel Hynes’ A War Imagined (1990), argued that the war’s
survivors were “shocked, disillusioned and embittered by their war
experiences.” In an earlier book, Stanley Cooperman argued that the impact
of the war was “unparalleled” because it “shattered a cultural universe and
… shaped the literature of a generation.”32 John W. Aldridge believed that
authors such as Hemingway wrote under the influence “of the climate of
war” and that his generation was both “lost” and “profoundly affected by

the light and humourous side of the conflict.” See Frost, Fighting Men (Toronto: Clarke &
Irwin, 1967), 151. Robert Taylor also notes this trend, observing that Victoria’s veterans
“prefer[ed] to recall service incidents that were amusing—probably a universal phenomenon.”
See Robert Ratcliffe Taylor, The Ones Who Have to Pay: The Soldier-Poets of Victoria BC in the
Great War 1914-1918 (Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2013), 70.
31 In addition to the cited work by Bond, Bourke, Eksteins, Fussell, Hynes, Meyer,
Watson, and Winter, see too for example Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker,
1914-1918: Understanding the Great War (London: Profile Books, 2012); Jean-Jacque Becker, The
Great War and the French People (Oxford: Berg, 1993); Douglas Mackaman and Michael Mays,
eds., World War I and the Cultures of Modernity (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000);
Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Review,
2002); Daniel Sherman, The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1999); Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon
and London, 2005); Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European
Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
32 Stanley Cooperman, World War I and the American Novel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1967), vii.
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[the war] as well as by the literary movements they stimulated.”33 According
to Hynes, the war generation’s critical portrayal of the conflict rejected the
values of prewar society and “separated their own generation from the past
and from their cultural inheritance.” This particular version of history took
form as a “Myth of the War” and resulted in a constructed tale that confirmed
“what the war was and what it meant.”34 The generation was disillusioned
because its war had “shattered the possibility of pursuing what society would
consider a normal existence.” And, as Modris Eksteins argued, their literary
efforts to deal with this disenchantment explored how the war “destroyed the
ties, psychological, moral, and real, between the generation at the front and
society at home.”35
Recognition of the generation’s disillusionment was immediate. In
1922 the English journalist C.E. Montague published Disenchantment, one of
the earliest critiques of the war’s conduct. Reviewers of the war books also
noted the generation’s disaffection. Towards the end of the 1930s David
Garnett, the English writer and publisher, summed up how this literature was
received: it was the product of “the disgust and bitterness of the generation
which had fought and won the war and which found all it had fought for was
betrayed.”36 By the 1960s, the war generation’s disillusionment was widely

33 John W. Aldridge, After the Lost Generation: A Critical Study of the Writers of Two
World Wars (New York: Noonday Press, 1959), x.
34 Hynes, A War imagined, xi-xii.
35 Eksteins, Rites of Spring, 282.
36 David Garnett, ed., “Introduction to Part Three,” Letters of T.E. Lawrence, 262.
Garnett’s reference to the generation’s disillusionment, their ‘disgust and bitterness’ is an
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accepted. As Barbara Tuchman argued in The Guns of August (1962), “the war
had many diverse results and one dominant one transcending all others:
disillusion.”37
In the 1970s, acceptance of disillusionment became so entrenched that
it was cited as explanation for wider social and political events. Paul Fussell’s
highly influential evaluation of the war’s cultural impact, The Great War and
Modern Memory (1976), linked the generation’s sense of disillusion to its
literary embrace of irony, which he believed was central to the cultural
memory of the war.38 Modris Eksteins expanded this argument for the war’s
influence on modern memory in The Rites of Spring, which argued that the
generation’s disenchantment was integral to the development of twentiethcentury modernism.39 The idea of a lost, or disillusioned generation, however,
is not without its critics.
Some of the most pointed critiques of postwar disillusionment argue
that the literary output of the so-called ‘lost generation’ was not
representative of its era. The average soldier did not possess the same levels
of education as a T.E. Lawrence, Robert Graves, or Siegfried Sassoon. These
‘elite’ literary accounts, however insightful, are dismissed by scholars such as
Rosa Maria Bracco for being “highbrow” and disconnected from the general

important reminder that such references preceded their popularity in the decades following
1950.
37 Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Ballantine, 1994 [1962]), 440.
38 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977), 28-31.
39 Eksteins, Rites of Spring.
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sentiments of readers in the 1920s and 1930s. In place of an educated lost
generation, Bracco calls for an examination of middlebrow authors, who, she
argues, were more representative of how the general public understood the
war. Their works, which continued to employ traditional concepts of honour
and heroism, were more conventional and less critical of the conflict.40 The
middlebrow version of the war, Janet K. Watson argues, reflected the
existence of “different wars” which, if not dismissed by historians, can add
new voices to the history of the war’s aftermath. The focus on a specific group
of war writers, she claims, has unduly “narrowed” historical perceptions of
the “culturally legitimate experience” of the war. In response, Watson calls
for more emphasis on experiences outside the front-line trenches. The efforts
of these non-combatant roles, including nursing and munitions work, were
valuable. Too often, however, these efforts are viewed as secondary to frontline experience, resulting in the marginalization of “alternative views,”
especially the roles of women, labourers, and others not clearly defined as
“the soldier in the trenches.”41
The use of literary sources and personal accounts to make sense of the
war’s meaning has also been criticized for distorting the postwar handling of
the conflict. Brian Bond criticizes the focus on war books as a study of
“individuals.” His research considers how men in the British army understood
the war while it was being waged. Bond concedes that “numerous”

40 See for example Rosa Maria Bracco, Merchants of Hope: British Middlebrow Writers
and the First World War, 1919-1939 (Oxford: Berg, 1993) and Betwixt and Between: Middle Brow
Fiction and English Society in the Twenties and Thirties (History Department: University of
Melbourne, 1990) for examples relating to privileging of a select group of British authors.
41 Watson, Fighting Different Wars, 186
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individual accounts exist to support the disenchantment thesis, but argues
that concentrating on them exclusively obscures the fact that the military was
composed of “groups” and that collective morale remained high throughout
the war.42 David Reynolds is equally dismissive of the value of personal
accounts. “Reducing the war conflict to personal tragedies,” he argues, has
resulted in a loss of “the big picture.” The war’s history has been “distilled
into poetry.” Reynolds also takes issue with the focus on commemoration and
mourning, which has further obscured the “direct” impacts of the war. The
dead may well have seemed ever-present in the aftermath of the conflict but
“life went on after 1918.”43
Such criticisms hinge on the argument that these disillusioned works
are poor guides to the war’s history. Personal experiences offered vivid
descriptions of the horrors of war, but they “largely evaded the crucial issues
of what the war was ‘about’ – both on the political and strategic levels.” In
Bond’s view, historians who rely too heavily on these accounts fail to
acknowledge the limits of their sources. Their subsequent evaluations present
a skewed appraisal of the war’s history that assumes the “anti-war” writers
were synonymous with those of wider society.44
Ironically, the war generation would have likely agreed with this
assessment. These ‘lost’ writers never intended to produce explanations of the

42 Brian Bond, The Unquiet Western Front: Britain’s Role in Literature and History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14. Emphasis original.
43 David Reynolds, The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), xv-xvi.
44 Bond, The Unquiet Western Front, 28.
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war that resonated with society writ large. Although read by the wider
public, their books were written with a more limited goal: to explain how the
war personally impacted them. In short, their books, novels, and diaries
helped shape their memories.45 The need to bear witness to their time at war
reflected a strong desire to record, or testify, to the experience.46 Some, like
Canadian artilleryman Wilfrid Kerr, wished to record his generation’s
“thoughts, mental attitudes, [and] reactions” for posterity. Kerr hoped that if
he shared his knowledge of the war, then it would ensure that the “coming
generation” might better understand what his had gone through.47 Others
focused directly on their own experience, including Robert Graves, whose
intention for his memoir was to present “the fate of a generation of young
men who, at the critical age when they were just beginning to feel the pulse of
life, were set face to face with death.”48
In addition to disillusionment, these writers were also united by a
belief in a collective generational identity.49 As Robert Wohl argued, the idea
that the war forged a “generation of 1914” resonated in the two decades that

45 Smith, The Embattled Self, 13.
46 Canada’s Will Bird, for instance, penned his memoir to examine the “psychic
effect it had on its participants.” See Bird, And We Go On (Rose), 4. Smith, The Embattled Self,
especially chapter four, “The Novel and the Search for closure,” 148-194.
47 Wilfred Kerr, “Foreword” to Shrieks and Crashes: The Memoir of Wilfred Kerr,
Canadian Field Artillery, 1917 (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2005 [1929]), n.p.
48 Graves to General Ian Hamilton, cited in Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979), 106-107.
49 Bond argues that not all of the generation’s writers identified as disillusioned, but
he does not address their wider generational identification. See Bond, The Unquiet Western
Front, 33-34.
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followed. His examination emphasized the elite status of the lost generation
authors whom he concluded were never more than a “minority within the
elite of the European educated classes.” But he went on to note that their
status “in no way annuls the importance that this idea had in the history and
consciousness of Europeans,” especially for those who came of age during the
war. The popularity of generational thinking, or “generationalism,” remained
one of their “most widespread and deeply enrooted convictions.” The
postwar emergence of a transnational ‘generation of 1914’ coincided with a
“wave of generational thinking.” As a concept, Wohl argues, generation came
into its own in tandem with the Great War and he identifies three of the most
prominent generational theorists from the period: François Mentré, Karl
Mannheim, and José Ortega y Gasset. Wohl claims that their appeal was
rooted in an “ideology of youth,” which operated on the premise that “youth
was a superior stage of life, beyond which lay degeneration.” For Wohl, the
youth of the generation of 1914 was central to its collective identity. Those
who survived could more easily divide their lives into pre and post-war,
categories that equated with life stages: “youth, young manhood, and
maturity.”50
More recent scholarship supports Wohl’s conclusions. Joanna Bourke
is critical of ideas of disillusion, but she also recognizes that British men who
came of age with the war developed a strong generational consciousness.
Bourke outlines how men’s bodies were endowed with signs of “age,

50 Wohl, The Generation of 1914, 208, 210, 236-37.
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generation, class and ethnicity.”51 She argues that the war provoked a “major
crisis” in British men, which was the result of a need to “reassert manliness”
in a society “undergoing rapid change.”52 Many were bitter about such
changes, but their “bitterness was only one response to wartime experience.”
Her work challenges romanticized portrayals of the importance of wartime
comradeship and she finds that servicemen were often alienated from each
other. Nonetheless, she contends that a generation of men “were
transformed” by the experience and that their “aesthetics of the body”
reflected these changes.53
Jessica Meyer’s work locates similar links between generation and
masculinity. Her study clarifies the relationship between crisis and
disillusionment. According to Meyer, men used their experiences in the Great
War to “define themselves as men.”54 While the conflict raged, they viewed
their experiences as transformative, creating “healthy, broad-minded men.”
More negative views of the war were only expressed after it ended.55 Disabled

51 Joanna Burke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain, and the Great War
(London: Reaktion Books, 1996), 11.
52 Bourke, Dismembering the Male, 13-14.
53 Bourke, Dismembering the Male, 19-20.
54 Jessica Meyer, Men of War: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2. See too Meyer, “‘The Tuition of Manhood: ‘Sapper’s’ Fiction
and the Literature of War” in Mary Hammond and Shafquat Towheed , eds., Publishing in the
First World War: Essays in Book History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 113-128.
55 See too Stephen Cullen, “Gender and the Great War: British combatants,
masculinity and perceptions of women, 1918-1939,” (PhD Diss., Oxford, 1998) and Cullen,
“‘The Land of My Dreams,’ The Gendered Utopian Dreams and Disenchantment of British
Literary Ex-Combatants of the Great War,” Cultural and Social History 8:2 (2011): 195-221.
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veterans, for example, found that their wounds undermined ideals of heroic
service and domestic and financial independence. Similarly, Meyer argues
that many of the ambivalent sentiments found in wartime sources were reconceptualized after the war as postwar disillusion. Despite the varying
nature of men's recollections, the conflict “remained a seminal moment.”
Although she does not address the existence of a lost generation, Meyer
concludes that the “war changed men.” Whether through death, physical
injury, a developing sense of maturity, or the broadening of horizons, men
saw themselves as different, the recognition of which caused them to
“construct themselves as a separate generation.”56
Australian and New Zealand historians have reached similar
conclusions about the importance of youth, experience, and a generational
understanding of the war’s meaning. Bill Gammage argued that “war and
youth had bound men closely.”57 Having bonded while overseas, this
generation struggled to come to terms with the war’s aftermath. According to
Gammage, what these men achieved during the war
did not immediately concern most soldiers. They confronted
their return to civilian life, and the war and their own
expectations had ill equipped them for this. … Some soldiers, at
a disadvantage beside those who had never sailed to defend
their country, feared to become civilians again. They felt lost in

56 Meyer, Men of War, 127, 160-162.
57 Bill Gammage, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War (Canberra:
Australian National University Press, 1974), 266.

38
a community that could not use the skilled trades of war, and
they dreaded a new fight for a livelihood.58
Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) veterans believed their
wartime ideals were part of their common experience. When the rest of
society failed to see this, the generation “stood apart” until it seemed “to
some that the war in Europe had created ‘a nation within a nation’” to which
only veterans were admitted. “They had become men apart” whose isolation
was as much a matter of pride as a burden. 59
Despite criticism of the disillusionment thesis, historical consensus is
emerging that age influenced how “people experienced and responded to the
war.” These different understandings were generational, with each cohort
interpreting the conflict “through the prism of its own preoccupations.” 60 In
Canada, however, debate about the lost generation, and indeed the crucial
link between war and generation, has been largely ignored. Canadian
historians have never made the case for the war’s generational impact.
Instead, they have embraced a nation-building narrative which argues that
the Great War was a painful but important step forward in Canada’s
inexorable march from colony to nation. These nationalistic blinders have
resulted in the privileging of certain voices over others. One result is an
assumption that English Canada’s view of the war was largely homogenous.
Indeed, with the possible exception of some voices of opposition in rural

58 Gammage, Broken Years, 269.
59 Gammage, Broken Years, 274-75.
60 Toby Thacker, British Culture and the First World War: Experience, Representation and
Memory (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 8-9, 268.
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farming communities, left-wing radicals, and pacifists,61 it is generally argued
that Canadians’ postwar understanding of the war was positive and cut
across the boundaries of “region, class, religion, and generation.”62 As a
result, the idea of a war generation has never taken hold in Canada. Instead,
historians continued to revisit an entrenched narrative that casts Canada’s
soldiers as heroes, charting the nation’s path up and down Vimy Ridge.63
The claim that Canada ‘matured’ during wartime is not new. Early
iterations of the thesis date to the Boer War when Colonel George T. Denison,
a leader of the Canada First movement, suggested that Canada had a duty to
send troops in aid of Britain because Canadians had “been children long
enough” and it was time “to show the empire that we have grown to
manhood.”64 By the time of the Great War, Max Aitken’s Canada in Flanders
expanded the argument by associating the quality of Canada’s “manhood”
with its battlefield successes, especially during the defense of Ypres in 1915. 65

61 See for example the debates over masculinity and self-worth that Robert Stead
explores with his character Gander in Grain (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2010 [1926]).
62 Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 40.
63 At his 2014 Joanne Goodman Lectures, Ian McKay cast the prevalence of this myth
as “Vimyism.”
64 Colonel T. Denison cited in Gwynne Dyer, Canada in the Great Power Game, 19142014 (Toronto: Random House, 2014), 10.
65 Max Aitken, Canada in Flanders: The Official Story of the Canadian Expeditionary Force,
Vol. I (Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916), 3. General Sir Arthur Currie made similar
postwar statements. In an open letter in a reconstruction newsletter, Back to Mufti, he wrote
that Canadian men “have made permanently secure the freedom and prosperity of the
country. They have written ‘Canada’ in bold outstanding letters in the world’s roll of honour.
They have secured Canada the right to speak as a nation admired and respected in the
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Subsequent postwar histories, such as George Drew’s Canada’s Fighting
Airmen, extended the thesis beyond the battlefield. The country’s airmen,
Drew noted proudly, performed “out of all proportion to her population”
and their deeds were requisite in “building the character of the nation.”66 This
“unfortunate identification” of the Canadian people with the Canadian state
continued well into the 1970s, when Russell Hann recognized that the
conflation of individual Canadians and their country’s nationhood remained
a “popular view of the meaning of the war.”67
Arthur Lower pioneered the “colony to nation” thesis in the 1940s and
1950s. He saw the war as the catalyst for Canada’s postwar nationalism. But
the picture he painted did not present Canada as emerging fully formed from
the war. Rather, the trenches of France and Flanders only gave birth to the
“spirit of Canadian nationalism.” Despite being dated, Lower’s work
remains one of the most valuable contributions to the historiography of
Canada’s veterans. His account of postwar nationalism was not blind to the
challenges and disenchantment following 1918, which he linked in early
evaluations of the war and its national impact. According to Lower, the war
generation was the most affected by this spiritual awakening. These men
were exposed to European culture, an experience that ultimately killed the

concert of nations.” See “A Stirring Peace Message,” Back to Mufti: A Magazine in the interests
of Canadians who have been ‘Over There’ 1:1 (February 1919), 3.
66 George Drew, Canada’s Fighting Airmen (Toronto: Maclean, 1930) 2, 10.
67 Russell G. Hann, “Introduction,” The Great War and Canadian Society, 25.
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nation’s “old parochialism,” and which, “for better or worse,” led Canadians
to tear themselves “loose from [the] simplicity” of an earlier era.68
The ‘spirit’ Lower identified still had to mature after the war and he
did not hesitate discussing how veterans were forced to struggle in the years
that followed. These men did not seem to fit into society. Instead of reintegrating they “began to prove ‘difficult.’” Lower believed they were
struggling because they had “outgrown the stuffiness of the lower-middleclass society that marked most of Canada.” Their distemper “accelerated”
postwar change. Lower explained the anger and disenchantment of veterans
in postwar society by arguing that domestic Canada failed to understand how
the war changed their outlook and expectations. While the war touched
households across the country, those who stayed home missed a “deep
spiritual experience” and they remained comparatively untouched by the
spirit of reform. As a result, “much of the generous gain that might have
come out of World War I, from a sense of duty done, and gratuitously done,
was frittered away.” 69
Lower lived through this ‘frittering’. He served in the navy during the
war and believed himself too close to the events in question to offer a
“complete assessment” of its history.70 His account of the war’s aftermath
nonetheless presented an early discussion of disenchantment. Lower pointed

68 Arthur Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green,
and Co., 1946) 459-460.
69 Lower, Canadians in the Making: A Social History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1958), 405-406.
70 Lower, Canadians in the Making, 405-406.
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out that at least a third of those who served overseas were wounded and that
“the broken soldier became a familiar sight.” Their wounds were physical, as
well as psychological and spiritual, and Lower believed the latter could be as
“serious as the physical.” He also noted that returned men were restless and
“burned out.” During the late 1920s and early 1930’s, he wrote, “the deaths of
ex-service men in their forties were reported with inescapable frequency.”71
By linking disenchantment with the suffering of veterans in the war’s
aftermath, Lower presented one of the earliest descriptions of Canada’s war
generation.72 Few of his peers followed suit, however, and work by his
immediate contemporaries ignored veterans and their reactions to the
conflict. In the 1960s, when critics in Britain and the US devoted considerable
attention to the war’s generational legacy, Canadian historians, such as W.L.
Morton, rejected these same links among the war, disillusion, and
generational identity. Morton’s The Kingdom of Canada (1963), which
completely ignored veterans, moved from an analysis of the war years and
the immediate aftermath to labour unrest, Canada’s push for representation

71 Lower, Colony to Nation, 459-460.
72 Another historian of the era, Donald Creighton, made vague attempts to capture
the tenor of the era, but his efforts lacked Lower’s specificity. In his general history of Canada,
Dominion of the North (1944), Creighton identified the “angry ambiguities” and the “profound
unsettlement” of the early postwar years, but did little more than attribute them to the war’s
“tragic legacy.” See Donald Creighton, Dominion of the North: A History of Canada, Revised
Edition (Toronto: Macmillan, 1957), 455, 471. Later analysis in Canada’s First Century (1970)
continued in the same vein. Creighton recognized that the years following 1918 were filled
with “confusing economic and social turmoil,” but apart from arguing that this awakened “a
sullen feeling of injustice in many Canadians,” he devoted no discussion to how the war
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unaddressed. See Creighton, Canada’s First Century, 1867-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970),
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on the Imperial War Cabinet, and a position at the Paris Peace Conference
and in the League of Nations.73 His study of the 1920s was even more
dismissive of the war’s generational impact. It concluded that Canadians
were not disillusioned and asserted that the war did not create a collective
generational identity. Instead of producing a disillusioned “Anthem for
Doomed Youth,” Canada’s literary output failed to account for the war.74
Canadians in the 1920s were “backwards in mind,” and their literature was
incapable of accounting for the country’s “fierce transition” from the
Victorian to the modern era. Critically, Morton’s explanation for this failure
rested on the assumption that the country had escaped the “psychological
impact of the Great War.”75 Yet, in spite of the certainty of his conclusion,

73 W.L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from the Earliest Times
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), 428-431.
74 Wilfred Owen, “Anthem for a Doomed Youth,” in Jon Silkin, ed., The Penguin Book
of First World War Poetry, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1982), 183-184.
75 W.L. Morton, “1920s,” in J.M.S. Careless and R. Craig Brown, eds., The Canadians
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), 226. Studies of Canadian literature also ignore the war’s
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war influenced the conflict’s meaning remains as underdeveloped as the historiography.
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Morton provided little evidence for his assertions. He declared that there was
an absence of disillusionment in Canada and claimed that this explained the
differences between Canada and its allies’ postwar experiences. He did not
cite Canadian war literature or authors critical of postwar Canada. The only
novelist referenced by Morton was Morley Callaghan, who was born in 1903,
and not old enough to take part in the war. By equating disillusionment with
generation, and then by offhandedly rejecting both, Morton’s analysis
separated Canada’s experience from other Western nations. The ensuing
historiography has continued to support Morton’s reading and there has been
almost no consideration of generation in Canada’s Great War experience.
In their contribution to the Centenary Series, Canada, 1922-1939:
Decades of Discord (1985), Allen Seager and John Thompson echoed Morton in
equating generation with disillusionment. They argued that Canadians
escaped the “bitter cynicism” of the lost generation so characteristic of
Western Europe and the US. In its place Canadians “celebrate[d] their native
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land” in a wave of postwar nationalism.76 In another book, Thompson argued
that the war was a catalyst for regional nationalism. “Western Canada,” he
wrote “‘came of age’ within the Dominion in the same way that Canada itself
matured within the Empire and the international community.”77
Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook’s A Nation Transformed also overlooked
how returned men understood the war. These historians concluded that “the
patriotism and idealism let loose by the war centered on the idea of building
a better Canadian nation. Only in this fashion could the great sacrifices of the
war be repaid.” Despite noting that the war unleashed underlying tensions in
terms of race, class, region, and ethnicity, Brown and Cook shrugged off
veterans’ grievances as mere “problems of demobilization.”78 The generations
in other countries—including Britain and the U.S.—may have been
disillusioned, but the “predominant Canadian view,” Christopher Moore
notes, “vehemently denied the war had been meaningless.”79

76 Allen Seager and John Herd Thompson, Canada, 1922-1939: Decades of Discord
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More recent work makes the same connection. Jonathan Vance argues
that Canadians were not disillusioned by the war. Instead, they continued to
believe in its “transformative power,” especially its “curative” properties
which helped elevate men to “saviour status.”80 According to Jeff Keshen,
civilians resisted disillusionment because, in public, the war “still constituted
causes for celebration.”81 C.P. Champion also rejects disillusionment,
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believing that it did not take hold until “decades” after the war.82 For Mark
Sheftall, Canada’s postwar nationalism proved “impervious to the contagion
of disenchantment,” in part because no Canadian writers “shared the sense of
post-war disenchantment” present across the Atlantic.83
Canadian historians have touched on the war generation’s
disenchantment in discussions of veterans’ organizations.84 These groups,
which included the Great War Veterans’ Association (GWVA), the Army and
Navy League (ANL), the United Veterans League (UVL), and, later, the
Canadian Legion, struggled throughout the 1920s to mobilize as effective
advocates for veterans. With few exceptions, however, their campaigns,
including the ‘bonus’ campaign and calls for more generous pensions, failed.
Historians have focused on the divisions between the veterans’ movement
and the federal government’s plan to assist men with rehabilitation and reestablishment. In one of the earliest examinations of the veterans’ movement,
James Eayrs criticized the treatment returned men received after 1918.
“What,” he asked “had been bought by all those lives and limbs, seemingly so
recklessly squandered?” He blamed the failure to secure a better postwar life
on the division between veterans’ groups which “unnecessarily retarded the
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formation” of the Canadian Legion. Although he did not push his analysis
further, Eayrs implied that had veterans united sooner, they could have done
more. In place of such advocacy, however, all these men could do was “vent
their anger” at government.85
Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright added to the understanding of
the veterans’ movement with a series of articles that culminated with the
book Winning the Second Battle (1987). It was path-breaking work which
presented the first overview of the GWVA’s formation and its fight with the
federal government to secure more generous assistance for veterans. But it
remains one of the few considerations of Canada’s veterans.86 In fact, with the
exception of Peter Neary’s and Serge Durflinger’s work, few historians have
broached the topic.87 Some historians have devoted additional study to the
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pension question,88 as well as examining the role of veterans in the labour
movements of the interwar period, but these works do not consider the views
of individual men.89
Morton and Wright highlight the importance of the veteran
organizations and their relationships with all levels of government but the
positions of these associations should not be considered synonymous with
those of returned men more generally. The organizations had their own
politics (a fact Lower recognized as early as the 1940s) and their interests did
not always align with those of individual veterans.90 Moreover, the vast
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Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
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favours that they could extract from government. But there were also thousands of exservicemen who did not maintain active associations with veterans’ organizations.” See p.
404.
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majority of returned men did not join a veterans’ organization or the Legion
during the first two decades after war’s end.
Continued focus on the war as the central nation-building event of the
twentieth century has ensured that the personal experiences of men like A.Y.
Jackson have been silenced.91 This situation started to change to an extent in
the 1980s when Canadians began to recognize that the generation’s personal
accounts offered a “distinctly human and personal point of view.”92
Examinations of these testimonies, however, are less concerned with how
these men understood the war and focus instead on how their experiences
support the colony-to-nation thesis. Instead of investigating their relationship
to a generational identity, historians highlight how these experiences
contributed to Canada’s national development. As a result, the war is
presented as more than a formative experience for the country’s young men;
it also acts as a coming-of-age site for the nation.
Nationalist interpretations of the war’s history continue to hold
powerful sway in Canada. Pierre Berton’s popular and influential book Vimy
(1986) directly linked the experiences of Canadians on the battlefield with the
nation’s development. Berton claimed that the war’s battles turned men “into
Canadians.”93 Based on personal interviews with veterans, the book opens
with the onset of battle of Vimy Ridge before examining the Canadian Corps’

91 Gus Richardson, preface to Read, The Great War and Canadian Society, 7.
92 Timothy Humphries, “Over the Top: The Archives of Ontario’s WWI Onsite
Exhibit,” ActiveHistory.ca, 16 September 2014. http://activehistory.ca/2014/09/over-the-topthe-archives-of-ontarios-wwi-onsite-exhibit/#more-13942 Accessed: 16 September 2014.
93 Pierre Berton, Vimy (Toronto: Anchor Books, 2001 [1986]), 292, 297.
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planning and execution of its attack in April 1917.94 The final chapter,
“Aftermath,” broadens the focus to ask if Vimy, and by extension the wider
war, was “worth it.”95 Berton did not think so but he softened this conclusion
by explaining that the war generation would have disagreed. To those who
lived it, he contended, the war remained defensible because it had to be. The
death and devastation required the war have meaning. Otherwise, there was
only disillusionment. When this proved a false hope, Canadians could cling
to notions that the conflict had built their nation: “Because of Vimy, Canada
came of age; because of Vimy, [their] country found its manhood.”96
Recent Canadian scholarship still echoes Berton’s conclusions. Tim
Cook’s two-volume Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1918 (2007, 2008),
uses men’s accounts of their experiences to emphasize Canada’s maturation.
He argues that these sources shed light on the “full experience” of the war,
including “what it meant” to the men themselves.97 Cook’s work is less
deterministic than earlier nationalist scholarship and admits that the war’s
sacrifices nearly “destroyed the country.” But his conclusion that battlefield
successes helped ensure Canada was “forged during the Great War”

94 Berton’s researchers, notably Barbara Sears, conducted more than seventy
interviews with veterans of the battle. See A.B. McKillop, Pierre Berton: A Biography (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 2010), 592.
95. Berton, Vimy, 292
96 Berton, Vimy, 307-308. See too McKillop, Pierre Berton, 593.
97 Cook, At the Sharp End, 2-3.
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continues the link between the study of men’s experiences and the colony-tonation thesis.98
J.L. Granatstein’s The Greatest Victory (2014) seeks to debunk the Vimy
myth by arguing that the Canadian Corps’ victories in 1918— breaking the
Drocourt-Quéant Line, crossing the Canal du Nord, and taking Cambrai,
Valenciennes, and Mons—were more impressive than Canada’s role in April
1917. But while he tries to move Canadians beyond Vimy, Granatstein ends
up linking the wartime prowess of the Corps with the birth of Canadian
nationalism and echoes Berton when he replaces Vimy with the exploits of
the Last Hundred Days to argue that these successes “made Canada anew.”99
The war generation and its importance to Canada’s coming of age are
now so closely integrated into the colony-to-nation thesis that historians have
described the pairing as the historiography’s “core focus.”100 Yet, as important
as individual experiences are to these arguments, the context in which they
are cited remains limited to arguments about the development of the
Canadian state and its military commitments overseas.101 The views of the

98 Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006), 253. Cook reiterates this conclusion
in Shock Troops, stating “Canada had come of age during the war,” 628. Jeff Keshen agrees
that the colony-to-nation thesis continues to remain legitimate. See Keshen, Propaganda and
Censorship, xvii.
99 J.L. Granatstein, The Greatest Victory, 193.
100 Mark Humphries, “Between Commemoration and History: The Historiography
of Canadian Corps and Military Overseas,” Canadian Historical Review, 95:3 (September 2014):
384.
101 In a recent evaluation of Canada’s historiography of the First World War the
dominance of some form of colony-to-nation thesis was acknowledged by Tim Cook, Mark
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war generation have not undergone critical analysis and, despite a heavy
emphasis and interest in the Great War among Canadian historians, there has
not been a corresponding interest in how these men privately understood the
war’s meaning.
The entrenchment of the colony-to-nation thesis became evident in the
reaction of historians David Bercuson and Jonathan Vance had to Robert
Fulford’s review of Niall Ferguson’s The Pity of War in 2000. Ferguson’s book
stirred up controversy for its claim that Britain’s declaration of war was a
colossal mistake, a decision the author called “nothing less than the greatest
error of modern history.” Fulford praised Ferguson’s work and was
impressed that the historian was willing to “judge” the war. His review then
posed a controversial question for Canadians: had their country really come
of age between 1914 and 1918?102 The journalist was well aware of the potency
of Canada’s colony-to-nation narrative and its place in “conventional
wisdom.”103 Fulford admitted, however, that the notion that his country
“became a nation on the battlefields of France,” always struck him as rather
“dubious.” He praised Ferguson’s work for its willingness to ask new

Humphries, Christopher Moore, and Amy Shaw. See Cook, “Battles of the Imagined Past:
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questions of old history. Canadian historians, by contrast, did not seem
interested in a similar project. The war may have been a formative event, but
“dealing with it in a fresh and honest way isn't even on our agenda.” Instead,
Canadians appeared content to “stick with the clichés of the past.”104
Both Bercuson and Vance, two leading Canadian historians,
challenged Fulford’s position. They argued that Ferguson’s work was not a
model to emulate. It engaged in counterfactual history and its thesis was
supported by little more than “science fiction.”105 There was no need to
question the war’s role as a “catalyst that transformed Canada into a nation,”
because it was “true.”106 To make their case, the historians laid out a twopronged defense of the colony-to-nation thesis. Bercuson defended it by
pointing to the “leverage” Canada’s participation gave Prime Minister Robert
Borden in his push for constitutional equality within the British Empire. 107
Vance took a different approach, citing Canadians’ use of the war to create an
independent culture and identity. He also highlighted changes in Canada’s
relationship with Britain, particularly how Canadian authors pushed back
against the wider British cultural influence. “The great Canadian novelists of
the 1920s—Durkin, Ostenso, Grove—,” Vance wrote in defense of an
emergent postwar Canadian nationalism, “came into their own because
Canadian readers were no longer satisfied with Ralph Connor’s anglophile

104 Fulford, “Our Darkest Hour,” A18.
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brand of Victorian muscular Christianity.”108 The country, they argued, had
no choice but to join the war. In 1914, Canada was not yet independent and
when Britain was at war Canada was at war. “To suggest today that [the
country] might realistically have chosen another course,” Bercuson wrote,
was “to pretend that Canada was something other than what it was.”109 By
questioning the judgment and reactions of Canadians during and after the
war, Fulford was guilty of using hindsight to frame the past. His critique was
unfair history, offered from the “lofty heights of the present” rather than with
the “eyes, … minds, [and] … hearts” of the generation who lived the war. If
the reactions of Canadians to the war are understood historically, Vance
argued, then “there is nothing mysterious about the persistence of this
cliché.” The war made Canadians “feel distinct from Britain” and to “suggest
otherwise simply because it also produced discord [was] to employ a crude
reductionism.”110 It was incorrect to assume, Vance pointed out, that Canada’s
Great War generation would react to the horror of war as we do today. Rather
than dwell on their losses, the war generation coped by looking to its
positives, which they found “in a new sense of Canadian nationality.”111
Fulford, however, was not asking how Canadian historians already
understood the conflict. He wanted to know how it might be understood
differently. Neither historian offered a new interpretation of the colony-to-

108 Vance, “Turning Point of a Nation.”
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nation thesis because they believed there was no need. The existing thesis
seemed to explain the history sufficiently. The professional historians
rebuffed the journalist, but Fulford raised an important question about the
experience of the veterans. He felt strongly that their experiences justified his
continued skepticism of Canada’s colony-to-nation mythology. The veterans
he knew would never have agreed with either historian. If presented with
this debate, he argued, they “would have snorted with disgust at the idea that
the calamity in which they took part was an act of nation-building.”112
Jonathan Vance explained his interpretation of the war’s meaning in
Death So Noble (1997), the first serious consideration of the subject in
Canada.113 Vance examines the construction of the public memory of the war
during the interwar period, particularly how Canadians “conceived of the
war, how they represented it, and how they accommodated it into their
collective consciousness.” His work rejects notions of postwar disillusionment
and argues that during the 1920s and 1930s, Canadians constructed a

112 Fulford, “Looking back on the First World War”.
113 Some of Vance’s conclusions were anticipated in a short article by John Scott,
which used the formation of the Canadian Legion to point out how ill served the war
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and his leaders.” In place of this alienation, Scott argued that Canadians had a “very different
memory” than Harrison’s novel indicated. They retained images of “honour, affection,
loyalty and esteem” for their commander and, by extension, for the war itself. While Scott
cites Generals Die in Bed in his work, the absence of any supporting evidence for his
conclusion that “historians” have used it in support of Fussell’s arguments is telling. John
Scott, “‘Three Cheers for Earl Haig’ Canadian Veterans and the Visit of Field Marshal Sir
Douglas Haig to Canada in the Summer of 1925,” Canadian Military History 5:1 (Spring 1996):
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mythical history of the war, which ensured its legacy was one of “promise,
certainty, and goodness.” Vance’s study changed how historians consider the
war’s legacy in Canada. In place of veterans and fights over federal pensions,
he focused on collective memory and public understanding of the war’s
meaning. The war may have been awful, but the myth Canadians constructed
“crafted a memory … that [also] recognized the gifts it conferred on those
who took part.”114
Vance engages the generation’s war writers, its artists, and its veterans,
as well as Canadian society at large. He agrees with critics such as Bracco,
who argue against overemphasizing the writing of elites, by concentrating on
how Canadian society commemorated the war. Vance rejects ideas of a lost
generation, arguing that the disillusioned were unrepresentative of Canada’s
wider collective memory. Elites might have been disenchanted but average
Canadians embraced the war myth. The strong critiques of literary and
academic leaders, such as O.D. Skelton, paled in comparison to the positive
response of the general public. Thus, the “impassioned pleas” of Arthur
Lower, Escott Reid, or O.D. Skelton, Vance writes, “against repeating the folly
of 1914-18” may have “impressed generations of historians” but it is
“unwise” to give “such people undue weight.” To examine the views of the
“Canadian mosaic,” Vance ventures beyond the “narrow band of traditional
sources,” using cultural artifacts such as remembrance programs, church
windows, and “deplorable verse,” to bare witness to a more “representative

114 Vance, Death So Noble, 2, 196, 266.
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range of interpretation.”115 He identifies key sites of memory and
remembrance to demonstrate how this public mythology emerged.
Canadians’ sense of a just war created a ‘legitimate’ memory of the conflict.
The result is a single, unifying mythology, which proved a fountainhead for
an emergent Canadian nationalism.
Vance argues that Remembrance Day serves as a poignant example of
Canadians embracing the positive war mythology constructed during the
interwar era.116 But he also recognizes that there were limits to the day’s
utility, especially for returned men, who were increasingly unhappy with the
direction of postwar life. For these Canadians, the mere paying of “tribute”
on 11 November was insufficient insurance that the war’s legacy was being
respected. They understood that the only way to ensure the war’s meaning
was to “complete the task” begun in France and Flanders. Postwar Canada
had to ensure that the war “was indeed the progenitor of good.” Otherwise,
Canadians’ sacrifices would be “meaninglessness.”117 To ensure this was not
the case, Vance contends that Canadians used the war myth to build a better,

115 Vance, Death So Noble, 6-7.
116 According to Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, the act of
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meaningful event to remember. Neither the public, nor veterans, argued with postwar
Canada’s embrace of Remembrance Day, but outside of such contexts the war generation
struggled articulate their understanding of the war experience. See Audoin-Rouzeau and
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postwar version of the nation. He acknowledges that many Canadians were
not living up to the ideal established in wartime, but despite recognizing that
ex-soldiers were disenchanted, disillusion did not take hold.
Ian McKay has challenged Vance’s reading of this history. McKay
concedes that mythic, romanticized ideas remained “part of the core
explanation” of the war’s meaning, but argues that Canadians did not
generally accept this interpretation.118 Veterans such as Tommy Burns and
Will Bird wrote critically about the war. Burns’ writing in the 1920s, for
example, “cut through the cant of patriotism to get at the war’s futile
tragedy.”119 Will Bird also “resisted” the war myth.120 Instead of seeing Bird as
a singular example of the myth, McKay argues that his writing is open to
“multiple readings.”121 According to McKay, Vance reads Bird as part of a
traditional High Tory view of the war. McKay, however, argues that he is
better read as an example of interwar liberalism, which remembered the war
differently. In place of a conservative mythology that “confirmed the justice
of the preexisting social hierarchy,” people like Bird shaped the postwar
world by “focusing on the future … [and] by firmly insisting that strong

118 Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of
Anxiety (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012), 83.
119 McKay and Swift, Warrior Nation, 82.
120 Ian McKay and Robin Bates, In the Province of History: The Making of the Public Past
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134.
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people should get over it.” Vance focuses on how Canadians created a social
memory of the war experience, regardless of the resulting myth’s accuracy.
McKay, on the other hand, is less concerned with the war’s memory. Instead
he critiques how the conflict should be studied. To do otherwise, he argues,
risks “not troubling to analyze and understand” a war that cost millions of
lives. In this reading, the postwar impact cannot be understood before
“conclusively resolving … the underlying political issues” over which the
war was fought. McKay argues that the conflict was not a nation-building
experience, at least not in so far as the Vimy myth suggests: “This was never a
war for democracy, freedom, or ‘Canada,’ but a war fought between empires.”
In place of “individual acts of valour and selfless nation-building,” the war
should instead be understood as the outcome of the world’s “socio-economic
order.”122
The writing of Will Bird serves as a revealing example of these varying
approaches. Both historians agree that Bird’s writing re-constructed his war
experience and they acknowledge that he was highly critical of “realism.”
Vance interprets this criticism as an example of how Canadians constructed a
positive postwar mythology. Bird’s war was thus “balanced,” “credible,” and
“optimistic.”123 McKay argues that Bird created an imagined Great War that
confirmed the “innocence” of his liberal worldview.124 This innocence was a
conscious choice that “rejected analytic reasoning” to ensure the war
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reinforced the “primacy of the individual.”125 Both readings suggest that Will
Bird was uncomfortable rejecting the war as futile. In Vance’s case, Bird’s
positive outlook is explained by his finding solace in the brotherhood of the
trenches. While Bird could be critical of the conflict, he always balanced his
observations by stressing the “inherent good in his Flanders adventure.” For
McKay, Bird’s version of the war was less benign. Instead of reflecting the
purposefulness of the conflict, he agues that Bird’s positivism was the
product of the war’s psychological horrors. The burden of trench warfare,
McKay writes, “permanently changed the mentality” of the men who lived it.
Men like Bird refused to reflect critically on the war because their
psychological survival depended on it.126
Vance does not deny that some men experienced “psychological
problems” after the war. He argues, however, that they were the exceptions
that confirmed the validity of the war myth. While some men may have
struggled, veterans could not be turned into “an animal or an empty shell”
because their cause was “righteous.”127 The few who are identified as
disillusioned, moreover, are pushed aside in favour of a discussion of
Canadians’ efforts to make sure the country’s youth, immigrants, First
Nations, and French Canadians were all adhering to the proper meaning of
the war.128
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In the war’s aftermath the average Canadian veteran had larger
concerns than debating how the war was portrayed in novels and poetry. The
failed bonus campaign, inadequate access to pensions, rampant
unemployment, health struggles, and denial of access to assistance programs
influenced the generation’s understanding of the conflict. None of these
issues are discussed in the debates over imagined wars and war myths.
Nevertheless, they were the practical, everyday causes of postwar
disillusionment. Despite not being considered part of the public dialogue
about the war’s memory, they influenced the meaning of the conflict. In these
cases, however, the war experience was not employed in relation to
remembrance or commemoration. Rather, it was the day-to-day challenges,
including the economy, men’s health, and the ever-increasing prospect of
another European conflict that ended up shaping the generation’s
understanding of the war’s meaning.
The differences between the war generation’s personal experiences and
public commemoration of the war also illustrate how private and collective
memories can coexist simultaneously. Collective memory is defined by an
“interaction between public and private memory.”129 Public memories are
also informed by collective experience, but studies have determined that
traumatic events remembered as part of collective memory need not be the
same as an individual’s private memories. According to Anita Shapira, an
individual’s experiences can be all but ignored in public commemoration,
with “collective memory” acting as a “blanket” that hides “all vestige of

129 Sue Haugbolle, “Public and Private Memory of the Lebanese Civil War,”
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private memory, of personal experience.”130 Historian Jay Winter, who also
distinguishes between private and collective memory, cites Maurice
Halbwach to argue that private or passive memory is composed largely of an
individual’s “personal recollections.” Collective memory, however, is
constructed “through the action of groups and individuals in the light of day”
and is created when people “enter the public domain, and comment about or
commemorate the past.” Although related, the two are not interchangeable
and private memories differ from collective memory.131
Despite such distinctions, little effort has been made to distinguish
between Canadians’ private and collective reactions to the war. Even histories
of local responses have focused on a community’s “popular and public
experiences.”132 Private memories remain so understudied that collective
memory risks being mistaken as the singular explanation for how Canadians
responded to the war. Outside of Canada, however, historians and literary
critics have critiqued the dominance of this collective response. Stéphane
Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, for example, argue that we need to
“cast doubt” on the “‘effectiveness’ of commemoration” because the very
public nature of collective mourning did little to diminish “individual

130 Anita Shapira, “The Holocaust: Private Memories, Public Memory,” Jewish Social
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bereavement.”133 Janet Watson’s argument for the differences between
experience and memory also suggests that we should consider different
reactions to the war as readily as we now recognize existence of “different
wars.”134 Peter Webb, one of the few Canadian literary critics to address the
subject, supports the idea of collective reactions to the war. He argues for
shared memories rather than collective memories. “There are many myths,
many experiences,” Webb writes, and the idea of shared memories
emphasizes “how a given war experience may be common to a particular
social group … without assuming that the experience is universal to all
members of a nation, gender, or culture.”135
As an example of shared memories, Webb cites the war writing of
Ralph Connor (the pen name of Rev. Charles Gordon) and Charles Yale
Harrison. They witnessed the war firsthand, yet their respective works are
“polar opposites in terms of ideology, diction, and political outlook.” In The
Sky Pilot in No Man’s Land (1919), Gordon describes self-sacrificing wartime
deaths that were “splendid” and “Perfectly glorious!”136 Harrison’s Generals
Die in Bed rejects Gordon’s romanticism entirely. His characters are killed
without glory. They fall “clumsily” after being shot; they are heard

133 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 1914-1918, 220-221.
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“shrieking;” some are so badly mutilated that what remains of their bodies
“convulse and jerk spasmodically.”137 Webb sees the differences between
these two authors as a clash between romance and realism, a dichotomy
which he considers fundamental to the makeup of early twentieth-century
Canadian fiction.138 But there is another overlooked explanation for why these
two authors differed so markedly in their treatment of the First World War:
their age and place within the war generation.
Gordon was born in 1860, while Harrison was born in 1898. When the
war broke out, the former was fifty-four years old; the latter was sixteen. In
Connor’s case, the war “reinforced” his existing worldview. He portrayed it
as a “temporary aberration on the path of human progress.”139 For Harrison,
however, like so many young men who enlisted as teenagers, the war shaped
how he would come to understand his world. This difference in experience is
why the study of men’s ages is so critical to understanding how the war
generation made sense of the event. Rather than using collective concepts of
representativeness to paint either Gordon or Harrison as a poor reflection of
how Canadians’ thought collectively about the war, studying generational
reactions clarifies how opposing views of the war need not be mutually
exclusive.

137 For the deaths of Brown, Karl’s brother, and Cleary see Harrison, Generals Die in
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Until recently, however, few histories recognized age or generation as
a category of analysis. The first in Canada to employ either was Neil
Sutherland, whose studies of childhood in English Canada established
important foundations for inquiries into life stages.140 Doug Owram’s The
Government Generation (1986) also used the concept loosely to study a select
group of Canadian intellectuals and their influence on the growth of the
Canadian welfare state. Owram defined the government generation as a
“community” of “activist intellectuals,” with a “shared outlook toward
problem solving and analysis, common social values, and close personal
connections.” For men like Frank Underhill, Harold Innis, Lester Pearson,
and Brooke Claxton, Owram recognized that the war was their “most
important common experience.” They were disillusioned by the conflict and
disturbed by Canada’s “martial enthusiasm and militarism.”141 The book
hints at both the importance and influence of the war, but its focus does not
consider how the conflict was understood or why it shaped a generation.
Owram’s Born at the Right Time (1996) devotes more consideration to
why and how groups identified generationally. It examines the baby
boomers, their ability to shape their surrounding culture and society, and the

140 See Neil Sutherland, Children in English-Canadian Society: Framing the TwentiethCentury Consensus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), and Growing Up: Childhood in
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group’s tendency to think in generational terms.142 Cynthia Comacchio,
whose The Dominion of Youth (2006) examines adolescence and coming of age
in Canada, also emphasizes the importance of age as a critical part of our
understanding of generational history. Both see generation as a life stage.
Comacchio’s work studies adolescence over a thirty-year period. Owram is
concerned with a specific group—the boomers—and studies them by
examining their “life cycle,” starting first with childhood and then moving on
to adolescence and early adulthood.143 Comacchio does not follow one group
as they age, exploring instead the process of aging by considering the
maturation of youth and their role in shaping a young nation. She situates her
study within a broader literature on generation that engages with sociological
and historiographical debates over its definition. In recognizing the problems
posed by generation’s multiple meanings, Comacchio observes that it is “a
decidedly loose category.” Hers is not a study concerned with sociological
predictions, preferring to ground its use of generation in historical context.
She argues that generation emphasizes “historical location more than specific
cohort dates.” Comacchio believes that generation remains an effective tool to
study “changes and continuities” in adolescence, especially as they pertain to
“broader socio-cultural change over a fairly limited period.”144

142 See Owram, The Government Generation and Born at the Right Time: A History of the
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A critical aspect of this interpretation is the recognition that the war
generation was “constituted by a traumatic event.” As June Edmonds and
Bryan Turner note, having lived through the trauma of the war, men were
seen to be different. The public accepted this difference, recognizing that the
war experience forged a form of collective response. It did so by uniting “a
particular cohort of individuals into a self-conscious age stratum” that cut the
war generation off “from its past and [separated] it from the future.” In so
doing, the war became “the basis of a collective ideology and a set of
integrating rituals” that acted as a “conduit” for understanding the conflict.145
For those who came of age at this time, the changes that accompanied 1914-18
were immense, so much so that their societies came to see the post-1918
world as a new era.146 In the case of the war generation, the shifting social,
economic, cultural, and political world also coincided with their maturation,
making these changes a potent marker for their generational identity.147
Age was therefore a critical part of an emerging generational identity
that was adopted by society and by men themselves. As young boys, this
generation was “exposed to enthusiastic support for war and war culture.”148
The dominant political ideology of their youth was imperialism and, as Mark
Moss argues, it was complemented by period support for militarism,

145 June Edmonds and Bryan Turner, Generations, Culture and Society (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 2002), 7.
146 J.O. Miller, ed., The New Era in Canada: Essays Dealing with the Upbuilding of the
Canadian Commonwealth (Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1917).
147 Wohl, The Generation of 1914.
148 Mark Moss, Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys in Ontario for War
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6.
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manliness, patriotism, and nationalism.149 In the decades before the war,
industrialization, urbanization and modernization were believed to be
threatening men’s role in society. At their most extreme, fears over the decline
of physical labour risked making men “superfluous.” In response, men took
refuge in manly pursuits like sporting and camping in hopes of “reviving”
their supposedly vulnerable position in society. The “ultimate form for the
exercise of masculinity” was war.150 With the brief exception of a few
thousand who joined the South African War, however, Canadian men faced a
martial problem: Canada was not at war. In place of actual warfare, therefore,
they embraced “suitable substitutes” that would hopefully prepare them for
combat when the time came. This was the atmosphere in which the war
generation was raised. As boys, their entire society was built on the idea that
the warrior “was the ultimate masculine ideal.”151 As men, they came of age
with the most destructive war in living memory.

149 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 13-14.
150 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 15.
151 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 20.
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Chapter 2
A silent generation?
“I fear for them, these silent men” 1
- Evadne Price

The men of the war generation rarely spoke about the war.2 Despite their
“conspiracy of silence,” some did feel compelled to write the conflict “out of
their system.”3 This need to record their experience indicated an attempt to
“bear witness to the trauma of war” and make sense of its consequences.4
Much of the resulting literature attests to the war’s undermining of notions of
progress. It was a disillusioning experience. In Canada, however, cultural
nationalism checked expressions of literary discontent. Postwar fiction shied
away from challenging the meaning of the conflict, even in its aftermath. As a

1 Evadne Price quoted in Jonathan Atkin, A War of Individuals: Bloomsbury Attitudes to
the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 143. An Australian-British
journalist, actress, and writer, Price wrote a female response to Eric Maria Remarque’s All
Quiet on the Western Front entitled Not So Quiet.
2 George Parfitt, Fiction of the First World War (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), 4. For
contemporary recognition of this silence, see R.H. Mottram, Ten Years Ago, in which W.E.
Bates writes as preface that these men’s silence has been “significant.” Bates cited in Parfitt, 4.
3 Dagmar Novak, “The Canadian Novel and the Two World Wars: The EnglishCanadian Literary Sensibility,” (PhD diss., Toronto, 1985), 67; Cook, At the Sharp End, 6.
4 Trudi Tate, Modernism, History and the First World War (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1998), 1.
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result, Canadian war fiction failed to portray the personal impact of the war.
Despite this fact, historians use these novels to argue that Canada somehow
escaped the same postwar disillusionment that haunted the U.S. and Europe.
Between 1914 and 1919, Canada’s war authors embraced notions of
romance and chivalry, much like their international counterparts.5 After war’s
end, however, authors outside Canada began questioning the conflict and its
ultimate meaning. They struggled to understand such killing on an industrial
scale; prewar notions of romantic and chivalric warfare were shattered.6
Debates raged, which critics now define as a “conflict between generations
over the war’s significance.”7 For the first time, combatants in a war also
became its literary authors.8 Their need to record experience, to bear witness
to the slaughter, and to highlight their own role in the narrative reflects
Clifford Geertz’s belief that refashioning one’s past helps give it meaning. By
making “sense out of experience,” the war stamped a deep imprint on this

5 See Crawford Killlian, “The Great War and the Canadian Novel, 1915-1926,” (MA
Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1972) and Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship.
6 L. Moore Cosgrave, Afterthoughts of Armageddon: The Gamut of Emotions Produced by
the War, Pointing a Moral that is Not Too Obvious (Toronto: Hunter Rose, 1919), 13-14.
7 David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York:
Oxford, 2004), 221; see too, for example, Holger Klein, ed., The First World War in Fiction: A
Collection of Critical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1976) and Partick Quinn and Steven Trout,
eds., The Literature of the Great War Reconsidered: Beyond Modern Memory (London: Palgrave
2001). In his study of French soldiers’ use of literature as a way to testify to their war
experience Leonard Smith argues that it is “unsurprising that the novel should have the final
say on the experience of the combatant of the Great War.” See Smith, Embattled Self, 149.
8 Parfitt argues that “no earlier war … gave rise to an equivalent body of writing and,
for the first time, … there was the possibility of a substantial literature produced by
combatants, for the armies of the Great War were the first literate … armies.” See Parfitt,
Fiction of the First World War, 135.
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generation in a heightened version of their otherwise “normal individual
development.” 9 This “generational imprinting,” as Howard Schumann and
Jacqueline Scott argue, was dependent upon the war as an unprecedented
historical event occurring at a particularly influential time in their lives.
For the youths of the war generation, the conflict was not just a major
world event; it was their introduction to the world.10 According to historian
Eric Leed, there was “no debate over whether [the war caused] a deep and
profound alteration of identity.” Belief in the conflict’s transformational
power led to hopes that peace would bring about a new age, an era
dominated by youth.11 After 1918, there was a sense that the old order had
been swept away and replaced by a new, modern society, represented by
youth and youth culture. Works such as The Revolt of Modern Youth by Ben
Lindsey and The New Generation by V.F. Calverton and S.D. Schmalhausen
focused attention on the “new form” that generational identity (and conflict)
was taking.12 Academics, particularly in the emerging social sciences, joined

9 Clifford Geertz, “Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols,” in
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic, 1973), 140. See too
Robert Fulford, The Triumph of Narrative: Storytelling in the Age of Mass Culture (Toronto:
Anansi, 1999), 15 for a discussion of the relationship between Geertz’s work and the
importance of narrative.
10 Howard Schumann and Jacqueline Scott, “Generations and Collective Memories,”
American Sociological Review 53:3 (Jun., 1989): 378.
11 Eric Leed, No Man’s Land: Combat & Identity in World War I (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1.
12 V.F. Calverton and Samuel D. Schmalhausen, eds., The New Generation: The
Intimate Problems of Modern Parents and Children (London: George Allen Unwin Ltd., 1930), 8.
See too Ben B. Lindsey and Wainwright Evans, The Revolt of Modern Youth (New York: Boni &
Liverlight, 1925).
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the chorus of theorists, such as Karl Manheim and José Ortega y Gasset, who
devoted considerable study to this new interest. Their work helped to
popularize generation as a concept and Manheim’s combining of generation
with class (to demonstrate that generational groups were framed by more
than birth years) proved particularly influential, leading to widespread
acceptance that such groupings were formed by common life-stages as well as
historical events.13
It was in literature, however, that the war’s generational impact was
most evident. Many of the most enduring of this generation’s voices came
from the ranks of men born in the decade and a half before 1900.14 Having
come of age with the conflict, these writers looked for new ways to
understand it. They rejected notions of a ‘good war’ and the literary
conventions that accompanied it. In their place, these authors embraced new
narrative tools, such as realistic descriptions of combat that tried to lend
structure to “otherwise inchoate fragments of experience.” In Europe, Britain,
and the United States, authors subjected the war and its aftermath to serious
critical analysis. France’s postwar writing, for example, framed the conflict as

13 See especially “The Problem of Generations,” in Karl Manheim, Essays in the
Sociology of Knowledge (London Routledge, 1952), 276-322.
14 Ernest Hemingway, for instance, was born in 1899. Charles Yale Harrison was a
year earlier, in 1898. John Dos Passos was born in 1896, the same year as Edmund Blunden.
Robert Graves was born in 1895, as was Gabriel Chevalier. Canadians James Pedley, Will
Bird, and George Godwin were born respectively in 1892, 1891 and 1889. Ernest Raymond
and Siegfried Sassoon were slightly older, being born respectively in 1888 and 1886, but both
were more than two decades younger than men such as Rudyard Kipling. There were
exceptions, such as Henri Barbusse and Ford Maddox Ford (both born in 1873), but the
postwar literary landscape was largely filled with young men.
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a tragedy.15 Many British writers, by contrast, were more concerned by irony
and ideas of futility.16 While the war inevitably consisted of “several hundred
thousand individually experienced wars,” the generation’s writing also had
much in common.17 It was trying to make sense of the experience, to define it,
and to find closure.18
This broad body of work is described as disillusioned. Although rarely
defined, postwar disillusionment generally refers to the “loss of illusions in
the norms and values of the pre-war world.”19 While the extent of this
disenchantment is contested, by the 1920s doubts were creeping into Western
societies as to “the status and authority of Western civilization.” These

15 Smith, Embattled Self, 185, 196.
16 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies,
1914 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 196. For a comparison of
French and British writing see Frank Field, British and French Writers of the First World War:
Comparative Studies in Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
17 Cook, At the Sharp End, 5.
18 According to Marlene Briggs, neither the Armistice nor its commemoration
“imposed closure on the war” and, in Britain, efforts at postwar reconstruction left much of
the conflict’s impact unresolved. See Marlene Briggs, “Haunted Armistice: The Great War,
Modern British Literature and the Mourning of Historical Trauma,” (PhD diss., University of
Ottawa, 2000), xii. The French had similar difficulty finding meaning amidst the failed
postwar “utopia” so many had hoped for. Like their wartime allies, therefore, France’s
authors were also searching for closure. Their literature evolved from a postwar “rejection of
the war” to a reconstruction of the conflict as a traumatic experience. See Smith, Embattled Self,
especially chapter 4, “The Novel and the Search for Closure,” 148-194.
19 Furedi, First World War, 16. John Keegan makes a similar observation. See Keegan,
The First World War (London: Hutchinson, 1998), 321, where he states “The Somme marked
the end of an age of vital optimism in British life that has never been recovered.”
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sentiments were felt “most forcefully … by artists and imaginative writers.”20
American writers, such as John Dos Passos, claimed that the war “brought
death … to everything that mattered.”21 Richard Aldington, author of the
British war novel Death of a Hero, asked why the war happened and
demanded to know who was responsible for its atrocities.22 Arnold Bennett
added to postwar critiques, writing of younger men who returned home from
war as “old, damaged, [and] disillusioned.”23 These works framed the war as
a harbinger of individual transformation. Men such as Aldridge believed that
few lives “remained unaffected by the war” and that most “[adult] lives were
cut sharply into three sections – pre-war, war, and post-war.”24
Examples of the war’s negative impact cut across literary genres. While
the Lost Generation writers produced the most famous expression of
disillusionment, popular, middlebrow authors, such as Britain’s Gilbert
Frankau, also wrote of damaged men. Frankau’s character Francis Gordon,
for example, went to war a “smooth-faced boy.” Once invalided, however, he
became a “middle-aged man.” Gordon’s hair greyed and “his eyes had lost

20 Furedi, First World War, 16, 18, 25. Canadians had similar doubts. After the war,
for instance, science and technology no longer equated to progress and it was “no longer
possible to have an implicit faith that technology would always be used to create a better,
more peaceful world.” See R. Douglas Francis, The Technological Imperative in Canada: An
Intellectual History (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 91.
21 Dos Passos, cited in Claudia Matherly Stolz, “Dos Passos’ Three Soldiers: A Case
Study,” West Virginia University Philological Papers 50 (Fall 2004), 77.
22 Richard Aldington, Death of a Hero (Dundurn, 1998), 157.
23 Bennett, cited in George Parfitt, Fiction of the First World War: A Study (London:
Faber & Faber, 1988), 73.
24 Aldington, Death of a Hero, 157-58.
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their laughter.” Now, he “no longer held himself upright, his shoulders
drooped as though he carried a burden on them.”25 According to James
Powell, American writers shared this postwar disillusionment. The war “was
not only psychologically transforming,” it altered how these writers “looked
at both life and literature.”26 Sarah Trott makes a similar case that “hardboiled”
detective fiction, such as that of Raymond Chandler, should also be read as
part of this “literature of traumatic experience.”27
Despite similarities to American and British fiction before and during
the war, Canadians did not follow the disillusioned path laid out by writers
such as Hemingway, Dos Passos, or others in the Lost Generation. Instead,
Canadian novelists produced staid, middlebrow fiction because “that is what
sold.”28 Their novels rarely questioned the conflict or its impact. They relied
heavily on romantic styles buttressed by strong morals and inspirational

25 Gilbert Frankau, Peter Jackson, Cigar Merchant: A Romance of Married Life (London:
Hutchinson, 1920), 322. For additional discussion of British literary reactions to the war,
including critiques of its postwar aftermath, see Parfitt, Fiction of the First World War and
James Powell, “A Humble Protest: A Literary Generation’s Quest for the Heroic Self, 19171930” (PhD diss., Ohio State, 2008).
26 Powell, “A Humble Protest,” 27.
27 Sarah Trott, “The Detective as Veteran: Re-casting American Hard-Boiled Writing
as a Literature of Traumatic War Experience,” in Stephen McVeigh and Nicola Cooper, eds.,
Men After War (London: Routledge, 2013), 130.
28 Amy Tector, “Wounded Warriors: Representations of disabled soldiers in
Canadian Fiction of the First World War,” (PhD diss., Université Libre de Bruxelles 2000), 14.
Dr. Tector was kind enough to send me proofs of her dissertation. This material is broken up
by chapter and the pagination provided reflects only the pages per chapter, not the
dissertation in total.
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endings.29 As Gilbert Parker, one of the era’s leading authors, explained: “I
make my characters a little better, a little more adventurous, a little more
superlative in all their qualities than they would be possibly in real life.”30 As
a result, Canadian war fiction was recognized for its mediocrity and it
escaped critical attention for much of the twentieth century.31 Indeed, until
the 1980s, literary critics and historians agreed that this body of work was
“conventional and undistinguished.”32 Historian W.L. Morton claimed that
these books lacked “a single memorable character” and that their only virtue
was that they could be read without the reader “ever being disturbed.”33
Others described Canada’s literature as filled with “clichéd romances by
authors more interested in jingoistic patriotism than honest portrayal of life at
the front.”34 It is not surprising, then, that in the wake of such criticism, many
of Canada’s war novels were ignored and that the idea of a canon of
Canadian war fiction rarely merited an afterthought.35

29 Amy Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 14, 16.
30 Parker cited in Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 16.
31 Colin Hill, “Generic Experiment and Confusion in Early Canadian Novels of the
Great War,” Studies in Canadian Literature 34:2 (2009), 2. Hill writes that “Canada’s literary
histories almost univocally consider war fiction of the period to be insignificant.”
32 Frank K. Stanzel, “‘In Flanders Fields the Poppies Blow’: Canada and the Great
War,” in Peter Easingwood, Konrad Gross and Lynette Hunter, eds., Difference and
Community: Canadian and European Cultural Perspectives (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 213–14.
33 See Morton, “1920s,” 225.
34 Eric Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” Canadian Literature 91
(Winter 1981): 84.
35 Donna Coates describes the novels from the early 1920s as “light reading.” See
Coates, “War,” in William New, ed., Encyclopedia of Literature in Canada (Toronto: University
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Since the 1980s, however, the reputation of Canada’s war writing has
been rehabilitated. In his 1981 article “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,”
Eric Thompson argued that although many of the period’s novels were
forgettable, there were also notable exceptions, including Peregrine Acland’s
All Else is Folly, Charles Yale Harrison’s Generals Die in Bed, and Philip Child’s
God’s Sparrows. These texts were sufficiently noteworthy to form a
“significant genre of Canadian fiction.” With themes that mirrored the
disillusionment of writers in the U.S. and overseas, Thompson praised these
novels for their accuracy. Because the authors were veterans, he privileged
their views. They knew about the war “first hand.”36
Scholars such as Dagmar Novak, Dominique Dumontet, and Amy
Tector have also attempted to recuperate the canon.37 Canada’s middlebrow
fiction, they argue, tells as “valid side of the story of the war” as more avantgarde work.38 Whereas Thompson rejected novels written before 1929 as
overly romantic, Novak argues that all books published between 1915 and
1939 need to be considered. She concedes that “a younger school,” led by
Acland and Harrison, came to prominence in the late 1920s, but argues that
the earlier fiction, as part of a “romance tradition,” was equally legitimate.
of Toronto Press, 2002), 1189. According to Tector, others who rejected the era’s writing
included E.K. Brown, Desmond Pacey, and Northrup Frye. See Tector, “Wounded Warriors,”
13-21. She argues that scholarly “neglect” of Canada’s war literature “cannot be entirely
explained” by Canada’s colonial status, because in Australia, an otherwise similar case to
Canada, “war fiction … has enjoyed sustained analysis and criticism for decades.”
36 Eric Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” 81, 83.
37 Tector, “Wounded Warriors;” Novak, Dubious Glory; Dumontet, “‘Lest We Forget’;”
also important is Coates, “The Best Soldiers of All: Unsung Heroines in Canadian Women’s
Great War Fiction,” Canadian Literature, 151 (1996).
38 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 32.
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Novels by Charles Gordon or J. Murray Gibbon may have been romantic but
they nonetheless reflected “the beliefs and values” of Canadians at the time.39
Tector agrees. She argues that Canada’s middlebrow war fiction has been
“unjustly neglected” and remains a window onto what “Canadians thought
of events shortly after having lived through them.”40 Yet, unlike Thompson
and Novak, Tector does not see a firm break between romantic and modernist
literature. She argues that the most significant shift in Canada’s war writing
was in tone, resulting from a “slow transformation” from romanticism to
realism.41 Dumontet, who also seeks to recuperate “under-valued texts,”
supports the idea of a literary evolution. She argues that pigeonholing
romantic and modernist war literature into set categories of “jingoistic
romances and cynical anti-war texts” misses the “social inclusivity and
balance” that many of Canada’s war writers attempted to convey.42
The major difference between these schools of thought is their position
on the objective “truth” of Canadian war fiction. Thompson and Novak both
claim that realist novels were more accurate, and thus more powerful, than
romantic work.43 But as Tector points out, equating “bad” romantic literature
of early novels with a belief that it is a “false” version of the war “conflates
the supposed realism of the soldier authors with their adoption of the realist

39 Novak, Dubious Glory, 7.
40 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 444-445.
41 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 39.
42 Dumontet, “‘Lest We Forget,’” ii.
43 See Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” and Novak, Dubious Glory.
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style.”44 More recent analysis rejects the privileging of realist fiction and
argues that the belief of romantic authors in “the Honour of battle and the
Glory of Patriotism” was an equally legitimate response to the war. In such
cases, the conflict described by romantic authors was “not only steeped in
horror and bogged down in mud, but also offered soldiers comradeship, a
sense of purpose, and new experiences that were not always negative.”45
Those defending this literature argue that critics have misrepresented
the importance of realist, anti-war books. Jonathan Vance and Maria Bracco
reject notions of postwar disillusionment. Bracco’s study of middlebrow
novels shifts focus away from the anti-war canon and on to authors whose
postwar popularity demonstrates that a more conservative, traditional
version of the war continued to appeal to readers after 1918.46 Like Vance,
Bracco dismisses the views of highbrow modernists as unrepresentative of
public opinion.47 Middlebrow fiction is interpreted as a conservative bulwark
against the modernism of the anti-war writers and, in the context of war
fiction, it helped “soften the [conflict’s] impact … by reasserting links with the
past” and reinforcing middle class standards and values.48 In place of a stark
break between the pre-war and post-war world, middlebrow authors offered
readers a cushion to help fashion meaning out of the changes wrought by the

44 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 28.
45 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 29.
46 Bracco, Merchants of Hope and Betwixt and Between.
47 Bracco, Merchants of Hope, 200.
48 Bracco, Merchants of Hope, 10, 12-13.
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war. Their values reaffirmed “the strength and importance of links with the
past. Morality, religion, tradition: such words made up a litany of appeals for
post-war regeneration.”49 The pre- and postwar continuity of societal values
is a central tenet of these positive readings, which argues that the “idea of
rupture” has been “exaggerated.”50
Historians and literary critics point to middlebrow fiction as a “fairly
accurate barometer of the Canadian perception of war.”51 It is assumed that
the work of Canada’s authors followed “the same structural patterns as their
German and British counterparts.”52 Nevertheless, while middlebrow novels
were popular on both sides of the Atlantic, Canada’s literary market was
sufficiently distinct to weaken direct comparison between its middlebrow
authors and those in the U.S. or Britain. One major difference was the relative
size of Canada’s book market. Bracco’s discussion of British novels considers
books that sold in the hundreds of thousands. But Canadian authors and their
readership never approached comparable figures, even relatively. Moreover,
conclusions drawn from Canadian book sales are questionable due to a lack
of sales figures, which, as Mary Vipond has revealed, are absent for much of
the 1920s. While Vipond’s study says much about early twentieth century
reading habits, it says little about the popularity of war books because she

49 Bracco, Merchants of Hope, 197.
50 Richard Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain Between the Wars (London: Allen Lane,
2009), 13-14.
51 Linda Steward, “A Canadian Perspective: The Fictional and Historical Portrayal of
World War One,” (MA Thesis, Waterloo, 1983), 104.
52 Dumontet, “‘Lest We Forget’,” 17.
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ends her analysis in 1928, a year before the flood of war texts that included
Peregrine Acland’s All Else is Folly, Robert Graves’ Goodbye to All That, and
Remarque’s All Quiet.53
Distinguishing between highbrow and middlebrow literature is also
difficult in Canada because few authors broke out of the middlebrow mold,
ensuring the absence of highbrow war literature. Canadian readers, as Tector
points out, were suspicious of realism in general and their conservative
reading habits had a direct impact on book sales: “the dispute between
romantic versions of the war and realistic ones was not simply about how the
conflict was portrayed.” It was also at “the heart” of a literary argument “that
had dominated Canadian criticism since the nineteenth century.” Debates
over the war fit into this romantic-realist struggle and middlebrow authors
proved reluctant to criticize the conflict out of fear that “if it was found to be
‘all for nothing’ the resulting societal despair would be crippling.” The
middlebrow mindset had “good reason,” therefore, “to avoid questioning the
conflict’s meaning too rigorously.” 54
The uncritical stance of much of Canadian war fiction divides
historians and critics. While novels such as Ralph Connor’s The Major and
Charles Yale Harrison’s Generals Die in Bed stand at either end of a romantic-

53 Mary Vipond, “Best Sellers in English Canada: 1919–1928,” Journal of Canadian
Fiction 35-36 (1986): 73–105.
54 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 24, 33.
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modernist spectrum, other works are less easily classified.55 Both Eric
Thompson and Jeff Keshen argue that Acland, Child, and Harrison wrote
disillusioned “anti-war novels.”56 Tim Cook makes a similar case, while
adding the memoirists Will Bird, James Pedley, and Wilfrid Kerr to the list of
“disillusionment writers.” Jonathan Vance, however, sees Bird and Child as
examples of a more positive, balanced interpretation of the war. Vance also
uses Kerr’s writing to dismiss anti-war novels such as that of Harrison. Amy
Tector agrees with Vance about Child and argues that the author refused to
portray his war experience as “entirely negative.”57 Dumontet’s reading of
Child is similarly focused on the author’s balanced writing, while Colin Hill
and Peter Webb see Acland’s All Else is Folly as a work in tension between
romanticism and realism.58
These conflicting interpretations are a result of middlebrow
sensibilities. Several novels, including All Else is Folly and Show Me Death!,
cannot be described as anti-war fiction because they combine wartime
disillusionment with “sentimentality” and “hackneyed” love-plots.59 Dent’s
Show Me Death! contains harsh descriptions of combat, death, and loss of

55 According to Hill, the “standard definitions” of Canada’s various genres of
literature: realism, romanticisms, naturalism, and modernism, “do not easily apply in the
Canadian context.” See Hill, “Early Novels of the Great War,” 60.
56 Keshen, “The Great War Soldiers as Nation Builder,” 14.
57 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 77.
58 Hill, “Early Novels of the Great War,” 67; Webb, “Occupants of Memory,” 114.
59 Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” 86.
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faith; its characters emerge from combat “broken, sobbing wrecks of men.”60
Yet, while the book continues in similar fashion until its conclusion, it shifts
its tone to a romantic ending. In place of the novel’s earlier critiques of the
war, Dent’s protagonist falls—literally—into the arms of his beloved: “The
door reopened. ‘Oh, thank God, Luella! Luella!’ I tried to run toward her, but
you see I had only one leg. I had forgotten that. I fell—fell into her arms. Her
lips brushed my cheeks.”61 These final romantic pages contrast oddly with the
novel’s earlier bitterness and disillusionment. But they are symptomatic of
how Canadian war fiction included criticism of the war within a broader
romantic structure, concessions to the middlebrow format that reflect these
authors’ embrace of “inspirational endings.”62 Indeed, with the notable
exception of Generals Die in Bed, almost every example of Canadian war
fiction ends on a positive note.63
Canadian fiction about the war’s aftermath also favours happy endings.
Douglas Durkin’s The Magpie (1923), Hubert Evans’ The New Front Line (1927),
and Harwood Steele’s I Shall Arise (1926) all deal with the postwar problems
of returned veterans. Each book offers a stinging critique of interwar Canada
and its failure to live up to wartime ideals. Unlike war fiction outside of

60 Dent, Show Me Death! (Toronto: Macmillan, 1930), 91.
61 Dent, Show Me Death!, 375.
62 Leslie Roberts’ When the Gods Laughed, a novel set during rather than after the war,
has a similar ending. Its main character, despite serious wounds, finds purpose in his
romantic love for his beloved “Molly-girl.” See Roberts, When the Gods Laughed (London:
Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1930).
63 Candida Rifkind, “Too Close to Home: Middlebrow Anti-Modernism and the
Sentimental Poetry of Edna Jacques” Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'Etudes Canadiennes
39:1 (Winter 2005): 103.
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Canada, however, they too end happily. In The Magpie a returned man
bitterly explains that veterans wasted “the best part of their lives fighting for
the big fellows.”64 Hugh Henderson in The New Front Line is similarly
disillusioned by postwar life. He proves unable to find meaning in postwar
capitalism and is bothered by how it “seemed that the less useful work a
person did the more money he made.”65 Chris Maynard, whose spirit is
nearly strangled in I Shall Arise by his “incessant disillusionment,” shares
these postwar struggles.66 Yet, despite such themes, none of these novels
carries its discussion of discontent through to the conclusion. In contrast to
disillusioned texts published outside of Canada, each ends with its characters
finding love and meaning after the war.67 It is not surprising, therefore, that
W.L. Morton concluded that Canada’s postwar fiction escaped the
“smoldering disillusionment” of the Lost Generation.68
Morton was correct about Canada’s war fiction but for the wrong
reasons. Age mattered to how this generation understood the conflict. Their
books, while limited in number, presented the conflict differently than those
of older Canadians. The romantic-realist spectrum so often identified by
literary critics was also a generational spectrum. The focus on middlebrow
literature, combined with an incessant preoccupation with studying

64 Durkin, The Magpie (Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1923), 12.
65 Evans, The New Front Line (Toronto: Macmillan, 1927), 110.
66 H.E.R. Steele, I Shall Arise (London: Hodder and Stoughton), 107.
67 In Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, for instance, a sniper kills the main
character. No Canadian war novel has its protagonist killed.
68 W.L. Morton, “1920s,” 226.
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representative books, marginalized the generation’s voices. Canadian
middlebrow fiction shied away from critical interpretations of the war’s
aftermath. But this did not mean that the war generation did as well. Nor did
it mean that this group failed to identify generationally. Rather, Canada’s war
fiction demonstrated that middlebrow fiction did not address the trials faced
by returned men. The conflict’s economic impact is almost uniformly ignored,
as is postwar hardship, battles for promised medical and social assistance,
and difficulties re-integrating into civilian life. Even texts that do attempt
discussion of the war’s economic aftermath, such as Durkin’s The Magpie and
Steele’s I Shall Arise, never resolve the issues their characters face. Instead,
these novels fall back on the twin middlebrow tropes of romantic love and
the agrarian myth as an answer for men’s postwar problems.69 Historians
have added to the critical silencing of this generation’s views by ignoring
what returned men thought about these novels. In the process, they overlook
how age and generation influences interpretations of Canadian war fiction.
When both are examined, it is clear that the so-called representative literature
is a poor gauge to the thinking of returned men which historians mistakenly
use to measure the war’s aftermath and generational impact.
The youth of the war generation is rarely considered a factor when
analyzing interwar fiction. Novak, for example, describes a “new generation”

69 James Doyle describes the imagined place of the Canadian farm as an “agrarian
ideal.” See Doyle, Progressive Heritage: The Evolution of a Politically Radical Literary Tradition in
Canada (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2002), 77. Stephen Cullen, whose
dissertation examines masculinity and Great War fiction in Britain, echoes this analysis,
describing idealized farm life as utopian postwar, rural Eden. See Cullen, “Gender and the
Great War,” especially Chapter 8, “‘There’s a long, long trail a-winding / Into the land of my
dreams’; after the war – combatant dreams and disenchantment,” 309-349.
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of authors who emerged onto Canada’s literary scene in the late 1920s, but
her analysis of age goes no further.70 Peter Buitenhuis also notes the
importance of generational context in Canadian war literature, however he is
concerned with authors born decades before.71 In place of age, critics focus on
war. While they have helped craft a canon of Canadian war fiction, they have
masked how younger men wrote about the conflict. Tector defends Ralph
Connor and Basil King’s war fiction, for example, on the basis that their
choice “to write in the romantic style rather than adopting a realist tone or a
cynical attitude” should not disqualify their books from Canadian war fiction.
Both men were highly successful middlebrow authors, but however
important their work is to the genre, there is little evidence to suggest the war
generation shared Connor or King’s understanding of the conflict. Indeed, no
member of the younger generation authored a war novel comparable to the
positive, romantic vision embraced by Connor and King. Moreover, younger
critics, such as Bill Deacon, were not fans of their work. Deacon, perhaps the
most influential and important book reviewer in the 1920s and 1930s,
dismissed Connor’s novels as “weak,” “pious tales,” filled with little more
than “half-truths.” His Canada “presented a … radically false view of
Canadian life” and, in Deacon’s opinion, the author’s “evangelical zeal” never
equaled his “artistic conscience.”72 Such generational divisions are masked,

70 Novak, Dubious Glory.
71 Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words: British, American and Canadian Propaganda and
Fiction, 1914-1933 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987), 151.
72 William Arthur Deacon, Poteen: A Pot-Pourri of Canadian Essays (Ottawa: Graphic,
1926), 168-169. Deacon was similarly dismissive of L.M. Montgomery, arguing that her work
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however, by claims that younger men like Deacon were elites and that the
fiction most representative of Canadian opinion was the canon’s balanced
and inclusive war texts.
Unlike disillusioned anti-war novels, such as Harrison’s Generals Die in
Bed, “balanced” war books were more “inclusive.”73 These novels were
middlebrow fiction at best and, while they did not deny the war’s “more
negative aspects,” they championed the belief that the war “was necessary.”74
According to Vance, Canadians continued to believe in the war and, although
few denied its toll, accounts too critical of the conflict risked being rejected as
unbalanced. The “right way” to tell the story of the war was to infuse it with
beauty, sentiment, and “noble ideas.”75 Any other approach, including that of
disillusioned anti-war fiction, was “invalid,” because it cast Canadian soldiers
“in a bad light.” As a result, postwar accounts seeking legitimacy with
Canada’s readers had to portray “both the positive and the negative” sides of
the war.76
John Murray Gibbon’s books are considered representative of these
balanced texts. Gibbon, born in 1875, was a Scottish-Canadian who served as
the first president and founding member of the Canadian Authors
Association (CAA). He was also an historian of the Canadian Pacific Railway
was about little more than “sugary stories” and said more about the “dearth of mature novels”
than the quality of Canada’s fiction.
73 Dumontet, “Lest We Forget,” 18.
74 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 52.
75 Vance, Death So Noble, 175.
76 Vance, Death So Noble, 187-188.
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(CPR) and author of two novels inspired by the Great War: Drums Afar: An
International Romance (1918) and The Conquering Hero (1920). The latter was set
during the immediate post-war era. Keshen describes the novel as “typical”
of those in the immediate postwar era.77 Tector agrees and praises Gibbon as a
popular writer. She uses his book as an example of Canadian writers who
failed to adopt realism out of “pure” economic reasons and cites his stories as
“typical” of Canadian postwar bestsellers, which featured “a courageous and
morally upstanding hero, a virtuous, if victimized heroine, sentimentalized
deaths and happy endings.”78
The Conquering Hero is a melodramatic romance-adventure story. The
plot shifts from New Brunswick to New York to British Columbia. It begins in
1918 in a New Brunswick hunting camp, where Donald Macdonald, a
returned man, works with his uncle as a guide. During the war Donald
served with the 42nd Canadian Highlanders. He distinguished himself in
battle, winning the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) for raiding a
machine gun nest, after which he was “wounded, gassed and honourably
discharged.”79 In addition to his status as a war hero, Donald is an
outdoorsman and a farmer, making him the embodiment of at least three
stereotypes of Canadian manliness.

77 Jeff Keshen, “The Great War Soldier as Nation Builder,” 13. It is unclear where
Keshen’s citations come from. He cites page 22 from Novak’s PhD dissertation, however this
citation is not in the chapter of that work (which incidentally was published in 1985, not
1988), nor in her monograph from 2000. Indeed, Novak’s dissertation never addresses The
Conquering Hero and the phrases cited by Keshen do not relate to those used in Novak’s
Dubious Glory.
78 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 18.
79 John Murray Gibbon, The Conquering Hero (Toronto: S.B. Gundy, 1920), 27.
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Like most Canadian novels of this type, The Conquering Hero is not a
war story and the conflict exists only in the background.80 Gibbon does not
deny that Donald was affected by the conflict and the veteran finds that after
returning home his “morbid imagination” runs “riot.” Gibbon blames
Donald’s bad dreams on his nerves. He can control himself by day but once
asleep, he returns to the war:
now on parade, now doing fatigue duty, now creeping out at
night on a wire-cutting expedition, now shivering in the
trenches with fierce excitement at the minute before zero, now
in a wild swirl of hand to hand bayonet fighting or choking
with the fumes of gas.”81
Such passages are reminders that the war is not easily forgotten. These
moments are fleeting, however, and do not affect the rest of the story. In fact,
the novel unfolds as though Donald is mentally and physically fit, despite his
wounds. These injuries never trouble him and he reintegrates into civilian life
with relative ease. In Gibbon’s fictional world, it is Donald’s pride in his
battalion that dominates his feeling about the war, not its consequences.
While authors such as Gibbon may have hesitated criticizing the war,
the emphasis placed on these more balanced books marginalizes the fiction of
Canada’s war generation. Their accounts were the most critical of all of
Canada’s war fiction. Yet, because they published so little, their opinions are
often drowned out by the emphasis on middlebrow books. In their place, the
novels of Ralph Connor are cited as the best example of the Canadian

80 Novak, Dubious Glory, 19.
81 Gibbon, The Conquering Hero, 65.
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rejection of disillusionment. Connor’s works, along with those of L.M.
Montgomery, F.G. Scott, Stephen Leacock, Theodore Roberts, and J. Murray
Gibbon, are used as examples of how Canadians thought about the war. The
focus on their views is justified because they reflected “the average Canadian
reader”82 and the “persistence of conventional habits and attitudes” in
Canada’s nascent postwar publishing industry.83 A select group of bestselling authors thus dominated Canada’s literary landscape, ensuring that the
literary market was a place where the “new generation” failed to “take the
lead.”84 After the war ended, the literary preferences of Canadians “remained
consistently traditional” and readers held to their “prewar favourites.” As the
critic Leo Kennedy lamented, “the Canadian literary scene is dominated by
the Frank L. Packards, the Howard Angus Kennedys, the Ralph Connors; the
Robertses and the Campbells.”85
Despite their popularity, however, novels by authors such as Ralph
Connor differed from those of younger writers.86 Connor, like Hemingway,
Dos Passos, and Charles Yale Harrison, served in the war, in his case as a
chaplain. But unlike these younger writers, Connor was fifty-four years old
when war broke out. His age shaped his experience, just as the war

82 Vance, A History of Canadian Culture (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2009),
263.
83 Mary Vipond, “Best Sellers in English Canada: 1919-1928,” Journal of Canadian
Fiction 36/37 (1986): 85.
84 Vance, History of Canadian Culture, 247.
85 Kennedy quoted in Vance, History of Canadian Culture, 262.
86 Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words, 152.
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generation’s youth shaped theirs. The younger generation generally rejected
traditional, romanticized portrayals of conflict in ways that older men, such
as Connor, did not. In The Sun Also Rises, Hemingway declared that the war
was “a calamity for civilization and perhaps would have been better
avoided.”87 Connor’s fictional response to the war was the exact opposite. In
place of disillusioned rejection, his books re-affirmed the war’s purpose in
prose and style “reminiscent” of writers such as Rudyard Kipling.88 No
Canadian authors rejected the war to the extent of Hemingway. But this does
not mean that the war generation disagreed with his approach. Their books
could also be critical of the conflict, despite ending positively, which reflected
more than a search for a silver lining in their war experience. Connor’s
generation viewed the war as a redemptive force for good, a theme that he
continued to support as late as 1925.89 The fiction of younger men was
different. It found meaning in the war (and its aftermath) despite the
calamity, not because war was a redeeming force.
The differences in the generational version of the postwar world are
evident in Harwood Steele’s I Shall Arise (1926).90 Steele’s book (now largely
forgotten) tells the story of a returned man. It begins with Chris Maynard

87 Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises, 24-25.
88 Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words, 154.
89 In Treading the Winepress Connor continues to describe the war as a “Great
Adventure.” See Connor, Treading the Winepress (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1925), 285.
90 H.E.R. Steele, born in 1897 (almost forty years after Connor), was the son of Sir
Sam Steele. He attested in May 1915, survived the war, and worked as a journalist and for the
Canadian Pacific Railway. In addition to a handful of articles about the conflict, Steele
authored a series of novels and short stories about the RCMP. See Tennyson, The Canadian
Experience of the Great War, 376-77.
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returning home from France. In place of a fiancée, job, and life that he
expected, Chris finds a changed Canada that shatters his wartime ideals.
After a failed suicide attempt, Maynard recuperates, falls in love, and builds a
new life on a soldier farm in British Columbia. The novel’s structure is similar
to other postwar fiction about veterans, such as Durkin’s The Magpie and
Evans’ The New Front Line. It combines sharp criticisms of Canada’s postwar
economy with a veteran’s struggles to reintegrate into society. As with other
middlebrow fiction from this period, it ends on a positive note and, like Craig
Forrester in The Magpie and Hugh Henderson in The New Front Line, Maynard
finds solace moving out of the city and onto the land.
What sets Steele’s book apart from other novels about the difficulties
faced by returned soldiers in postwar Canada is that the main character is the
most deeply affected. In Durkin’s book, Craig Forrester does not face serious
personal hurdles. He has a job waiting for him and his health is not an issue.
Rather, it is his friend, the secondary character Jimmy Dyer, who embodies
the struggles of returned soldiers. In I Shall Arise, however, Chris Maynard
experiences extreme hardship. Indeed, within the first few pages of the novel
his life spirals out of control. His prewar love marries another man, he loses
his job, and his former comrades abandon him. Everywhere he turns,
Maynard is let down. The government will not help him with his health,
veterans’ associations do not want him as a member (because he was an
officer), and even the Church proves unable to provide the necessary support.
Maynard finds himself completely alone. Canada has failed him and he is
consumed with disillusionment. His “bitterness” swells up “like a rising
flood, dark and deep and awful.” As the flood rises, “it quenched the
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gleaming fire that once had burnt there—Faith. His faith in himself was gone;
his faith in mankind going; his faith in God going too.” Maynard’s trust is
fundamentally shaken, “trust in the women he knew, his trust in his friends,
his confidence in the sincerity of those who promised Justice to the ex-soldier,
his confidence in the future.” The veteran is despondent and the arrival of
Armistice Day proves the final straw. Having witnessed how poorly veterans
are being treated, Maynard cannot stand that Canadians are celebrating their
‘glorious dead’ while forgetting the plight of the living. The postwar world
ushered in a “second war,” a “War of Peace.” Unlike 1914-18, this new war
would have “no victory.” Without a family or a job, and with his health
failing, Maynard decides his only solution is suicide. He retrieves his service
revolver and attempts to shoot himself at the base of Winnipeg’s cenotaph. In
a final act of irony, the cold proves too much for his damaged body and he is
overtaken by sleep before he can pull the trigger.91
Had Steele’s book been written later in the decade, or outside of
Canada, the novel would likely have ended with Maynard’s suicide, a
damning indictment of the plight of the returned man.92 But it did not and the
book quickly returns to its middlebrow sensibilities when a Winnipeg nurse,
Daphne Hargraves, saves Chris from hypothermia. The two eventually fall in
love and settle on Vancouver Island at the fictional soldier farm of

91 Steele, I Shall Arise, 122, 174.
92 Virginia Woolf’s character, Septimus Warren Smith, for example, famously
commits suicide in her novel Mrs. Dalloway. In addition to that text, see too Karen
Levenback, Virginia Woolf and the Great War (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999).
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Pinehurst.93 There, Chris meets Toby, another veteran, whose life motto—“I
Shall Arise”—inspires Maynard to reconsider his sense of disillusion. Chris’
postwar renewal becomes complete in November while listening to Colonel
Kent’s Armistice Day address. The speech addresses the postwar trials of
returned men: “We see the world rolling along … as before. And we ask
ourselves, was it worth it?” His answer is a resounding yes, because of the
‘gifts’ the war gave the soldiers. Even though veterans had to do without
“riches and prosperity,” the war gave them something much more valuable:
“happiness and self-respect.” In the end, these were the qualities that
mattered, along with their memories. Kent calls on the crowd to forget the
“rough side” of the war by remembering only its “good side.”94
Steele’s defense of the war’s memory is typical of Canada’s
middlebrow war fiction. What is surprising, however, is his scathing portrait
of both life overseas and in postwar Canada. Chris Maynard’s experience on
the battlefields is described in gruesome detail and Steele’s willingness to
discuss the horrors and its postwar traumatic aftermath is what sets his
generation’s accounts of the conflict apart from earlier fiction by older
authors such as Connor and Gibbon. The destruction of Flanders that Steele
recounts, with its “corpses, stiff, mud-covered, blood-stained, gazing with
glassy eyes,” is anything but romantic. Descriptions of Maynard’s return to

93 Steele likely based Pinehurst on the Merville Soldier Settlement plan, which bears
similarities to Pinehurst, notably a forest fire that destroys much of the community in 1922.
See Paul M. Koroscil, “Soldiers, Settlement and Development in British Columbia, 1915-1930,”
BC Studies 54 (Summer 1982) and James Murton, Creating a Modern Countryside: Liberalism and
Land Settlement in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008),
especially Chapter Three, “Stump Farms: Soldier Settlement at Merville,” 73-108.
94 Steele, I Shall Arise, 271-274.

96
Canada are equally critical and Steele states explicitly that the
disappointments Chris experiences crush his spirit, draining him of “every
ounce of strength he had.” Although he eventually comes to embrace his war
memories, Steele makes it clear that they will haunt him for the rest of his life
and Chris realizes “what the War had cost him.” The conflict “could not be
thrown aside, like a closed book, as soon as peace was signed,” because “its
consequences … were to meet him and those of his generation everywhere, as
long as they lived.” 95
The most revealing difference between the war generation’s version of
the war and that of older Canadians is in their descriptions of the dead. In The
Sky Pilot in No Man’s Land, Connor ends his novel with the death of his main
character, Barry Dunbar. It is a death of redemption and it plays a critical part
in the novel’s plot. Having proved himself in battle, his last words recall the
glory of God and war, reaffirming the reason for fighting and the importance
of faith:
“Now—that’s—all—major,” he whispered. “Tell—her—
I—thank—God—for—her—and—for—the—other.
Major—
tell—the—boys—that—God—is good—. Never—to be—
afraid—but to—carry on-”
It was his last word, and there could be no better. “God is
good. Never be afraid but carry on.”96
By comparison, Will Bird, who authored several books about the war,
stripped battlefield death of all sentimentality. He opened his memoir, And

95 Steele, I Shall Arise, 36. 74.
96 Connor, The Sky Pilot in No Man’s Land (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1919), 343.

97
We Go On, with the killing of a young recruit. The man, new to the trenches,
asks a veteran sergeant, “Where is the war—what is it?” A chance bullet kills
the recruit midway through his sentence: “Ping! We buried him before it was
light.” The young man’s death is devoid of meaning, glory, or romance. It is a
sad, brutal fact that merits no further description. What is war? Bird’s answer
is simple and straightforward: dead men, reduced to little more than a
“shriveled corpse,” so “rotted” that no one could say whether he was “friend
or foe.”97
Charles Yale Harrison’s descriptions of death in Generals Die in Bed are
just as jarring. Wounded men are described as running with “gushing
stumps.” In a scene describing the bayoneting of a German soldier, Harrison
details just how awkward and unclean the act of killing actually was:
My tugging and pulling works the blade in his insides.
Again those horrible shrieks!
I place the butt of the rifle under my arm and turn
away, trying to drag the blade out. It will not come.
I think: I can get it out if I unfasten the bayonet from
the rifle. But I cannot go through with the plan, for the blade
is in up to the hilt and the wound which I have been clumsily
mauling is now a gaping hole. I cannot put my hand there.
Suddenly I remember what I must do.
I turn around and pull my breech-lock back. The click
sounds sharp and clear.
He stops his screaming. He looks at me, silently now.
He knows what I am going to do.
A white Very light soars over our heads. His helmet
has fallen from his head. I see his boyish face. He looks like a
Saxon; he is fair and under the light I see white down against

97 Bird, And We Go On, 4-5.
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green cheeks.
I pull my trigger. There is a loud report. The blade at
the end of my rifle snaps in two. He falls into the corner of
the bay and rolls over. He lies still.
I am free.98
Ralph Connor was capable of writing critically of the war’s impact,
but, like other older authors, he chose not to.99 In To Him That Hath, his novel
about the postwar era, Connor produces as sympathetic and nuanced a
critique of veterans’ issues as any war generation writer. The war, he wrote,
was a “soul-devastating experience,” which forced men to return home to a
life “desolate and maimed in all that gave it value.” Yet, in spite of such
prose, what sets Connor apart from younger writers is that he tempered the
harsh realities his characters faced. In place of disillusionment, his veterans
find meaning and purpose in their postwar lives. After meeting the future
love of his life, Captain Jack feels his sense of purpose return and he is
thankful that the “dreary weeks” that followed his return home are finally
ended.100

98 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, 112-113.
99 Stephen Leacock, for example, produced a brilliant satire of the younger
generation’s war writing in his collected My Remarkable Uncle. In an essay, “War and
Humour,” he lampooned the realistic staccato of much of the war generation’s writing: “As
the first roar of grape shot zoomed past us, my stomach suddenly sank. I walked to the edge
of the mound and vomited. My stomach turned. I was sick. I threw up. “Did you vomit?”
asked Lord Kitchener. I said I had. “Well, I’m going to,” he said. He went and vomited. He
was sick. “Did you vomit, Kitchener,” said Roberts. “Yes.” “Well, move aside and let
me.”Such prose set “newer,” “realist writers” apart from an earlier literary tradition,
including the works of Ralph Connor. See Leacock, “War and Humour,” in My Remarkable
Uncle (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2010 [1942]), 129.
100 Ralph Connor, To Him That Hath (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), 27.
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The war generation writers rebelled against these tame, romantic
descriptions. They did not praise war. They rejected it and some did so by
explicitly taking aim at romanticized accounts. In Generals Die in Bed, a
moralizing, “middle-aged” lay preacher symbolizes the older generation. He
does not fit in with the younger men and has trouble relating to them. The
recruits reject the preacher’s attempts to sermonize, telling him bluntly (in a
thinly veiled reference to Ralph Connor), “Shut up, sky pilot.”101 Steele’s I
Shall Arise is similarly critical of the war and it frames its critiques
generationally by criticizing how men younger and older than the war
generation were profiting at their expense: “The War has played hell with the
careers of our generation.” The conflict was not “catching” the “youngsters”
or the “senior chaps,” but rather “the fellows in between like you and me,
who were just old enough to be starting but too young to have got fairly
going. We’re the birds that have to pay. We’ve had to sacrifice our dreams,
our life-work.”102
Steele’s book demonstrates that these authors did not just write
differently about the war, they also framed their work generationally. Hubert
Evans’ The New Front Line and Douglas Durkin’s The Magpie, for instance,
were very much about the postwar era. Neither sees anything positive about
the war’s outcome. Generational conflict is central to each. In Evans’ case,
division exists between the novel’s main character, a returned soldier, and his
father, a middle-class businessman. In Durkin’s book, the main character

101 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, 16.
102 Steele, I Shall Arise, 156.
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clashes with the established interests in Winnipeg, all men older than himself.
Both novels are highly critical of postwar Canada and they blame the older
generation for not understanding the overwhelming expectation of postwar
change or their resulting disillusionment. Gibbon’s postwar novel, by
comparison, ignores Donald’s age. There is no inter-generational conflict in
the story and Donald gets along with those older than himself, particularly
his uncle Hector. Moreover, none of the challenges Donald faces relate to the
war. Instead, they are rooted in traditional points of middlebrow interest:
romance.
Beaumont Cornell’s realist novel, Lantern Marsh (1923), about a young
historian in Toronto, is another novel that explored generational division and
its roots in the war. In Cornell’s book, those men older than the war
generation simply do not understand the conflict. In a key passage two
university students ridicule a new history of the war by an older, established
member of the department: “He’s got the whole war so definitely sized up
that you don’t feel any surprise at anything that happened.” The historian
tries to make the war feel “as natural as taking your coffee into the drawing
room after dinner.”
You feel that the strategic movements in the battles cost nobody
a moment’s thought. The soldiers just emerge from the west
salient and the east flank like so many automatic chess-pieces
headed for their preordained positions. There’s no smoke or
explosions or blood in his battles at all. Just 3,000 casualties, 500
prisoners, and a dent in the Allied line or the German line.103

103 Beaumont Cornell, Lantern Marsh (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1923), 219-220. Bill
Deacon made a similar complaint in the late 1920s during an address to the St. Catharines
Women’s Canadian Club. “Histories,” he told his audience, “… specialized in wars and
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Cornell was critical of more than the official histories of the Great War. It was
generational. For the war generation, the conflict did not need to be explained.
It was felt.
The importance of getting the feeling of the war right may explain why
so few members of the war generation wrote novels about the conflict.
Regardless of the reason, however, there was no boom in Canadian war
fiction and this fact was noticed. In 1933, the historian and veteran Wilfrid
Kerr was bothered by the absence of his generation’s writing about the war, a
fact he lamented because the Canadian Corps had a particularly “high
standard of literacy and intelligence.”104 Four years later Frederick Noyes,
another veteran and author of a battalion history, also remarked on how few
novels his generation had produced. “Let us hope,” he wrote in 1937, “that
before it is too late a Zola or a Hugo may appear and place the case for [our
story] before the general public in a manner befitting the terribly tragic
subject.”105 Such a book was never written. The literary silence is even more
surprising given the publishing frenzy that accompanied the conflict. No full
account by scholars of the number of Canadian war books exists. That said, at

generals and kings. Little was heard of the common people; and even in telling of the armies
we did not hear how many meals the soldier had, nor what he ate.” See Thomas Fisher Rare
Book Library [hereafter TFRBL], Ms. Col. 160 [hereafter Deacon papers], Box 48, folder 12,
“Casual Observations of a Bookman,” address to St. Catharines Women’s Canadian Club, 9
May 1928.
104 Wilfrid Kerr, “Historical Literature on Canada’s War Participation in the Great
War,” Canadian Historical Review 14:4 (1933), 427.
105 Frederick W. Noyes, Stretcher-Bearers … at the Double!: History of the Fifth Canadian
Field Ambulance which Served Overseas during the Great War of 1914-1918 (Toronto: Hunter-Rose,
1937), 277.
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least fifty novels set during the war were published between 1914 and 1939.106
Despite the desire for a postwar canon, however, critics fail to acknowledge
how few of these books were written by the war generation. Indeed, when
compared to the output in Britain, Canada’s output was meager. According
to Stephen Cullen, British ex-combatants published 146 novels between 1919
and 1939.107 During the same period fewer than ten were produced in
Canada,108 a discrepancy that cannot be explained by relative differences in
population size.109
This low literary output in Canada should give historians pause,
especially when judging the historical representativeness of these texts.
Nonetheless, many of the books by the war generation are dismissed for
being unrepresentative, often in favour of works by older, more established
authors; this despite the fact that younger authors published more war books
than older authors (see Figures 2 and 3).

106 See Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 40 and the appendix to Novak, Dubious Glory.
107 Cullen, “Gender and the Great War,” 77-85.
108 See Appendix II for more detailed listing of Canadian war books and the war
fiction published during this period.
109 Based on 1931 populations, in Canada the ratio of war books published
compared to the population was 1:314,545. In Britain, it was 1:255,890.109 The divide is even
starker when only war novels are considered. Britain’s ratio is 1:549,397, while Canada’s is
nearly three times greater at 1:1,482,857. These comparisons compare Canadian war books,
including memoirs, to British literary fiction alone. No comprehensive tally of these memoirs
has been conducted, but if they are included in the total, then the discrepancy between
Canada and Britain is even greater.
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Figure 2. Visual representation of data in Appendix II
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Figure 3. Visual representation of data in Appendix II

Critiques of Generals Die in Bed are a case in point. The book is
dismissed as an inaccurate gauge of Canadians’ view of the war, despite the
fact that Harrison was one of the war generation. Neta Gordon, for instance,
argues that the book did not appeal to interwar Canadians.110 Jeff Keshen is
similarly dismissive. Canadians, he argues, disliked Harrison’s portrayal of
the “dehumanizing nature of war” and instead continued to believe the

110 Neta Gordon, Catching the Torch: Contemporary Canadian Literary Responses to
World War I (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2014), 36.
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conflict had been fought for “noble causes … and that the stupendous
performance in combat had created a new, strong, and internationally
respected nation.”111 Tim Cook also concludes that disillusioned writing “did
not resonate with most readers.” Harrison’s book may have been the “most
aggressive” of Canada’s war writing, but it was also “vigorously attacked”
for being “unrepresentative.”112
Jonathan Vance makes the strongest case for dismissing Harrison’s
novel. He cites its critical reception in the press, parliament, and amongst
military commanders as evidence for its widespread rejection. According to
Vance, the book left Generals Arthur Currie and Archibald Macdonell
fuming. Currie considered it “a mass of filth, lies and appeals to everything
base and mean and nasty.” The former commander of the Canadian Corps
continued his tirade, telling Macdonell that Harrison’s book “is full of vile
and misrepresentation, and cannot have any lasting influence.” Macdonell
agreed. He consoled Currie, telling him that he wanted nothing more than “to
live long enough to have the opportunity of shoving my fist into that s— of a
b— Harrison's tummy until his guts hang out of his mouth!!!”113 Critics,
according to Vance, were equally offended. Saturday Night’s Nathaniel
Benson believed that “fully half the incidents described in the book never
occurred.”114 It was “a book of very dubious literary merit” and made “very

111 Keshen, “The Great War As Nation Builder,” 11, 14.
112 Cook, Shock Troops, 634, 635.
113 Currie and Macdonell cited in Vance, “Soldier as Novelist,” 30-31.
114 Vance, Death So Noble, 193.
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ugly reading indeed.”115 The Ottawa Citizen also ran stories criticizing what it
interpreted as slandering of Canadians and the federal MP Tommy Church
called for its ban in parliament.
Aside from not critically examining the nationalist response to a
critical description of the war and the military, historians such as Vance,
Keshen, and Cook have only told part of the story. A closer look at reaction to
the book reveals a more complicated picture. It is not surprising that
Canadian officers (and generals in particular) reacted so negatively to the
critical portrayal.116 The reaction of enlisted men, however, was more positive
and many reviewers were also generous in their praise. Far from dismissing
the book as slanderous, they were grateful that somebody was finally
describing the war in a way that resonated with the experiences of those who
actually fought it in the trenches.
The book was intended to be controversial. But historians have
ignored how this controversy was largely the product of a skillful advertising
campaign by Harrison’s publisher. During the novel’s British and North
American tours, this publicity campaign fuelled critical fires by distributing

115 Benson, cited in Vance, Death So Noble, 193.
116 The same is true of Will Bird’s war memoir, And We Go On. It was praised by
enlisted men, but officers were critical of the text, as a review in Canadian Defence Quarterly
illustrates. In July 1931, the journal panned Bird’s book, describing it as “flatly obnoxious,”
and admonished its accuracy, stating “Established facts—a matter of historical record—seem
to have little appeal for Mr. Bird.” Ironically, given recent use of Bird as an antidote to the
supposed unrepresentativeness of disillusioned authors, this review stated that Bird’s book
would have been improved if he “had been content to tell us what he did and thought sixteen
years ago instead of attributing current sophistry, inspired, one guesses, from a night with
Remarque or Zweig, to his Great War experiences.” See W.W.M.’s review of And We Go On in
Canadian Defence Quarterly 8:4 (July 1931): 582-583.
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sensational extracts from the book. These excerpts were presented out of
context and highlighted only the most controversial parts of the novel. While
this material undoubtedly drummed up publicity and headlines, it obscured
the larger narrative and message.117
Once past the initial controversy, reviewers gained more appreciation
for the novel.118 The Montreal Gazette lamented that many recent war books
were so negative, but its reviewer noted that veterans, like Harrison, had
every right to produce their own accounts, even if they caused “annoyance in
high quarters.” In stark contrast to early reviews, the Gazette praised
Harrison’s style for its “compelling narrative,” and admitted that the book
spoke to “the feelings of a private in the various trials of war.”119 The Ottawa
Citizen was even more praiseworthy. Its review claimed that talk of banning
the novel was “simply childish.” The book was a “realistic and outspoken
story of one man’s experiences and reactions to the war.” It was a modernist
novel, written in the “prevailing fashion” which emphasized the “brutality,
stupidity, dirt and degradation of war.” The resulting picture was “revolting.”

117 Columbia Rare Book and Manuscript Library [Hereafter CRBML], MS 0560 C.Y.
Harrison [hereafter Harrison papers], CMI 13, Scrapbook 2, n.d.
118 Many of the most critical Canadian reviews simply parroted criticism leveled in
the British press, particularly in the Daily Mail. Despite sensational headlines, however, these
Canadian reviews preceded the release of the novel in Canada and they were clearly little
more than pieces strung together from wire services.
119 “The Private Talks Again,” Montreal Gazette, 21 June 1930.
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But this was Harrison’s intent. Efforts “to uphold war and object to its literal
description,” the paper argued, were “a species of hypocrisy.120
There was no appeasing some critics, usually because they disliked the
new modernist style or disagreed with assaults on the romanticized versions
of the war. Nathaniel Benson was one of Harrison’s most vociferous
detractors. He hated anything that smacked of modernism. Not long after
panning the book, Benson told reviewer Bill Deacon that he was deeply
skeptical of literary modernism. “What do [these works] bring to us,” he
asked. “Just a little less cheer than the gloomy horrors of Dostoievski. I think
that the world is a bit sick of the modern debunking intellectual and his poor
creations. What we really need is some force or movement to restore our old
belief in things heroic and perhaps incredible.”121
Many veterans felt differently. They did not object to Harrison’s style
or its message. On the contrary, they embraced it and the author received
“many letters from Canadian veterans who expressed pleasure at the
publication of the book.”122 James Lott was ecstatic about the novel. He had

120 “Generals Die in Bed,” Ottawa Citizen, 14 June 1930. This is an important review
because the Citizen’s reporting has been cited as critical of Harrison.
121 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Box 2, folder 23, Benson to Deacon, 27 June 1933. Deacon
complained to his colleague Betram Brooker about such thinking during the preparation of
his book, Open House. “I see both Bridle and Hammond are at the same game again with
Acland’s ‘All Else is Folly’; and this is so general a habit with Canadian ‘critics’ that the point
must be made” that their views are largely irrelevant to the younger generation. See
University of Manitoba Archives [Hereafter UMA], Mss 16 [hereafter Brooker papers], Box 1,
folder 2, Deacon to Brooker, 5 October 1929.
122 “Generals Die in Bed, The Author Replies to Criticism,” London Times, 13 July
1930.
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served with the 14th Battalion—as did Harrison—and wrote the author to tell
him that his book brought back “the old days, names, and places.” Lott was
especially keen to relive moments of his old unit and he pointed out that it
was the “first time I have had an opportunity of reading anything about the
14th R.M.R!” He certainly had his own personal reasons to begrudge Harrison.
As Lott reminded him, Harrison had put a pick through Lott’s hand when
they both served on a working party during the war.123 Laban Hill also served
in the 14th Battalion and he was even more laudatory of Harrison’s novel,
which he considered “wonderful.” Hill was not an avid reader but picked up
the book because of its title. “At once,” he wrote Harrison, he “became
interested.” The veteran was impressed with Harrison’s realistic portrayal of
the war and thankful that somebody had finally written a war story who
“knows what he is writing about.” In Hill’s opinion, most war books and war
films were a “joke,” which anyone who saw “active service in France”
realized. Harrison’s book, by contrast, was “vivid and real.”124 Reviewers and
ex-combatants gave Harrison’s book a warmer reception than previously
acknowledged.
Disillusioned war writers in Canada were joined by intellectuals in
criticizing the war. Yet Canadian historians deem their voices as

123 CRBML, Harrison papers, Box 1a, Correspondence – Generals Die in Bed, 20 June,
1930. There is no enlisted man named James Lott in the CEF database, however, Lott did sign
his letter to Harrison as Cpl. James J. Lott and there is an attestation paper listed for John
James Lott (note inverted primary names) who served as a corporal. This service file was
removed from circulation for digitization and has not yet been posted on-line. Nonetheless,
the familiarity with which Lott writes to Harrison and Harrison’s lack of comment about this
suggests the men are in all likelihood the same person.
124 CRBML, Harrison Papers, Box 1a, Correspondence – Generals Die in Bed, Laban
Hill to Harrison, 29 August 1930.
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unrepresentative. Critics such as Frank Underhill and F.R. Scott were highly
skeptical of the war’s value. But for every Underhill, it is argued, there were
“countless Canadians who aired conflicting views.”125 The case of F.R. Scott
and his father, Canon F.G. Scott, is particularly illustrative of this sentiment in
Canada and the importance of age in shaping understanding of the war.
Frederick George Scott was a leading Confederation-era poet, who later
served as archdeacon of Quebec. His son, Frank, was also a poet, as well as a
constitutional and political scholar. During the 1920s, the two generations of
this family represented very different understandings of the war.126 F.R. Scott
was critical and therefore has been dismissed by historians. Canon’s Scott’s
work, on the other hand, remains “one of the most cited war testimonies
among Canadian scholars of the Great War.”127
The elder Scott was a contemporary of Ralph Connor and his war
memoir, The Great War As I Saw It, typified how many of his generation
wanted the war remembered: as a tragic but heroic struggle. Scott witnessed
many of the war’s worst horrors. Yet even the loss of a son did not alter his
overall perspective: “Nothing overseas … prompted [Scott] to question the
settled conviction that the war had been a crusade that offered Canadians a
providential opportunity to realize a higher level of national

125 Vance, Death So Noble, 6.
126 Bowker, A Time Such as There Never Was Before, 348.
127 Marc McGowan, “Introduction” to Frederick George Scott, The Great War As I
Saw It (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014) viii.
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righteousness.”128 The younger Scott did not serve in the war but his views
reflected his generation’s sense of disillusioned skepticism. His criticisms
were based on a reading of modernism that led him to reconsider the war’s
effect on his generation, their ideas about masculinity, and a sense of
hopelessness with the state of the postwar world. This morass seeped into
Frank Scott’s re-evaluation of postwar literature, religion, nationalism, and
science. By Armistice Day in 1926, he summed up the effects of his changing
worldview, revealing in his diary that his beliefs were now “all topsyturvy.”129
When the war first broke out, Frank tried to enlist five times before a
fireworks accident nearly blinded him. At the time he held similar views
about the conflict to his father and he was frustrated by his inability to serve.
In 1919 he confided in his diary that he would have given “10 years of my life
to have been able to get to the front.”130 A trip to the Western Front, in 1922, to
visit his brother’s grave changed his mind: “Scott lost much of his enthusiasm
for war” and he wrote in his diary that he would spend his life “fighting
those things that make war possible.”131 Frank learned that his brother was
suffering a nervous breakdown before he was killed. This revelation
coincided with increased questioning of the “causes and conduct” of the war

128 Duff Crerar, Padres in No Man’s Land, 213.
129 Sandra Djwa, The Politics of Imagination: A Life of F.R. Scott (Toronto: Douglas &
McIntyre, 1989), 112.
130 F.R. Scott, cited in Djwa, The Politics of Imagination, 42.
131 Sherrill Grace, “Canadian Poets on War,” in Sherrill Grace, Patrick Imbert, Tiffan
Johnstone, eds., Bearing Witness: Perspectives on War and Peace from the Arts and Humanities
(Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), 45.
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and how it was framed in its aftermath.132 Scott read widely about the conflict,
steeping himself in the war literature emerging out of Britain and the United
States. By the end of the 1920s, the younger Scott developed a decidedly
different understanding of the war than his father.
The works of Robert Graves and Erich Maria Remarque, both leading
voices of disillusionment, had a profound impact on Frank Scott.133 He found
them more relevant than traditional interpretations articulated by poets such
as Rupert Brooke, who was killed in 1915. As a pre-war poet, Brooke may
well have “typified the willing self-sacrifice of youth on the altar of
patriotism,” but he died before the end of the war. Those who had seen the
conflict to its conclusion, however, dismissed Brooke’s patriotic and romantic
ideals as naïve. Scott concluded that society had learned its lesson from the
war and that poets who had lived to the end saw its “truth.” Frank compared
Brooke’s chivalric “galahadism” to the writing of Siegfried Sassoon and
Wilfred Owen. Sassoon wrote of “martyred youth” and “manhood
overthrown.” Owen described the war’s dead as “cattle” that had been
slaughtered by the “monstrous anger of the guns.”134 In addition to
illustrating the lasting impact this literature had on Scott’s understanding of
132 Djwa, The Politics of Imagination, 113.
133 Djwa, The Politics of Imagination, 113. He was not alone in doing so. Other
Canadians his age, including Harry Cassidy, also made an effort to engage with British and
American war writing. During the 1920s, for example, Cassidy made a serious effort to read
Ford Madox Ford’s No More Parades (1925), the second novel in his series Parade’s End. See
University of Toronto Archives (UTA), B72-0022 [Hereafter Cassidy Papers], Vol. 8, folder 1,
Cassidy to Bea, 10 July 1927. Cassidy described the novel as “ununderstandable.” For
Cassidy’s war experience, see too Keith Walden, ed., The Papers of Harry Cassidy and Beatrice
Pearce: The Courtship Years, 1917-1925 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 2009).
134 Djwa, The Politics of Imagination, 114.
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the Great War, such comparisons also demonstrate that Canada was by no
means an island isolated from the currents of criticism emerging in the U.S.
and Britain.135
The realist writing of the war generation did not sit well with “average
Canadians.” Indeed, it was not meant to. They found its modernism coarse
and vulgar. While this may have been the case with modernist literature like
Generals Die in Bed, it was not necessarily true of more middlebrow fiction,
such as Lantern Marsh or I Shall Arise. Although these novels were more
traditional in style, they also criticized romantic depictions of warfare. In
terms of postwar representations, therefore, elite and middlebrow authors
who counted themselves part of the war generation did not have radically
different understandings of the conflict and they agreed that the war could
not be treated as it was by Ralph Connor, Canon Scott, or other older and
established authors. This position was more critical in message and tone than
the work of many of Canada’s most popular authors.

135 According to Colin Hill, “Canada’s early Great War novels … indicate the degree
to which Canada’s post-war realism was both modern and international: the affinity of
Canada’s Great War novels with works by writers such as Ford Madox Ford, Rebecca West,
Henri Barbusse, Ernest Hemingway, Edith Wharton, and Erich Maria Remarque, among
many others, suggests that Canada’s war realism, and modern realism more generally, are
necessarily considered in an international context, rather than within a cultural-nationalistic
paradigm that sees realism as a conservative, mimetic, reflective, and often regionalist
literary form.” See Hill, “Early Novels of the Great War,” 61.
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Chapter 3
The postwar disillusioning of Canada’s war generation
“What we did for them never was enough. We cross-questioned them,
we checked them narrowly as to their disabilities, as to what happened
to their characters, ‘why don’t you get a job’ [they were asked]. How
could he get a job when the poor fellow was mentally crippled as the
result of living in a monstrous atmosphere and under conditions that
did something to his spirit.”1
- Greg Clark, interview with the CBC

At the outbreak of the Great War, Canadian youth were optimistic about the
future. Their fight would end war, put a stop to German tyranny, and save
European civilization. As the war progressed they also became increasingly
nationalistic in their desire for postwar change. Although naïve in retrospect,
during the war’s darkest hours, such hopes helped the war generation find
meaning in the conflict. Peacetime challenges, however, including economic
hardship and international instability, undermined their certainty in the war’s
purpose. The future these men fought for did not materialize, leaving many

1. LAC, RG41, Vol. 17, 4th C.M.R., Flanders’ Fields: Greg Clark, tape 2/3, n.d.
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angry and disillusioned with the direction of peacetime Canada. For these
veterans, their disenchantment remained a personal affair, in part because it
did not fit with how the war was commemorated in public.
Few Canadians objected to the importance of remembering the
nation’s sacrifices. The war generation knew first-hand what the conflict cost
and, while uncomfortable discussing its personal experiences, it agreed with
the public’s desire to commemorate the conflict.2 This commemorative
impulse, combined with period literature and other “cultural products,”
remains a popular way to study the war and its aftermath. In Canada, many
of these sources focused on what the war achieved, not what was lost, and the
resulting narratives explaining the conflict’s meaning argue that unlike
Europe “disillusion was successfully marginalized.”3
An idealized history of the Canadian Corps and its achievements in
Europe helped buttress this public memory of the war. After 1918, most of the
combatant nations began to compile official histories. Canada did so as well
but the official historian failed to produce a volume until 1938. Several
veterans, including Will Bird and the historian Wilfrid Kerr, hoped to fill the
gap with detailed memoirs. Their initial efforts were stymied, however,
because they were denied access to critical records until the official project
was completed.4 American war stories faced no such hurdle. These flooded

2 Vance, Death So Noble, 213.
3 Sheftall, Altered Memories, 2.
4 See “Preface” to Bird, The Communication Trench, where Bird decries that the official
records were “more closely guarded than the gold of the Mint.” Bird was not the only to
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across the border throughout the 1920s, much to the concern of nationalists,
such as George Drew, who worried Canadians would be unduly influenced
by an Americanized version of the war.
When a series of American articles belittled the British Empire’s war
effort, Drew led the charge to correct the historical record. His article, “The
Truth About the War,” which appeared in the Dominion Day issue of
Maclean’s magazine, attacked American claims that the Empire had “shirked
its duty.”5 By calling on documents held by the Historical Section of the
Department of National Defence, Drew laid out a statistical defence of the
British Empire’s achievements between 1914 and 1918. “The Truth About the
War” struck a chord and a series of additional articles soon followed,
including profiles of Canadian Airmen.
Drew’s writing preserved one version of the war’s history and,
according to Jonathan Vance, any account that strayed from the accepted
narrative was rejected as “a dangerous falsehood.”6 While this mythical
history enshrined a particular memory of the conflict, the war generation was
not bound by the myth’s limited scope. In addition to the conflict’s public
memory, it judged the war’s history in light of personal experience. To these
notice this. So did Wilfrid Kerr, as well as Bird’s own readers. See DUA, Bird Papers, Vol. 9,
Scrapbook 5, Ed to Bird, 9 January 1934. As Jonathan Vance argues, the gap was filled by
popular histories, including Unit Histories, pulp magazines, and other sources that adhered
to the war myth. See Vance, Death So Noble, 163.
5 George A. Drew, “The Truth About the War,” Maclean’s (1 July, 1928): 2. Later,
Drew expanded his argument by focusing specifically on Canada’s contributions to the war
effort. The most successful of these articles were a series of profiles of Canadian airmen,
which proved so popular that they were re-published as a book, Canada’s Fighting Airmen
(1930). See too Vance, Death So Noble, 178.
6 Vance, Death So Noble, 179, 187
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men, the memory of the conflict was complex. It could be used to defend
Canada’s military record but it was also cited as justification for strong
critiques of the war and its aftermath. Such criticisms were rooted in the
generation’s hopes for an improved postwar future and when this world
failed to materialize young men began to question the meaning of the war.
Record of this disillusionment is sparse. While few veterans were
comfortable discussing their war experiences, it was rarer still to discuss the
war’s impact. Even the most candid of memoirs, such Will Bird’s And We Go
On, omitted life after coming home. Fred Bagnall’s Not Mentioned in
Despatches, another candid account of the war experience, did offer some
critiques of postwar life, but such discussion was limited to asides. In fact,
Bagnall apologized to his readers each time his narrative veered towards
postwar Canada: “I am trying to keep [this] from being a problem story,” he
wrote.7 As a result of this collective silence, vocal critics of the war, including
the historian Frank Underhill, have been dismissed as unrepresentative. But
Underhill should not be pushed aside so easily. While his politics differed
from Drew’s (the former was closely aligned with the CCF, the latter a
Conservative) both men were equally critical of the Great War’s wider legacy,
a similarity often overlooked when equating the war’s meaning with an
idealized history of the Canadian Corps.8

7 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 132.
8 See for example Sheftall, Altered Memories, 2, 88. See too Vance, Death So Noble, 6.
Both Drew and Underhill veterans who were wounded during the conflict. Underhill was
wounded twice in the leg. Drew suffered a serious wound to his forearm that required nearly
two years recuperation, including bone grafts from his shin to repair missing sections of his
left arm. See Drew’s CEF Service File, LAC, RG 150, Vol 2556.
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Both Drew and Underhill were young educated elites when war broke
out. Their understanding of its meaning was shared by other members of
their generation, including Edward Binns, Will Bird, F.P. Day, Bill Deacon,
and Robert Manion. During the 1920s and 1930s, these men began to question
the meaning of the Great War. Some doubted the legitimacy of public
commemoration, while others reflected on why they reconsidered the
conflict’s purpose. Their positions contrasted with those of older Canadians,
such as William Creighton, father of historian Donald Creighton and editor of
the Christian Guardian, who “hated the physical facts of war,” but nonetheless
maintained that its “great moral purpose … would redeem its crimes.”9 The

9 Peter Buitenhuis argued that while older men accepted that war was horrible, their
generation reacted to the horrors of the front with renewed idealism rather than outright
criticism. According to Donald Creighton, his father believed this so passionately that “the
war … became a family affair” and “hope of a better post-war world dominated” their
household both during and after the conflict. Donald Creighton “My Father and the United
Church,” in Creighton, The Passionate Observer: Selected Writings (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1980), 97. I would be remiss if I did not thank Donald Wright for sending me early
chapters from his biography on Donald Creighton to help better understand Creighton’s
relationship with his father. Creighton’s essay was originally intended for the United
Church’s Observer, but was not published until its inclusion in The Passionate Observer. See too
Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words, 153.
L.M. Montgomery, often so perceptive of the nuances of the Canadian character, was
another who had difficulty critiquing the war, in part because she professed to be unable to
make sense of the conflict. After asking what would come of its end, decided she could
“never know.” But she hoped, maybe the next generation could. See Mary Rubio and
Elizabeth Waterston, eds., The Selected Journals of L.M. Montgomery, Vol. II: 1910-1921
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 274. Similarly, those who were too young for the
war understood that they were different. As a boy, Harry Boyle reminisced that he
recognized little in the “quiet men” who had come back from the war. “Something happened
during the Great War,” he recalled, which made them different and those who had returned
forever remained a “mystery.” Harry J. Boyle, With a Pinch of Sin: Fond Recollection of a Rural
Background Some Forty Years Ago (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 82. British writer and critic
George Orwell made a similar observation: “As the war fell back into the past, my particular
generation, those who had been ‘just too young’, became conscious of the vastness of the
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war generation never accepted this position. Together, these men produced a
disparate body of work that included articles, books, and unpublished
writing. It does not form a canon, but it represents some of the only instances
in which the war generation discussed why it re-interpreted the war’s
meaning, particularly in light of the conflict’s aftermath. This writing
demonstrates that not only did the war remain a matter of great personal
concern, but that its meaning was also continually re-evaluated in response to
the postwar present.
After the success of his early articles in Maclean’s, Drew branched out
in his writing beyond the British Empire’s war record. These later pieces
examined the contemporary world and offered a much wider interpretation
of the war’s impact than his articles about Canadians overseas. Drew was
worried that the Great Depression and the rise of totalitarianism were
destabilizing the fragile international order. One piece from 1932, “Salesman
of Death,” about the League of Nations disarmament conferences in Geneva,
was particularly critical of war and the risks re-armament posed for
international security. It tapped into concerns about the West’s economic and
diplomatic stability during the late 1920s and early 1930s. If European leaders
did not stop the apparent slide towards another conflict, Drew warned, then
world’s youth risked being killed in “meaningless slaughter.” Leaders had a
clear choice. They could reduce arms and enter in a “wave of prosperity,”

experience they had missed. You felt yourself a little less than a man, because you had
missed it.” See George Orwell, “My Country Right or Left,” in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angust,
eds., The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. 1 (London: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1968), 538.
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followed by swift “economic rejuvenation,” or they would face the “ghastly
spectre of a war of machines and chemicals which would carry death and
destruction to the civilian populations even more than to the soldiers in the
field.”10
Drew’s description of modern warfare was damning, particularly
when contrasted with his defense of the Canadian and British actions during
the Great War. These historical arguments did not portray the conflict as a
‘meaningless slaughter’, yet that is exactly how he described warfare in the
1930s. Another article, “The Truth About War Debts,” expanded this critique
of modern warfare describing the Great War as “fruitless.”11 Despite this
apparent contradiction, Drew based his conclusions on his reading of the
war’s history. Any “study of the last war,” he wrote, clearly indicated that
militarism was “largely to blame” for the July Crisis of 1914. Avoiding
another arms race would reduce the risk of another conflict.12 Drew did not
know if the disarmament conference would succeed. Nonetheless, he hoped
that the talks in Geneva would prove at least a “substantial beginning” on the
road to peace. If not, Drew feared that Canada would be engulfed in another
slaughter.13

10 Drew, “Salesmen of Death,” Maclean’s (1 August 1931): 3.
11 Drew, “The Truth About War Debts,” Maclean’s (15 April 1931), 82.
12 Drew, “Salesmen of Death,” 34.
13 Drew, “Salesmen of Death,” 3. Drew’s critique of war in this issue of Maclean’s (as
well as his April article, “The Truth About War Debts), is further noteworthy for criticism of
Canadian Defence Quarterly, the military’s scholarly review, which argued for the need to
prepare for another war.
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Given their political differences, Drew’s characterization of the war
was remarkably similar to one of the conflict’s harshest critics, Frank
Underhill. During the interwar years, Underhill was known as a strong
supporter of isolationism, but his position was different in 1914. When war
broke out, he supported it wholeheartedly and, in 1915, he enlisted with the
CEF before transferring to a British unit as a machine gun officer. Underhill
was wounded twice and, at war’s end, was hired by the University of Alberta
as part of the Khaki University (the education system organized by the
military to help convalescent soldiers continue their education). According to
his biographer, Underhill had “mixed feelings” about discussing the war,
though this did not stop him from contributing a Canadian section to Charles
Lucas’ multi-volume history The Empire at War (1923). Underhill’s “Canadian
Forces in the War” was a dry study about the country’s military overseas.14 It
praised Canada’s achievements, while downplaying its failures.15 Underhill
applauded the Canadian Corps for its “striking force,” “resourcefulness,” the
“energetic spirit” of its soldiers, and its “business-like” staff who planned the
Corps’ assaults.16 This history of the CEF overseas also reflected a nascent
version of the colony-to-nation thesis. The “Canadian Corp,” Underhill wrote,

14 Underhill later described his work as “dull.” See Francis, Frank H. Underhill, 49.
15 In a chapter on the Second Division’s failed attack on the St. Eloi craters, he
declared reassuringly that the Canadians might have been “beaten,” but “certainly not
disgraced.” Frank Underhill, “The Canadian Forces in the War,” in Charles Lucas ed., The
Empire at War, Vol II (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), 114.
16 Underhill, “The Canadian Forces in the War,” 130.
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was “the greatest national achievement of the Canadian people,” which stood
as “real testimony to Canada’s entrance into nationhood.”17
Over the following decades, however, Underhill’s view changed. He
reversed his opinion of the value of the war, a transformation he believed
common to his generation. “We did not really achieve maturity in the years
1914-1918,” he argued, “though that is what we used to claim for ourselves in
the 1920’s.”18 The reason for his reversal was a complex and deeply rooted
disappointment in the postwar world. The conflict, he concluded,
undermined nineteenth-century notions of progress. With the war’s end, the
“old sense of established values” disappeared. By the 1930s, the Depression
“completed the work of destruction that the war had begun.”19 Underhill
admitted that the war was a “leap forward” for Canada but argued that such
successes were outweighed by the failures at home.
By the end of the 1930s, Underhill rejected any thought of Canada
joining another European war. He was upset at the failure of the League of
Nations and skeptical of the justifications for another conflict, no matter the
rhetoric of peace, freedom, or democracy.20 “All that we can help to assure by
such action is the burying of 60,000 more Canadians somewhere across the
ocean.” His skepticism was grounded in this history of war and postwar
failures. “Our experience during and since the last war,” Underhill argued,

17 Underhill, “The Canadian Forces in the War,” 286.
18 Frank Underhill, “The Aftermath,” Flanders’ Fields, 14.
19. Underhill, “The Aftermath,” 15.
20. Francis, Frank H. Underhill, 107.
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“should have made us skeptical about such claims. And we should be
especially suspicious of all those elderly statesmen and publicists who so
nobly dedicated one generation of Canadian youth to these high causes of
1914, and who can now think of no more fitting way of sanctifying that
sacrifice than to dedicate another generation to a similar sacrifice.” 21
Frank Underhill’s support for isolationism was informed by a sense
that Canada failed to make its wartime sacrifices worthwhile. While victories
at Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, and the gains during the Last Hundred Days helped
secure Canada’s place as an international player, the country’s actions in the
1920s and 1930s forced him to question if Canada was capable of acting as an
independent country. He was not optimistic and believed the country was too
tied to Britain (a connection he called an emotional complex) to act
independently. This was a pessimistic reading of what the country had
achieved since 1918. If Canada had fought for a seat at the international table,
if that is why it had sacrificed so heavily, why was it unable to wield its
independence? In Underhill’s opinion, it might have been possible for prewar
politicians such as Robert Borden to believe that the war was worthwhile,
provided it resulted in an equal partnership between Britain and Canada.
But, Underhill was not convinced that Canadians had actually achieved that
goal. Instead, he believed Canadians were merely “flattering” themselves
about membership in the Commonwealth. If it came to war again, Canada

21. Underhill, “Keep Canada out of War,” in In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1960), 184.
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would never have any “real” control of the British Foreign Office. 22 Without
such control, Underhill could not say that the war was worth it.
Like many of his generation, Frank Underhill remained proud of the
achievements of the Canadian Corps. He remained troubled, however, that
these sacrifices were being squandered. He summed up his position in 1941
by describing what he considered to be the contradictory nature of Canada’s
wartime and postwar history. It was defined by a “strange dualism” between
a capable—even “brilliant”—ability to handle the concrete tasks of waging
war and a “persistent political incapacity” to address the challenges of
governing during peace. Underhill lamented that the initiative Canadians
displayed during the war was not carried into the postwar era:
What became of all those young Canadian soldiers who showed
such indomitable courage, such individual initiative, such
capacity for discipline and organization; what became of all
those young captains and lieutenants and sergeants who led
their men across no man’s land, who cleared out trenches and
captured pill-boxes; what became of them all in the post-war
Canada to which they returned? How was it that their splendid
qualities seemed to have no purpose but to be dissipated in the
sorry futilities of the 1920’s and 1930’s?23
Peace, more so than war, proved a disillusioning experience.

22. Frank Underhill, “The Outline of a National Foreign Policy,” in Violet Anderson,
ed., World Currents and Canada’s Course: Lectures Given at the Canadian Institute on Economics
and Politics, August 7th to 20th, 1937 (Toronto: Nelson, 1937), 133-138.
23. Frank Underhill, “Canada and the Last War,” in Chester Martin, ed., Canada in
War and Peace: Eight Studies in National Trends Since 1914 (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1941), 148.

124
Neither Underhill nor Drew discussed the extent to which their
disenchantment was personal. Such disclosure was particularly rare among
veterans. One man who bucked this trend, however, was Will Bird. During a
career that spanned fifty years, he published a plethora of memoirs, novels,
and articles about the conflict. Many were serialized in newspapers and
magazines in Britain and the United States. By the 1970s, Bird had published
six books on the war. But it was in the 1930s that he published his most
reflective work, including a series of articles that explored veterans’
psychological disenchantment in the postwar era.24
William Richard Bird was born 11 May 1891 at East Mapleton,
Cumberland County, Nova Scotia. In 1904, the family moved to Amherst. Six
years later, Bird headed west on a harvest excursion to Alberta. In 1915, he
moved to Saskatchewan. After the war broke out, he tried several times to
enlist, but was turned down. Only later did Bird learn that his brother, Steve,
who had enlisted before him, had asked recruiters to keep him in Canada. By
1916, Bird finally secured his enlistment and served the majority of the war
with the 42nd Battalion, CEF. He witnessed some of the Canadian Corps’
worst fighting, including its engagements at Passchendaele and the Last
Hundred Days. In 1918, during the final days of the war, Bird was awarded
the Military Medal for his service at Mons.

24. These were Private Timothy Fergus Clancy, And We Go On, The Communication
Trench, Thirteen Years After, The Shy Yorkshireman, and Ghosts Have Warm Hands. Bird’s articles
appeared in, among others, Canadian Defence Quarterly, The Canadian Veteran, Canadian War
Stories, Collier’s, The Legionary, Maclean’s, The Maritime Advocate and Busy East, Reveille,
Whirligig, and The Ypres Times. He also wrote for multiple newspapers, especially those based
in Nova Scotia, though his work appeared in national publications, including the Toronto
Star, as well.
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After the war, Bird returned to Nova Scotia where he worked as a
writer, historian, and novelist. All told, Bird sold five hundred and fifty two
short stories and won numerous awards, including the Ryerson Press AllCanada Fiction Award, which he was awarded twice. He served two terms as
the president of the Canadian Authors Association, the first from the
Maritimes. During the 1930s, when he produced the most war-related work,
Bird was hired by Maclean’s to tour the battlefields and write a retrospective
that tapped into the increasingly popular trend of battlefield tourism. The
contract resulted in seventeen articles, which were later collected into a book,
Thirteen Years After. Bird parlayed his travels into a successful lecture circuit
and delivered over a hundred lectures across the country.25
It was the war that turned Bird into a writer.26 While overseas, he was
involved in a gas attack, during which he gave his mask to a young soldier in
his unit. As a result, Bird inhaled gas and, two years after the war ended, he
began experiencing symptoms of gas poisoning. His right arm was painfully
swollen and needed to be treated by sitting with the arm in a solution for a
week.27 Unable to do anything else, Bird read widely. He came upon a writing

25. Dalhousie University Archives [hereafter DUA], MS-2-367 [hereafter Bird papers],
Scrapbooks, Biographical note, n.d., typed on Bird’s stationary. Bird uses the same figures
(552) in a letter to Miss May Martyn, 2 April 1969. See Bird papers, Vol. 1, folder 1. N.B.
McKay and Bates also cite this letter, but note it in Bird’s Scrapbooks.
26. He elaborated on the chance that set him on his career in 1973, telling Rev. A.E.
Kewley that if it were not for that gas attack “I would never have written about the war or
those who I came to know so well.” See Bird papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, Bird to Kewley, 4 May
1973.
27. Bird’s ailment is another example the lack of documentation of the war’s physical
toll. His service record does not list any mention of this experience and notes that the only
time he spent in hospital during the war was for a case of mumps. He deals with this
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contest for the best fish story in the Halifax Sunday Leader. As he recounted
later, the outcome of the contest proved a surprise: “it was spring and trout
fishing was about to start. I had never written anything or thought of writing
but I scribbled out a story and to my utter amazement won the prize.” Bird
was soon on staff with the paper writing children’s adventure stories. What
started as a whim turned into a viable career that produced over twenty-five
books.28 While he may not have been a trained writer, Bird mastered his craft
and by the end of the 1920s, he was writing short stories, articles, humour
pieces, and a memoir. The latter, And We Go On, was published in 1930. Its
descriptions of the war’s psychological impact, the realities of the battlefield,
and the trials faced by common soldiers were based on Bird’s diary.
Bird’s work was praised widely during his lifetime.29 As with so many
of Canada’s interwar authors, however, he is now largely forgotten. Yet,
among Canada’s historians he is used as the voice of the country’s war
generation. Jonathan Vance cites Bird widely in his work, describing him as

experience and the gas attack in his memoirs. With regards to the mumps, he notes: “I was
just sixteen days at St. Pol, then coolly walked away from the place and got on board a train.
… I never had seen a doctor again.” See And We Go On, 68.The gas attack and Bird’s gassing
are not recorded on his record and he was demobilized with “no disability” in 1919. See
Bird’s medical examination form in his service file, LAC, RG 150, vol. 748.
28. DUA, Bird papers, Vol. 1, folder 1, Bird to Martyn, 2 April 1969.
29. After Bird’s tenure as president of the Canadian Authors Association Bill Deacon
wrote to Bird telling him that he considered him “the greatest president we have ever had.”
DUA, Bird papers, Scrapbook 18, Deacon to Bird, 3 October 1948. Hugh MacLennan was
equally praiseworthy of Bird’s accomplishments and skill as a writer; so too was Watson
Kirkconnell. See DUA, Bird papers, Bird Scrapbooks, MacLennan to Bird, 13 July 1949 and
Kirkconnell to Bird, 5 July 1956.
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the “quintessential articulator of Canada’s war.”30 Ian McKay and Robin
Bates, despite holding contrasting views of the war to Vance, are similarly
praiseworthy of Bird, calling him “Mr Great War.”31 Norm Christie, whose
publishing company CEF Books republished several of Bird’s works,
describes Bird as “a one man remembrance program.”32
The praise for Bird’s work is testament to the insight and nuance of his
war writing. His body of work does not shy away from describing men’s
complex reactions to warfare. Books such as And We Go On are filled with
haunting observations and humorous asides. Bird’s short stories and poetry
about the postwar years are equally revealing, making him one of the few
postwar writers who wrote about the war while also considering its
aftermath. This material is often overlooked in favour of Bird’s more lengthy
and self-reflective memoirs, despite the fact that returned men were
captivated by Bird’s writing about the postwar era and his short stories more
generally.33 This material did not shy away from addressing the
disappointments of peacetime or the disillusioning of Canada’s war
generation.

30. Vance, Death So Noble, 196. Bird plays a critical part in both this text and Vance’s
article on war books, “The Soldiers As Novelist.”
31. Ian McKay and Robin Bates, In the Province of History, 133.
32. Norm Christie, “Introduction,” Will R. Bird, Private Timothy Fergus Clancy (CEF
Books: Ottawa, 2005), n.p.
33. Both 1930’s And We Go On and the more accessible Ghosts Have Warm Hands,
which was republished in 1968. For the widespread popularity of all of his war writing see
Bird’s scrapbooks at DUA, which contain pages upon pages of pasted letters from veterans
discussing and responding to his war writing.
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Bird wrote several poems and short stories that examined the postwar
era, particularly about veterans and their memories of the war. Most of these
are not examples of critical commentary, but their use of postwar
disenchantment as a literary device illustrates how readily readers accepted
the war generation’s disillusionment. One poem, “The Veteran’s Thoughts,”
from Maclean’s in 1936, is an example of Bird’s concern for men’s private
thoughts about the war and their disappointment in postwar Canada.34 In his
memoir, And We Go On, Bird emphasizes the “psychic” effects of the conflict.
This later piece uses a veteran’s thoughts on Remembrance Day to cover
similar ground.
The poem describes a man haunted by his war experience. He is
unhappy and embittered that Canadians devoted only two minutes a year to
commemoration and he rages at Canadian society, which he believed did not
properly remember his or his comrades’ sacrifices. Like the author himself,
Bird’s fictional veteran went to war as a young man, but he is now older,
“tired, time-lined, and gray.” His memories of the war include disheartening
descriptions of no man’s land, a “pock-marked ridge where Death was king.”
Looking back, he concludes the war amounted to “a “devil’s game” in which
he was merely a “human pawn.”
The veteran in Bird’s piece does not see war as glorious. In place of
skill, honour, or other prized qualities of men in battle, he believes they died
futile deaths and that their names filled monuments because of a mere “freak

34. Bird, “The Veteran’s Thoughts,” Bird papers, Scrapbooks, n.d., signed Will R.
Bird; same page as the continuation of the clipping for “What Price Vimy,” Maclean’s (1 April
1936).
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of Fate.” Such passages are reminders that veterans often held contradictory
views on the war. According to the war myth, veterans rejected such
pessimistic portrayals of the conflict. To them, the conflict was supposed to
remain a defensible, even noble, endeavour in which Canadians continued to
perform gallant acts. While veterans wanted the war remembered, Bird’s
story challenged notions of glorious warfare and even contradicted an earlier
assertion in his memoir that men were not dehumanized by the war.35
Canadians had to do more than just remember the war, they had to do so
correctly. As Bird’s critique demonstrates, in the aftermath of 1918, veterans
were not above questioning the war’s meaning in light of its public
commemoration.
Disenchantment with Remembrance Day is a subject Bird returned to
in other short stories, including “Jimmy Benton, War Vet, Views Militia
Parade On An Armistice Day.” This piece also evokes the symbolism of 11
November, again by describing a veteran’s disillusionment in postwar
Canada. Originally published in the Saint John Evening Times, the piece
chronicles the story of veteran James, ‘Jimmy’, Benton the day he dies. Benton
attends the city’s Armistice Day, watching a militia company on parade. The
sight of the young men marching before him brings back memories of his
own time at war, but he is disappointed these new soldiers fail to live up to
the standards set by he and his comrades. “They lost step, jostled, were out of
lines; they crowed, elbowed,” and, he lamented, these young troops seemed
to take “an endless time getting correct.” Angered, Benton can only look
away in disgrace.
35 In And We Go On, he maintains that soldiers maintained a “strength of soul.” 5.
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When eleven o’clock arrives, Jimmy is overcome by memories.
“Burning” they flood back, “choking him, scalding him, shaking him.” He
wishes his comrades could have witnessed the service too, to share his shock
at how poorly the new militia compared to their example. Jimmy returns to
the Legion hall “disgusted.” After settling into his chair, he is startled to meet
“a stirring group” of fellow veterans. They decide to show the young militia
how to march properly and together they head out on parade, with Jimmy
proudly in the lead. Soon their old Colonel appears and Jimmy feels amazing,
as though he could “march forever” and the music carries the whole unit off,
“all in step.” Benton is finally happy. Unfortunately, however, Bird informs
the reader that none of this had taken place. Jimmy died in his chair, his death
and subsequent march reminiscent of Abel Gance’s film J’Accuse, in which the
war dead arise and march on screen. By transporting Jimmy amongst his
comrades as he dies, Bird contrasts the glory of the past with the perceived
failures of the present. Postwar life, this piece suggests, was nothing like war
and Jimmy is forced to suffer in silence, only finding solace in death, when he
rejoins his wartime comrades.36
Men like Bird may have been embittered by their “dashed hopes,”
however, according to histories of the war myth, they never dared blame their
disillusion on the war.37 As Bird’s own memoir makes clear, veterans
remained proud of their war service. Yet, this does not mean that the war’s
meaning was static, enshrined upon a mythical pedestal, never to be debated.

36. Will R. Bird, “Jimmy Benton, War Vet, Views Militia Parade On An Armistice
Day.” The Evening Times, n.d, n.p. DUA, Bird papers, Vol. 16, Scrapbook 55-1.
37 Vance, Death So Noble, 222.
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Rather, the critiques that men such as Bird, Underhill, and Drew produced in
the conflict’s aftermath did not shy from challenging its commemorative
symbols; symbols that they used to re-evaluate the meaning of the war.
After the Armistice of 11 November 1918, the date became invested
with special symbolism and was soon the accepted way to remember
Canada’s sacrifices. For the war generation, critiquing the public
manifestation of the conflict’s memory was an expression of its postwar
disillusionment and changing understanding of the war’s meaning. Although
rarely discussed in public, veterans, such as Edward Binns, were even more
critical in private.
Binns was a doctor from Welland, Ontario. During the war, he and his
three brothers all served. They survived, except for Percy, who was killed by a
shell near Arras in 1918.38 In the early 1930s, Binns wrote a poem re-assessing
the war’s meaning that used Remembrance Day as a way to explain his
shifting feelings about his brother’s death. The piece, simply titled
“November Eleventh, Nineteen Thirty-Three,” was dedicated to Percy Binns,
“my brother, Killed in Action, very shortly before the Armistice.”39 Its nine
stanzas describe how Edward Binns began to reconsider the war and his
beliefs about the meaning of his brother’s death.

38 See the CEF Service Files for the Binns brothers as well as the Commonwealth War
Graves Commission entry for Percy Binns.
39 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 2, File 33, Edward Binns, “November Eleventh,
Nineteen-Thirty-Three,” n.d.
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The poem opens with Binns explaining how each Remembrance Day
would bring on a wave of war memories about his brother’s death. By 1933,
Edward decided he needed to address his feelings about the war. His solution
was to subject his memories to a “frank appraisal.”40 As Binns explained in
his poem, each 11 November he would ritually assume that Percy’s death was
worthwhile. Faced with the “cruel master of black despair,” Binns admitted
that he needed to “feel” his brother “had not died in vain.” Such thoughts
helped him deal with his grief, but he admitted that the need to ‘feel’
meaning in his brother’s death did not last. Instead of comforting him, Binns
found postwar life unsatisfying and, in spite of his brother’s sacrifice, nothing
about the postwar era justified Percy’s loss. In response, Binns described that
his understanding of the war began to shift. Instead of taking comfort in
Percy’s death, he began to “hope” that he had not died in vain. In the end,
this hope also fails. It no longer comforted Edward and he admitted that the
passage of time undermined his family’s certainty in the war’s purpose.41
Edward did not want to doubt the meaning of his brother’s death. But
he had little choice. He realized that during the 1920s he engaged in a “sordid
quest” to convince himself that Percy had died in a “war-to-end-war.” Yet,
the war’s aftermath gave no reason to support his earlier view and he began
to fear that his belief in the war’s meaning was misplaced. In time, he and his

40 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 2, folder 33, n.d., but likely 1933.
41 Author’s emphasis. See TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 2, folder 33, n.d.
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family found themselves doubting their hopes, wondering: “Could it be, ye
died in vain?”42
The poem culminates in a damning realization that the war was a
“monstrous Fraud.” At last, Edward concludes, “we know the bitter truth.” It
was clear that Percy’s sacrifice had achieved nothing. More than a decade
after war’s end, Binns concludes that Percy and his comrades were “futile
heroes” who had indeed “died in vain.” In the final stanza, he summed up his
sense of the futility of his brother’s death:
Wherefore I hail you as the goodliest band
Of myth-deluded Knights did ever deign
To tilt at windmill or defy the wand
Of warlock-ogre … All hail, who
died in vain!43
These concluding lines are rich with metaphor and demonstrate that Binns
rejected popular ideas of the war’s ‘goodness’ as well as its mythic status. The
poem is a clear statement of post-war disillusion that evokes and parodies
many of the postwar tropes used to assure Canadians that their wartime
losses were not in vain. The Canadian Corps may well have been a ‘band of
brothers’, but against the ‘warlock-ogre’ of modern industrial warfare, the
cause proved futile.
Binns never published his poem. But he did send it to his friend Bill
Deacon, describing it as a “bitter little poem.” The two conversed for several

42 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 2, folder 33, n.d., but likely 1933.
43 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Bins, “November Eleventh, Nineteen-Thirty-Three.”
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years. As Binns explained in his letter, his poem summed up his sentiments
about the war’s legacy. “[I]t expresses what I feel,” he told Deacon, who
thought the piece “very fine,” and he debated whether he should publish it.44
The poem’s message motivated the two men. They recognized that it
challenged notions of a good war because, unlike histories that only
described the war itself, it judged the conflict in light of its aftermath. Binns
figured his piece was likely to “disturb a few complacent people” and
thought it “so much the better” if it aroused some “protest.” Deacon agreed
wholeheartedly, telling him that “we need it now” and that he hoped it could
be published “at once.”
Binns and Deacon were critics of the war because they feared another
was on the horizon. Deacon, in particular, was horrified at what he
considered the looming prospect of another European conflict. The poem
echoed Deacon’s concern. It bothered him that the world seemed to be
lurching to war, which confirmed that the previous conflict had not been “toend-war.” What then was the point of the Great War? Binns and his brothers
enlisted and did their part. Immediately after 1918, Edward was sure that his
brother’s death—and by extension the entire war—stood for something
important. A decade later, however, this was not the case. By 1933, he reassessed what the war and his brother’s death meant. The conflict had lost its
purpose and the loss was no longer a sacrifice, but a waste. While Binns may
have used 11 November as a forum to express his discontent, his poem was
about more than just the failure to properly remember the war. It was a

44 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 2, File 33, Binns to Deacon, 12 November 1933 and
Deacon to Binns, 14 November 1933.
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private exploration of how his understanding of the conflict shifted in the
1920s and 1930s.
Although a poem about his personal re-consideration of the war’s
meaning, Binn’s willingness to consider publishing the piece suggests that he
was open to discussing his transformed views. Certainly Robert Manion
(future leader of the federal Conservative Party) welcomed the chance to
publicly discuss why he reconsidered the conflict. In 1936, Manion published
his autobiography, Life is an Adventure, which completely revised his earlier
writing on the war. Manion was another member of the war generation
disillusioned by peacetime Canada and, like fellow Conservative George
Drew, Manion was also a veteran. During the war, he served as a surgeon
with the Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC) and was awarded the
Military Cross for action at Vimy Ridge. When he returned home, Manion
was elected as an MP for Borden’s Union Government in 1917. After Arthur
Meighen replaced Borden as Prime Minister, Manion served briefly as
Minister of the Department of Soldiers Civil Re-establishment. His wartime
memoir, A Surgeon in Arms, was published in 1918.
Manion’s first book sought to explain the conflict to those on the home
front. It divided the war into different themes and categories, interspersed
with personal anecdotes. Manion also described the war experience. His
account of a gas attack, for example, was harrowing. “Never elsewhere had
we experienced anything akin to it,” he wrote. “The inflamed eyes; the
suffocation in our lungs; the knowledge that inhalation of sufficient gas
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would put us into Kingdom Come.”45 He was also praiseworthy of Canada’s
part overseas and his chapter “Over the Top,” lauded the spirit of the
Canadian Corps. As the men waited for the moment of attack, Manion
recounted how
Something which struck me then, and which still impresses me
as extraordinary in looking back at it, was the buoyant, cheerful,
optimistic spirit in which our army of citizen-soldiers looked
forward to the day when were to take part in one of the greatest
battles in history. We knew it was to be a fearful and
magnificent trial of strength out of which many of us would
never return to the people and the lands we loved. And yet all
awaited it with a gay, hopeful, undaunted optimism, asking
naught but the opportunity, anticipating nothing but victory.46
The bulk of A Surgeon in Arms echoed this passage’s optimistic tone. When he
re-examined his war experience for his 1936 memoir, Life is an Adventure,
however, he described a very different view of the war.
This later book covered similar ground to his earlier memoir but did so
in hindsight. As a result, Manion admitted that the war failed to live up to its
purpose, a failure that forced him to revisit his earlier position. He now
believed that the war was futile. This reconsideration of the war’s meaning
began with a rejection of the reasons for his enlistment. At the outbreak of
war, Manion wanted to enlist, but his wife opposed it. He convinced her
otherwise and joined up in 1915. Looking back at this decision, he conceded
that he was irresponsible, especially leaving his wife with three young

45 Robert Manion, A Surgeon in Arms (Toronto: D. Appleton, 1918), 72-73.
46 Manion, A Surgeon in Arms, 20.
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children. “My wife was right in opposing my going,” he wrote, “for it is not
fair to leave a wife and three boys, the oldest less than seven, and take a
chance on not coming back.”47
Manion railed at length against the stupidity of the war:
What a brutal and barbarous custom it is, to send our loved
ones to face the love ones of other people … to encourage them
madly, insanely, to shoot or stab each other, or poison each
other with horrible gasses, because of some silly dispute
regarding a piece of land or trade policy!
Surely, he continued, “we are a lot of madmen that we cannot settle our
differences internationally as we settle them individually — in the courts!”
Manion recognized that it was impolitic to take strong positions on the war.
He wrote candidly, however, because he had seen the war’s horrors first
hand and he feared for the future. The “mutilations and the killings, the
brutality and the butchery of war in the trenches” needed to be remembered
in their entirety because it seemed as though the world was “once more
preparing for another slaughter of innocents!”48
Manion’s criticisms stopped at the men themselves. He knew the war
experience remained an integral part of men’s lives and he was proud of his
own service. As with so many returned men, living through the conflict left
“a memory which surpasse[d]” all others. Manion was unwilling to criticize
men’s actions in war, nor was he willing to besmirch the “undying

47 Manion, Life is an Adventure (Toronto: Ryerson, 1936), 150.
48 Manion, Life is an Adventure, 177.
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recollections” veterans had of friends killed overseas. 49 It was because of their
memories, he explained, that veterans were so unhappy with the prospect of
another conflict. They had had their share of “horrors” and “filth” already,
and knew well that man’s “inhumanity to man” was never clearer than when
nations sent their “sons to the mass slaughter of modern warfare.”50
The prospect of another war was too much. Manion and his comrades
had gone to war believing it could still be a noble affair. Men’s stoicism and
optimism on the Western Front impressed him. But nothing had come of it.
Now, they knew better. In a lengthy denunciation written to dissuade anyone
considering taking up arms in the future, Manion explained why he had
come to reject the monstrous nature of total war:
To-day war means the clashing of whole nations; it means the
wholesale slaughter of men on both sides by high-powered
explosives, or the wholesale poisoning of combatants by deadly
gasses. The machine-gun, the long range gun, and other
scientific and mechanistic instruments … have turned war into
the most horrible type of slaughter, in which not only are huge
armies necessary in the fighting zone, but in which as well (due
to the aeroplane, the airship and the submarine and their ability
to spread death far and near) civilian populations are visibly
running the same risks as those on the immediate battle-front.
… What an outlook for our so-called Christian civilization!”51
Modern war was slaughter. It could achieve nothing but destruction.
And so, Manion concluded his description with a sad lament that exemplified

49 Manion, Life is an Adventure, 201.
50 Manion, Life is an Adventure, 214-15.
51 Manion, Life is an Adventure, 216.
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why the failure to live up to wartime ideals left so many of his generation
disenchanted with peace:
When one looks about to-day at the chaotic condition that exists
throughout Christendom, and the failure of our ideals of peace
to be realized, one feels all the more pity that these boys of all
nations should have been asked to give up their lives for a cause
unrealized and apparently unrealizable.52
Such disappointment with peacetime Canada was a common cause for
disenchantment. Some men proved able to discuss their changing views of
the conflict and its meaning in public. But others, including others writers—
such as Edward Binns or F.P. Day—never did so. Their experience reveals
how the war continued to be re-conceptualized in private as the generation’s
personal understanding of the conflict transformed after 1918.
Frank Parker Day published several novels and short stories, most
famously Rockbound in1928. But, with the exception of “The Iroquois” (1925),
the veteran never published anything about the war, despite serving with the
85th Battalion, the 185th Cape Breton Highlanders, and the 25th Battalion. His
memoir of his youth, The Autobiography of a Fisherman (1927), was similarly
vague about his war experience. It summed up his time overseas as “four
years of restless worried life in which I had no time to think of fishing.”53 Not
surprisingly, therefore, Day has been omitted from Canada’s war book canon.
Yet, he did write about the war, though he made no effort to publish it.

52 Manion, Life is an Adventure, 217.
53 Frank Parker Day, The Autobiography of a Fisherman (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2005), 133.
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Day was born in 1881, in Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia. He was a Rhodes
Scholar and an impressive boxer, winning the heavyweight championship at
Oxford. In 1912, he joined the English Department at Carnegie Mellon
University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He returned to this position after the
war and, in 1926, became the head of the English Department at Swarthmore
College. Between 1928 and 1933, Day served as president of Union College.
While at Oxford, Day joined a yeomanry regiment, the King’s Colonials.
Three years later, he was made a Second Lieutenant and, when he returned
home, he was promoted major in the 28th New Brunswick Dragoons, a prewar
militia regiment. He served through much of the war in various units before
taking command of the 25th Battalion during its assault on Amiens, in 1918.
He led the battalion during some of its worst fighting, until early October
1918 when he was hospitalized. He spent the remainder of the war in and out
of convalescence recovering from surgery for a variety of bowel related
issues.54
In the years that followed, Day worked on a collection of poetry titled
“War and Peace.” It was never published but it demonstrated the complex
and contradictory responses of returned men to the war. The collection was
likely intended to contain fourteen poems written between 1919 and 1936:
“Old Alumnus,” “House-Painter Hitler,” “The Regular,” “War,” “The
Civilian Soldier,” “Through the Sleeping Village,” “The Trench Cat,”
“Pacifist,” “Think Well,” “The Soldier,” and “Peace.”55 The poems describe

54 LAC, RG 150, Vol. 2377-45, Lt.-Col. F.P. Day Service File; War Diaries for 25th,
85th, and 185th Battlions, CEF.
55 DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3.
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aspects of military life, post-war commemoration, and re-evaluations of the
conflict and ensuing peace. At times, Day wrote positively about the war,
particularly when it concerned the roles of individual Canadians assisting
local inhabitants of war torn Europe. When it came to the war’s aftermath,
however, he was highly critical of what the conflict achieved.
Poems such as “Through the Sleeping Village” and “The Trench Cat”
are generally positive. The latter offers fond memories of a small cat that is
nursed back to health in the trenches. It highlights the very human and every
day experiences of men seeking hope in a world of war. Day describes how
the cat could have “scorned the war and all mankind” but instead found
affection in the most unlikely of places. After giving birth, the cat becomes the
battalion’s mascot, “stalking along the parapet.”56 The poem “War,” contains
only twelve lines. It paints a vivid picture of the unglamorous, day-to-day life
of the soldier. “Most of war is just humdrum,” Day wrote, including chores
such as feeding men, providing water provisions, delousing, repairing
bridges and roads, and emphasizing the importance of clean feet.57 The
poems “Last Long Hill” and “Through the Sleeping Village” also offer
positive recollections, again focusing on the daily grind of soldiering. Day
sympathizes with soldiers’ “[w]eary marching feet and deep-lined faces.”
Though their bodies may have failed, these men persevered “by nerves and
will” and Day praised the Canadian Corps for its willingness to see beyond
rank:

56 DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, “The Trench Cat,” n.d.
57 DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, “War,” n.d.

142
Worn men stagger to the ditches at the side,
Mount them on the Colonel’s horse, let the sick men ride;
Pile them on the limbers, on the doctor’s car,
Canadians leave no stragglers, who have played their part.58
Day was relatively old for the war generation and his writing was often
sentimental, verging on the romantic. Parts of “War and Peace” conclude
with portrayals of men lifting their heads high, “alight with hope.”59 What is
surprising, however, is the inclusion of poems such as “The Civilian Soldier,”
“Soldier,” and “Peace,” which challenge this sentimentality.
Day’s most bitter poems focus on the peace. In “The Civilian Solider,”
“The Soldier,” and “Peace,” he was especially critical of postwar life. “The
Civilian Soldier” tells the story of a returned man. It is undated but portrays
the psychological turmoil that veterans suffered. Day begins by describing a
“bland and kind” veteran’s outward appearance: “He does not limp, he
wears no medals / Old soldiers’ tales he seldom peddles.” Yet, despite
appearing as an ordinary citizen, the poem emphasizes how veterans without
obvious injuries lived in a private world of isolation and suffering: “You’d
scarcely guess whats [sic] in his mind / Or how his memory backwards ran.”
The poem recalls the horror of facing another human being in a trench,
knowing that one would have to bayonet the other:
In a trench I killed a man,
Breathless gasping, in the dark,
Left him there without a mark.

58 DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, “The Last Long Hill,” n.d.
59 DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, “The Last Long Hill,” n.d.
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That was the worst, that was the worst,
But for a slip, he’d had me first.60
These otherwise shocking experiences were made normal by the war. They
left “[s]ome peasant mother miss[ing] her son,” but this butchery “was how
the war was won.” Such blunt, even emotionless, discussions leave the
reader with clear questions about the justification of such brutality.
“The Soldier” was written between 1933 and 1936 and references
Arthur Currie’s death as well as the opening of the Vimy memorial in 1936.
The veteran in the poem suffers in the uncertainties of the postwar world and
ironically longs to return to the certainties of war. Unable to attend either
Currie’s funeral or the opening of the Vimy memorial, the veteran loses his
sense of belonging. Now alone and isolated, he practices old drills,
surrounded only by his haunting memories.61
In “Peace,” Day allowed his disillusionment to manifest fully. The
poem opens by presenting an idealized version of peacetime Canada. The
landscape “smiles,” the young country is full of hope and optimism. Later
stanzas bring the reader back to reality. The dream ends and the reader faces
a world bordering on nightmare. Instead of factories “full of work,”
Canadians face an economy where the unemployed are left wandering “up
and down the earth.” But the search will fail and nothing of value will be
found. Those that find wealth and prosperity learn that their nightmare only

60 DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3
61 Eric Brown and Tim Cook, “The 1936 Vimy Pilgrimage,” Canadian Military History,
20:2 (Spring 2011): 37-54; DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, “The Soldier,” n.d.
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worsens because they have profited on the backs of those who continue to
suffer. It is the greedy capitalists who have profited:
Hardworking poverty paying through the nose
While idlers live at their repose;
Fat-jowled fellows with piglike eyes
Full of treachery, full of stealthy lies;
Grasping selfishness and stupid greed,
Still are in the vanguard, still are in the lead.
This is the postwar world; this is the world for which the veterans sacrificed.
“War may kill your body,” Day mourns, “but peace your soul.” Despite his
deep disillusionment, F.P. Day never expressed his disenchantment in public.
Like so many veterans, he left discussion of the transformation of his personal
understanding of the war’s meaning to others, including Will Bird, Robert
Manion, and Bill Deacon. 62
If Robert Manion, George Drew, Frank Underhill, and other prominent
Canadians were critical of the war’s legacy, Bill Deacon went further still. In
similar fashion to many of his generation, Deacon was an ardent Canadian
nationalist. He differed from some, however, when it came to Canada’s place
in the British Empire. Drew believed that Canada was best served by
furthering its interests alongside Britain. Deacon could not have disagreed
more. By the early 1930s he embraced isolationism and wanted the country to
divorce itself from the Empire and to disavow engagement in foreign wars.
Two events led Deacon to this conclusion: the fighting of the Great
War and his strong belief that there would soon be another. He thought often

62 DUA, F.P. Day papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, “Peace,” n.d
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about the war and its consequences, and his beliefs changed in response to his
deeply held conviction that the postwar era had failed to live up to
expectations. Unlike Drew, however, Deacon blamed Canada’s failures on
entanglements in European wars; events which Canada would never have
become ensnared had it not been for its commitments to the Empire. “Our
connection with the Empire has led us into two foreign wars, for causes and
interests not our own,” he explained during a meeting of the Native Sons of
Canada, before telling those who had gathered why he so despised the war:
I look on the Boer War as a disgrace to Canada, and on the
Great War as a futile tragedy. It is a terrible thing to say to those
who have suffered, as some of you have; but we poured out our
blood and our treasure in vain.
We did not end war with our victory; we did not
preserve democracy, since most countries are now under
dictatorships. What was accomplished? NOTHING. I mean
nothing good. The fruits were wholesale slaughter, debts that
crush nations under taxation, the debauchery of women and
many other things we should like to forget.63
The Empire had done nothing to serve Canada’s interests. Any further
participation in it risked the possibility of becoming embroiled in yet another
European conflict.
During the first half of the 1920s, however, Deacon was not nearly as
bitter about the war. He still blamed Canada’s involvement on Britain but he
was noticeably less critical of the conflict compared to his later views. “Do
you know why Canada entered the war?” he asked his friend Laura

63. TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 48, folder 21, “‘Canadian Nationalism and War’,
address to Hamilton Assembly of Native Sons of Canada,” 16 November 1933.
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Davidson: “Out of impuls[e] to England.” Other causes included “Liberty” as
well as a series of “inner economic factors.” By 1918 it did not matter why the
country had gone to war. The only thing that mattered was the conflict’s
human costs, which for Deacon, included both friends and family. The war
was no longer about ideals and he freely admitted that he hated it: “I think
we should all have been pacifists.”64 To some degree, however, Deacon
remained sentimental. His sense that the war had been fought for something
as “precious” as liberty stopped him from rejecting the conflict outright. “I
cannot say it was wrong,” he concluded, but the war’s aftermath continued to
weigh heavy regardless.65 By the time he published his nationalist call to
action, My Vision of Canada (1933), his beliefs had changed.
In the late 1920s, Deacon was certain there was going to be another
European war and that it could break out soon. Although he proved wrong
on the conflict’s timing, the fear of being drawn into another conflict pushed
him further away from the Empire and strengthened his calls for Canadian
isolationism. “War threatens Europe,” he wrote, and “Canada must stay out
this time.” This flagrant rejection of war notwithstanding, Deacon was not a
pacifist. Indeed, were Canada asked to help “prevent a war in Europe,” then
he believed the country should risk “all in the attempt” to maintain peace.
Joining in total war was a different matter, however. It amounted to “massinsanity and mass-murder.”66 Deacon would do almost anything to keep the

64. As Deacon told Davidson, “[t]wo of my cousins came home wrecks; the rest are
dead.” See TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 6, folder 7, Deacon to Davidson, 14 March 1924.
65. TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 6, folder 7, Deacon to Davidson, 14 March 1924.
66. TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 4, folder 1, “Canada and War,” n.d.
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country out of such a conflict: “I have told my son that, if I am to die in the
next war, it will be right here in Toronto, resisting war, where he can see me
being a hero, and where my death may possibly do him some good.”67
Although he came to believe the war had been futile, Canada’s soldiers
remained a subject of considerable pride. “[M]an-for-man,” Deacon declared
during a promotional talk for My Vision of Canada, “our soldiers in the Great
War were rated the best fighters in Europe. I am proud of those men: but I am
glad Canada is not one of those nations now disturbing the peace of the
world by possession of heavy armaments.”68 Such praise for the Canadian
Corps reflected his generation’s reluctance to criticize its achievements
overseas. His support did not waiver but the achievements now lacked
meaning. The sacrifices were wasted, especially if there was another war. As
Deacon explained on the eve of the Second World War, the real possibility
that men might again find themselves engulfed in European conflict was
more than “terribly depressing,” it was further proof that “every idealistic
impulse” in the world had “gone awry.”69
Veterans such as Will Bird, F.P. Day, George Drew, Robert Manion,
and Frank Underhill were all, to some extent, elites. So too were Bill Deacon
and Edward Binns. These men had little in common, either in profession or
politics, yet they were all disenchanted with the outcome of the Great War.

67. TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 3, folder 45, “Canada Won’t Fight,” n.d.
68. TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 48, folder 21, “‘Canadian Nationalism and War’,
address to Hamilton Assembly of Native Sons of Canada,” 16 November 1933.
69 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 3, folder 34, Deacon to Burris, 17 January 1939.
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There was no single cause for this discontent. International instability was
one factor. General disappointment with the direction of peacetime Canada
was another. For the veterans, their changing postwar views were also linked
to their war experience. The memories of that conflict continued to inform
their understanding of the peace. While public commemorative ceremonies
called on all Canadians to remember the war, these men and their postwar
disenchantment lacked a similar unifying purpose, often because their views
were a reaction to the present. Although a disparate record, these changed
interpretations of the war’s meaning were no less valid a reaction to the
challenges and failures endured in the war’s aftermath.
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Chapter 4
Unemployment and the Problem of the Returned Man
“[The unemployment problem] … is no occasion for faintheartedness
but in the name of those who have fallen in the defence of the liberties
of the country and in obligation to those who have returned from that
struggle, the Canadian people have before them the task of presenting
to the world, a nation morally and materially great, a monument
worthy of the men living and dead who have made this possible.”1
-

Harold Innis, “The Returned Soldier”

In 1919, Canada celebrated its “Victory Year.” The war was finally over. For
those who came of age with the conflict, however, postwar life proved a poor
reflection of the nationalist myths already being constructed. They may have
won the war but now veterans struggled amidst a pessimistic and troubling
reality: demobilization did not go smoothly and their resulting list of
grievances was long and often contradictory. Dashed hopes soon led to
frustration and even despair as postwar Canada endured widespread and
prolonged unemployment. These setbacks fuelled a sense among veterans,
including writers such as F.P. Day, that not enough was being done to
recognize and address the problems they faced after coming home.

1 Innis, “The Returned Soldier,” 20.
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Veterans did not initially expect to have trouble finding jobs. The war
was waged for a better world and propaganda encouraged the belief that
soldiers would return to a prosperous Canada. Department of Soldiers’ Civil
Re-establishment (DSCR) publicity material assured veterans that Returned

Figure 4. DSCR Poster advertising employment in
“every province” of Canada.
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Soldiers Commissions existed in “every province” to “secure proper
Employment for all honourably discharged Canadian Soldiers.”2 Such
advertisements touted all forms of work, from house painting to poultry
farming to typewriting to teaching, mechanical farming, mechanical drawing,
and work in machine shops. The wounded were not forgotten either. They
would be employed using “ingenious” substitutes for missing limbs.
Veterans in need of recovery would recuperate for civilian life at garden clubs
in convalescent hospitals. Whether rural or urban, industrial or agricultural,
in the trades or the classroom, Canada was committed to putting its returned
men back to work. Yet, when the country slid back into recession, returned
men were particularly hard hit.
Historians acknowledge that some veterans struggled after the war,
but few evaluations study how the postwar economic decline affected these
men or their understanding of the war’s meaning. Histories of major labour
unrest, including the Winnipeg General Strike and the On-to-Ottawa Trek,
say little about how the war generation reacted to these struggles. More
general considerations of how the war changed Canadian society are equally
silent on the war’s economic legacy, focusing instead on the war’s impact on
social reform, such as the temperance question, or shifting beliefs about the
power of the state.3 In the case of Winnipeg in 1919, debate continues about
the position of veterans during the strike, in part because returned men lined

2 See for example the DSCR , no. M.H.C. VII 5-2-18.
3 John H. Thompson, “ ‘The Beginning of Our Regeneration.’ The Great War and
Western Canadian Reform Movements,” in R. Douglas Francis and Howard Palmer, eds., The
Prairie West: Historical Readings (Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1985).
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up both for and against the strikers.4 Their role during the On-to-Ottawa-Trek
and the Regina Riots is even more ambiguous because most of the relief
workers who protested were much younger than the war generation. As Bill
Waiser argues, when the men in federal relief camps protested their
employment and living conditions, the march on Ottawa was led not by
veterans but by “hundreds of young men, many still in their teens.”5
Conventional wisdom dictates that Canada’s veterans “were reabsorbed into civil pursuits without much unemployment or industrial
disturbance.”6 While true, to an extent, for veterans who returned during the
war, this was not the case for the postwar era. The notion that veterans
reintegrated relatively easily into the postwar economy endures, a
misconception which helps explain why their struggles have not been
considered relevant to the discussion of the war’s wider meaning. Despite
this misunderstanding, however, returned men were particularly affected by
the 1920 downturn and by subsequent unemployment throughout the
interwar era. Admittedly, the picture of how badly these men struggled is

4 See for example, David Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial
Relations, and the Genearl Strike (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974),
Reinhold Kramer and Tom Mitchell, When the State Trembled: How A.J. Andrews and the
Citizens’ Committee Broke the Winnipeg General Strike (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2010), A. Ross McCormack, Reformers, Rebels and Revolutionaries: The Western
Canadian Radical Movement, 1899-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), D.C.
Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).
5 Bill Waiser, All Hell Can’t Stop Us: The On-to-Ottawa-Trek and Regina Riot (Calgary:
Fifth House, 2003), xi.
6 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, Canada: 18671939 [Hereafter Rowell-Sirois Commission] (Ottawa, 1940), 100.
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clouded by a lack of statistical information on unemployment generally but
the records indicate that veterans faced serious hurdles after 1918.
Comprehensive employment figures were not kept during the
interwar period and analysis of employment in the 1920s is limited by this
lack of statistical data.7 An exception was the Dominion Bureau of Statistics,
which began to make forays into employment research as early as 1920, but
even this data was limited. It was derived from small averages of selected
trades unions and, as a result, there is no consensus on how many men were
unemployed at the outbreak of war or at its close.8 As the University of
Toronto economist Gilbert Jackson complained, Canada could “scarcely claim
to possess the data from which a calculation of the risks of unemployment
could be made.”9 The era’s policy makers were forced to rely on estimates
and no national statistics were recorded until after the Second World War.10

7. The most extensive considerations of Canadian employment in this era include
James Struthers’ work in No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State,
1914-1941 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) and The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in
Ontario, 1920-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). The development of social
security is better studied. See for instance Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), Raymond Blake, From Rights
to Needs: A History of Family Allowances in Canada, 1929-1992 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2009), and Nancy Christie, Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
8. Struthers, No Fault, 13.
9. Jackson, quoted in Struthers, No Fault, 20.
10 Although important steps were taken to compile statistical portraits of
unemployment in Canada after 1920, no regular measure existed before 1945. See Dave
Gower, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/studies-etudes/75-001/archive/e-pdf/87-eng.pdf 4 June 2014.
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In the 1920s and 1930s the unemployed were not “counted regularly”11 and
Ottawa “did not even know how many Canadians were unemployed.”12 It is

11 Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada 1900-1945, 219.
12 Thompson and Seager, Canada, 1922-1939, 26. Estimates for the 1920s suggest that
the average unemployment rate for the decade was 3.5%. The figure is a poor reflection of the
difficulties faced in the early 1920s because the percentage is artificially buoyed by the more
prosperous period between 1926 and 1929. See Fortin, http://www.csls.ca/repsp/1/06fortin.pdf, 114. According to James Struthers, the real unemployment rate between 1920 and
1925 was nearly double the average for the decade. The years with the highest rates were
1921 (8.9), 1922, and 1924 (both at 7.1). See James Struthers, No Fault, 215. In 1921, nearly
250,000 men were unemployed, approximately twelve percent of the projected labour force.
Such figures, while offering a more accurate picture of the overall unemployment situation,
are more a reflection of the distribution of unemployment in the economy generally and they
remain silent about the overall numbers of unemployed. See M.C. Maclean, et al., Census
Monograph No. 11, Unemployment: A Study Based on the Census of 1931 and Supplementary Data
(Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938), 23. Other estimates indicate that the country’s unemployment
rate was considerably higher, especially during the fall and winter months. See “1,500
Returned Men Without Employment,” Globe, 13 June 1924, 12. In January 1920, Ottawa’s
department of labour concluded that Canada’s unemployment rate was sixteen percent. The
report did not expect the situation to improve soon. See “Unemployment on Increase in
Canada,” Globe, 27 April 1921, 3.
Unemployment on the prairies is less well documented, but is estimated at equally
high rates. Anecdotal figures from James Gray suggest it “may well have reached 20 or 25 per
cent” in the region’s urban centers. See James H. Gray, The Roar of the Twenties (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1975), 71. The most dire years could well have been worse. Kenneth Buckley
reported in 1955 that the unemployment figures for the interwar era were skewed by the
failure to recognize that in times of economic difficulty excess farm work tended to stay on
the farm. Moreover, there may even have been a “reverse movement from the cities to the
farms.” See Kenneth Buckley, Capital Formation in Canada, 1896-1930 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1955), 46, 152 n. 22. Regardless of the rate, it should not be forgotten that the
proportion of men of working age actually declined after the war. See O.J. Firestone, Income
and Wealth Series VII: Canada’s Economic Development, 1867-1953: With Special Reference to
Changes in the Country’s National Product and National Wealth (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1958),
55. Between 1870 and 1910 men aged 15-64 rose from fifty-four per cent to sixty-four percent.
The losses incurred during the war forced these figures down and by 1920 the percentage of
working age men had declined to 61½ percent. The percentage did not rise to 1910 levels
until 1939 (when it reached 65½ percent).
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unsurprising, therefore, that scholars consider it nearly “impossible” to
document the scope of interwar unemployment.13
Social scientists began extensive study of the economy in the 1930s to
address the lack of information on the labour market. This work contributed
to policy debates about the role of government and business in the market,
but it rarely focused on veterans.14 Rather, it examined the causes of
unemployment, studies of regional or municipal reactions to labour issues,
and the role of private industry. L. Richter’s Canada’s Unemployment Problem
(1939) was one of the major publications released during the era. It was the
first study published by Dalhousie’s Institute of Public Affairs, which
coordinated research between the governments of Newfoundland, the
Maritime Provinces, and the region’s universities. Leading social scientists,
including Harry Cassidy, Director of Social Welfare in B.C., Dorothy King,
Director of the Montreal School of Social Work, and A. MacNamara, deputy
minister of Public Works and Labour in Manitoba, contributed to the volume.
The U of T economist, S.A. Saunders, acknowledged that returned soldiers
received assistance for unemployment immediately after the war, but none of
the remaining studies of the relief question considered veterans’ place in

13. Gray, The Roar of the Twenties, 71. See too C.P. Gilman and H.M. Sinclair,
Unemployment: Canada’s Problem (Ottawa: Army and Navy Veterans in Canada, 1935), 17,
which also laments the “paucity” of data on unemployment.
14 See for example Norman Rogers’ Foreward to L. Richter’s edited collection,
Canada’s Unemployment Problem (Toronto: Macmillan, 1939).
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postwar society or how unemployment affected them.15 Instead, these men
were lumped into the wider pool of unemployed workers.
The tendency to overlook veterans was also true of other studies
produced earlier in the 1930s. F.R. Scott and Harry Cassidy’s Labour
Conditions in the Men’s Clothing Industry (1935) was an important report on
urban labour but it said nothing about jobless veterans in the clothing
industry.16 The same is true of Leonard Marsh’s research, which did not
highlight the plight of unemployed veterans although it did acknowledge
that postwar unemployment was a product of the war’s aftermath caused in
part by “commercial, monetary, and political dislocations which derive from
the War.”17
Despite a lack of concrete statistics, by 1921 it was estimated that
200,000 Canadians were unemployed, “many of them veterans.”18 According
to Desmond Morton, “too many veterans had chosen overvalued or

15 The omission is notable because the book contains work by leading experts, such
as Harry Cassidy and Charlotte Whitton.
16 F.R. Scott and H.M. Cassidy, Labour Conditions in the Men’s Clothing Industry: A
Report (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1935).
17 Leonard Marsh, Employment Research: An Introduction to the McGill Programme of
Research in the Social Sciences (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1935), 44. Marsh expands on
this “dislocation” in a chapter on “Industrial Fluctuations.” The conflict left a “legacy of
overequipment and inflated capital values in its wake,” he wrote. See Employment Research,
197.
18 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 153.
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unproductive land in the Soldier Settlement plan.”19 The promises of “full reestablishment” boiled down to a “brutally simple” reality: returned men
would have the “renewed privilege of fending for themselves in a businesslike, profit driven society.”20 In the estimation of the Great War Veterans’
Association (GWVA), unemployment among veterans was “intolerable.”
Instead of life getting better after 1919, it got worse. Unemployment increased
between 1920 and 1921, and veterans were the group “most severely
affected.”21
During the early 1920s, the GWVA produced the most statistical
information on returned men. Yet its estimates were as varied as others,
making it difficult to compare the figures with municipal, provincial, and
federal records. In 1919 the association counted at least 1,500 members who
were unemployed in Toronto and it estimated the provincial figure to be
close to five thousand.22 Provincial soldiers’ aid commissions, tasked with
finding employment for veterans, reported that need for relief was so great
that Ontario’s relief funds were “considerably” overdrawn.23 Churches and

19 Desmond Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” in J.L.
Granatstein and Peter Neary, eds., The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada
(Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 27.
20 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 104.
21. “Unemployment on Increase in Canada,” Globe, 27 April 1921, 3.
22. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview with
Gentlemen Representing the G.W.V.A. Introduced by Sergeant Conroy, District Secretary for
Toronto District,” 19 February 1919 [hereafter “Notes of Interview”].
23. AO, RG29-165, Soldiers’ Aid Commission, Minutes of the Soldiers’ Aid
Commission, 31 December 1919; AO, RG 8-5, B226501, Soldiers’ Aid Commission, “Notes of
Interview.”
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benevolent societies noted similar pressures as unemployment increased.
Veterans living in urban centres were especially hard hit. In 1922, the Toronto
Brotherhood Federation recognized that returned soldiers were badly
affected by the economic downturn. In response, the federation put out an
“S.O.S.,” asking individuals to pledge for relief efforts for unemployed
veterans. The appeal reminded the city’s congregations of the debt they owed
the country’s returned soldiers:
The Christian Churches received much praise for helping to
secure volunteers for the great conflict. Now that it is over and
nobly won and the men are back with us, many of them in
distress the Churches will not stand by and see them suffer for
lack of the mere necessaries of life.
The plan here proposed by the Toronto Brotherhood
Federation, and endorsed by the authorities of the different
Churches, is simple, direct and effective.
He who gives quickly gives twice.24
But community efforts could not solve unemployment, however well
intentioned, and jobless veterans continued to face difficulty into the 1920s.
By the winter of 1924, job prospects were so poor that returned soldiers had
resorted to hoping for winter storms to make extra money removing snow. 25
The economy improved halfway through the decade but
unemployment problems continued. George Parker, for example, was an
experienced pipe fitter. Despite his training, he was unemployed and

24. “Churches Will Hear Appeal for Members to Come to Aid of Distressed Returned
Men,” Globe, 14 January 1922, 13.
25. “Snow Proves Boon to Many Soldiers and Workless Men,” Globe, 21 February
1924, 8.
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desperately seeking a job. In 1926, Parker wrote Ontario’s premier, Howard
Ferguson, asking for a letter of introduction. He hoped to secure a position
with the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad, but was
uncomfortable asking for such assistance. The precarious state of the
economy forced him to put aside his “regret.” As he explained, “things have
come to such a pass, that I am almost desperate.”26 Ferguson was sympathetic
but did little more than direct the veteran to an official at the northern
railway. The premier regretted that Parker was in such a condition. He
emphasized, however, that his hands were tied by the fact that others in the
province were in similar circumstances. “The conditions all over the Province
… are very serious,” he explained. He could do nothing more to help.
According to estimates, the unemployment rate in 1926 had fallen to under
five per cent. Yet, in spite of the increase in jobs, Ferguson’s letter painted an
especially dreary picture of veterans’ employment prospects: “In a centre like
Toronto particularly there are thousands of men walking the streets, and
similar conditions prevail in every centre in the Province.”27
Five years later, by the second year of the Great Depression, veterans
in urban centres, such as Toronto, were even worse off. In 1931, the city’s
Central Bureau of Unemployment Relief produced one of the most detailed
accounts of urban unemployment. It tracked age, physical condition,
residence, economic status, family responsibilities, and nationality of the

26. AO, RG3-6-0-961, Civil Service Applications for Positions #1, Parker to Ferguson,
1 January 1926.
27. AO, RG3-6-0-961, Civil Service Applications for Positions #1, Ferguson to Parker,
7 January 1926.
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unemployed. The bureau calculated that between August and November
there were 36,500 unemployed men. A large number— 7,310—were veterans.
The bureau’s figures do not specify how old these men were but by 1931 the
vast majority of the war generation were aged 36 to 55, indicating that their
ranks accounted for approximately 52% of unemployed men.28 According to
the Hyndman Report on unemployment of ex-service men, by the mid 1930s
as many as twenty percent of non-pensionable veterans were unemployed.29

Table 1. Age Distribution of Unemployed Men, Toronto
(17 August to 30 November 1931)30
Age

Single

Married

Total

20 and under

2,801

108

2,900

21 to 35

8,875

7,563

16,438

36 to 55

4,056

9,930

13,986

56 to 69

883

2,159

3,042

70 and over

49

126

175

Total

16,664

19,886

36,550

28 Cassidy, Unemployment and Relief in Ontario, 38.
29. This figure was an approximation based on the exclusion of pensionable men and
those estimated to be receiving municipal or federal departmental relief. With these men
excluded from the total of CEF veterans, it means that of the roughly 189,000 men not eligible
for some sort of assistance, at least 38,000 of these were unemployed. No explanation is
provided in the report for how the committee reached these figures. See Report of the
Committee Appointed to Carry Out an Investigation into the Existing Facilities in Connection with
Unemployment of Ex-Service Men and Care and Maintenance while Unemployed, and to Report
Thereon with such Suggestions and Recommendations as may be Deemed Advisable (Ottawa: King’s
Printer, 1935), 5.
30 Data derived from Cassidy, Unemployment and Relief in Ontario, 37.
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Amidst the Depression, veterans wrote impassioned letters to
provincial premiers asking for jobs. But these desperate appeals did not
commence with the 1929 downturn. Even during the so-called boom years of
the late 1920s, returned men were pleading for aid for unemployment from
all levels of government.31 James Rowan Linton, for example, wrote the
Ontario government seeking work. He enlisted in 1915 and was severely
wounded overseas. In 1926 he was unemployed. Premier Ferguson assured
him that it would have given him “great satisfaction” to help a returned man,
especially an amputee (as Linton now was). But it was impossible. “I have
made enquiries throughout the service,” he explained to the young man,
“and I am unable to find that there is any opportunity presenting itself at the
present time.”32 The employment problem was both widespread and
prolonged.
When the war ended, the expectation was that employers would
accept healthy returned men back to work as part of their patriotic duty.33

31. The correspondence from returned men to the province’s premiers from the 1920s
demonstrates that their appeals pre-date the cases cited by Lara Campbell in her analysis of
Ontario’s veterans during the Great Depression. See especially Chapters 2 and 5, respectively
“‘If He is a Man He Becomes Desperate’: Unemployed Husbands, Fathers, and Workers,”
and “Militant Mothers and Loving Fathers: Gender, Family, and Ethnicity in Protest,” in Lara
Campbell, Respectable Citizens: Gender, Family, and Unemployment in Ontario’s Great Depression
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
32. AO, AO, RG3-6-0-961, Civil Service Applications for Positions #1, Ferguson to
Linton, 14 January 1926. Ferguson did pass on Linton’s request to Col. Price, the Provincial
Treasurer, however, in hopes that he could find the man a position with the Soldiers’ Aid
Commission.
33. Sessional Paper No. 35a – 1916, Military Hospital Commission, The Provision of
Employment for Members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force on their return to Canada
and the Re-education of those who are unable to follow their previous positions, 5.
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This did not happen, either because jobs were scarce or because employers
were reluctant to hire veterans because they feared employees with physical
or psychological wounds. The difficulty these men had in finding work was
noticed early on and newspapers, such as the Edmonton Herald, ran ads that
called on employers to “find out what jobs are vacant in your community”
and then make it a matter of pride “to give the first chance to a returned
solder.” Other ads argued that veterans needed to be encouraged to return to
work. They preyed on period fears about idle men, declaring that “[loafing] is
bad for them, as it is for any of us.” As Robert Rutherdale points out, this type
of advertising framed returned men’s difficulty finding work in terms of
existing fears over male unemployment. Idle soldiers were no longer heroic
volunteers; they were now malingering ‘loafers’.34 It was not just employers
that were at fault.
As the Star noted, returned men could also make difficult employees.
The paper reported that “some of the [returned] men are hard to handle.”35
They wanted employers to make concessions on their behalf. Veterans
believed that fighting for the nation meant that the government and
businesses had a responsibility to help them. This assumption did not sit well
with potential employers. In their experience, veterans may well have wanted
to work, but they seemed too selective when it came to what they were
willing to do. Employers complained that returned men wanted

34. Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons, 238.
35. “Fifty Soldiers Register,” Star, 13 October 1915, 1.
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“sinecures.”36 The hostility of the labour market put veterans in a doubly
difficult position. They had sacrificed for the country on the expectation that,
should it be necessary, their needs would be addressed after the war. The
postwar market, however, was not sympathetic to men who returned home
less capable than before the war and the re-establishment programs created to
assist them proved equally inadequate. The harsh reality for many veterans
was that they were left worse off because of their military service.
According to the GWVA, ex-soldiers were denied good jobs because
they were being filled by unworthy men. During the war, much of this anger
was directed at foreigners. The hostility of ex-soldiers towards those they
perceived as un-British was both a reflection of men’s desire “to fight the war
at home” and a call for “better re-establishment efforts” that would ultimately
result in an idealized “vision of Canada as a British country.”37 By war’s end,
however, veterans had come to the realization that they had little power to
influence the hiring practices of private businesses.38 Ideally, they wanted
businesses to be “accommodating.” If employers were willing to give them
greater leniency, then these men would surely be back on their feet in no
time. “We are asking the manufacturers … to take men who are not 100%,”
explained Col. Hunter of the GWVA. The hope was that if such
accommodation were made, men would be helped along “until they become

36. “Fifty Soldiers Register,” 1.
37. Smith, “Comrades and Citizens,” 144.
38. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
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efficient.”39 This did not happen and returned men were increasingly turned
down in favour of civilians.40 In response, veterans’ associations refocused
their advocacy. They stopped calling on private business and shifted
attention to elected officials and government agencies, such as Ottawa’s
DSCR and Ontario’s Soldiers’ Aid Commission (SAC). By concentrating on
government, veterans’ associations ceded their ability to advocate for
employment for all returned men—both able-bodied and disabled—in favour
of securing better benefits for those deemed eligible for federal assistance.
This change led to a nearly two-decade long struggle with the federal
government over pensions. It revealed that veterans’ associations were as ill
equipped as provincial and federal governments to offer solutions to the
problem of postwar unemployment.
William Edward Turley was one of the GWVA’s leading spokesmen.
While in uniform he was a sergeant. Out of uniform, he was an ex-boxer and
former reporter for the Toronto Telegram.41 Born in 1882, Turley was a wellknown Orangeman who had enlisted in September 1914. After his return to
Canada, he was actively involved in recruiting efforts in Toronto. Turley then
served as secretary of the Ontario branch of the GWVA. It was in this capacity
that he and the GWVA tried to draw the government’s attention to the plight
of unemployed soldiers. The association opted to focus on government
because the GWVA concluded that private businesses were not responding to

39. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
40. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
41. See Turley’s biographical information on his Attestation Papers and in Smith,
“Comrades and Citizens,” 82.
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appeals to hire more veterans. As Turley explained, “one does not expect or
get much sentiment from private business, [but] one does expect some …
sentiment and consideration in connection with government positions.” 42 If
business would not hire ex-soldiers, then the government had to step in.
Politicians had made well-publicized commitments to bring them into the
public service. As one GWVA member explained to the Ontario SAC, asking
for increased aid from the government may have seemed “selfish” in a time
of difficult employment but
for reasons that are apparent we [returned men and the state]
have a linking up with each other that you cannot get in any
other way, and kindly consideration by the Government of this
problem would go far to make us more quickly the power for
good that we are going to be in the Province of Ontario and the
Dominion of Canada. We are going to do this right and make
this country a better place to live in.43
The GWVA devoted considerable energy to such advocacy, with many of its
campaigns directed at ensuring government employed returned soldiers.
The Ontario SAC was aware that returned men faced difficulty
securing jobs and that they lacked sufficient social and medical support as
well. The commission was created in 1916 to facilitate the re-establishment of
veterans. It had limited scope to provide work but it did act as an advisory
body that documented soldiers’ efforts at re-integration. The group tracked
the number of men returning to Ontario and also organized committees and
branches to help men find work. By 1918, its efforts included organized

42. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview”
43. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview”
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appeals to secure the “good will” of employers. The Commission also worked
with the federal and provincial governments to ensure returned men were
considered when either government made appointments. Aside from some
vocational training, however, the commission was limited to offering aid and
assistance to men in need. As with the provincial efforts to address
unemployment, generally, it had no powers to ensure veterans received jobs.
In a confidential memo, the commission identified some of the major
obstructions facing returned soldiers. One of the most daunting challenges
was the veteran assistance system itself. It was a confusing combination of
organizations with overlapping jurisdictions. Men often had no way to use it
“without the benefit of advice or counsel.”44 A myriad of groups and
organizations all purported to assist veterans. These included benevolent
societies, municipal assistance, provincial organizations, and those operated
by the federal government. Some, such as the CPF, were officially sanctioned
but privately operated. Others, such as the provincial aid commissions were
arm’s-length extensions of government. Others still were entirely
unconnected to government and based on charity. This patchwork of
programs left men bewildered. A.E. Lowery of the GWVA cautioned that
Canada’s various levels of government had failed to approach the problem of
returned men in any comprehensive manner. “The trouble,” he wrote, “is that
if the problem grows to be very great and neither the Provincial nor the
Dominion Government is primarily responsible for the solution there is

44. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, Confidential Memo: Proposed
Organization of the Ontario Soldiers’ Advisory Board, n.d.
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danger of a good deal of falling through between the two.”45 The result was a
maze of programs and agencies that proved difficult to navigate.
Many assistance programs did little to assist veterans, which only
added to men’s frustrations. Veterans were often confused about which
organization was best suited to their needs and they faced a myriad of groups
claiming to offer help. One such organization was Toronto’s Civic League
(TLC). It was part of a laundry list of organizations and groups created to
assist returned soldiers and, while well meaning, it offered little practical
assistance. In fact, no veteran was sure of what the organization actually did.
According to Edward Turley, the group had a “broad plan” to help returned
men reintegrate into civil life. Despite its desire to help, the group’s mandate
did not include provision for assistance of returned soldiers. Instead, it
seemed that the league existed solely “for the purpose of giving [a man] a
feed once a month.” Veterans did not discount this work, but “when it comes
down to practical things,” they concluded, the organization was of little use. 46
Veterans were angered that assistance programs lacked oversight.
They felt that returned men who appeared before pension boards (not to
mention the boards of benevolent associations, including those of the
provincial canteen funds), were at the mercy of their decision, no matter
whether “right or wrong.” If a veteran believed he had been turned down

45 Proceedings of the Special Committee on Returned Soldiers, Parilamentary
Session 1917, No. 8, 21 March 1917, 709.
46. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview”
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unjustly, he had no recourse or appeal. This situation was ripe for abuse. As
an Ontario report noted,
there is no check either, on behalf of the man, on the
interpretations placed upon the regulations under which the
various departments operate. Such interpretations are, in some
cases, unnecessarily strict and narrow. Matters of policy directly
affecting the veteran are at times decided more from a point of
view of office management, administration, or economy, than
from regard to the interest of the veteran himself. The system
that some organizations adopt in dealing with the men is not
satisfactory to the men.47
The federal and provincial governments may have been well intentioned in
their desire to assist veterans, but the policies and procedures implemented to
assist them proved naïve in their assessment, particularly of the employment
problem. The resulting strain on the system proved unbearable and many of
the programs established were over-burdened by the influx of men claiming
assistance
In Ontario, veterans’ organizations offered few solutions about how to
address the unemployment of returned men. Beyond information campaigns
explaining that returned soldiers faced perilous job prospects, groups like the
GWVA did little more than advocate for special status for veterans. Indeed,
the group spent much of its postwar energy fighting for positions in
government agencies. In Ontario, the Labour Bureau came in for particular
rebuke. It was the province’s primary employment body and it employed a
staff of eight, three of whom were veterans. The GWVA advocated strongly

AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, Confidential Memo: Proposed
Organization of the Ontario Soldiers’ Advisory Board, n.d.
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that this number needed to be higher. It also took issue with the fact that at
least one of the civilian employees had been eligible for duty. According to
the veterans’ association, failure to don a uniform meant this man did not
deserve his postwar position.
The GWVA also singled out a young woman who was placing men as
farm labourers. According to the association, because so many returned men
were heading to farms, “a returned soldier would be more efficient in placing
returned soldiers on farms than a girl could possibly be.”48 The federal DSCR
was similarly rebuked for not employing enough veterans. As the
organization complained, “this Department is being administered, to a great
extent by civilians, who are just as capable of serving overseas as any man
who went.” The GWVA believed these men were not worthy of employment,
not least because they were profiting off of the hard won labour of Canada’s
soldiers. Instead of doing their part overseas, DSCR employees had “stayed
behind” and secured “good positions,” which “could [now be] filled by
returned men.” The GWVA believed that the DSCR employees received
“good pay” at the expense of returned soldiers. This was not a “square
deal.”49
Returned men wanted recognition and fair consideration for work. But
they were also critical of those who considered them for employment and the
“majority of returned soldiers” chafed at receiving assistance from civilians. It

48. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview”
49. “Report of Meeting of Commission of Government and Representatives of
Guelph Brance of G.W.V.A,” 25 November 1919, 5 in Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons, 254.
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was the GWVA’s position that civilian employees were ill-equipped to deal
with former soldiers, particularly when it came to cases of disabilities.50 Not
all returned men had issues with civilians, but they certainly did when it
meant “rubbing shoulders” with them looking for employment.51 By asking
for recognition of their status as veterans, ex-combatants set themselves apart
from the rest of society, a distinction that ran up against the fact that they
were now demobilized. Once back in civilian clothes, they were treated as
regular men. Many did not think it fair because their war service had set them
back in comparison to their peers. As a result, “the returned soldier desire[d]
to maintain [that title] by virtue of his having gone over and fought and
earned [it].”52
Despite ongoing advocacy on behalf of their membership, the
veterans’ organizations did not secure meaningful change in hiring policies
and, much like the case with private businesses, the lobbying of government
proved ineffective. These efforts failed because with the exception of calling
for new hiring, the alternative proposals put forward were impractical.
Edward Turley, for instance, wanted to ensure that governments hired
returned men. When pressed how the GWVA would achieve this goal, Turley
admitted to the Ontario SAC that the only solution to employing returned
soldiers was to fire civilians who had not served. Even then, however, Turley
recognized that there were not enough jobs to meet the need. During an

50. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
51. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
52. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
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exchange, the veteran pointed out that London, Ontario, had at least 450
unemployed returned soldiers. Yet, Turley conceded that “even if all
government employees were relieved of their duties that would not relieve
the situation so far as soldier unemployment is concerned.”53 Even if veterans
did not want to admit it, the GWVA’s lobbying of government highlighted
the point that the war had put these men at a disadvantage. While making his
case for “releasing present employees,” Turley admitted that they would
have a better chance at finding a new job than returned men. These male
employees were “physically fit,” in part because they had not served. As
such, they would “have less difficulty in securing employment from the
ordinary private employer of labour than the returned man, [who was left]
more or less disabled.”54
The GWVA also wanted Ontario’s employment offices to provide a
separate employment bureau exclusively for veterans. As the province’s
deputy minister of labour noted, what the association desired was a “Bureau
that will be given up exclusively to returned soldier applications.” 55 The
GWVA pushed for this option because it recognized its members were
increasingly unhappy with their employment prospects. “We have many
dissatisfied men coming to our offices with various grievances,” explained
the association’s Col. Hunter. “We try to smooth these things out as we go

53. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
54. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
55. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
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along, but the situation is becoming more acute all the time.”56 The push for a
separate veterans’ employment bureau was also the result of a tacit admission
that returned men were not always as predictable as their civilian
counterparts. With jobs scare and men increasingly desperate, instances of
abuse and assault increased.57 Veterans were ‘fed up’ with having to deal
with men who had “never been over” to Europe and were threatening to give
civilian men “a punch in the jaw” for taking their jobs.58
Labour bureau staff worked to match prospective employees with
prospective employers, a task that required considering both the needs of an
employer and a potential employee. In Ontario, individuals who visited the
provincial labour bureaus utilized the same space. Officials only considered a
veteran’s status if a potential employer—generally the government—agreed
to give preference to these men. The problem for veterans was that there were
too few jobs in the public service, let alone in the private sector. Many
veterans, such as Patrick G., were considered less desirable than ‘civilian’
men, for whom labour bureau employees could more easily find work.
Patrick suffered from chest pain that prevented him “from engaging in any
strenuous form of employment such as heavy labour.”59 As a case officer from
an employment bureau acknowledged, there was no employment for the

56. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
57. Col. Hunter estimated that the number of men dissatisfied with the assistance
they received from the SAC and the Ontario Employment Bureau was as high as fifty-percent.
See AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
58. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
59 AO, RG 29-65, File No 1765 [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act], 7 December 1929.
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veteran, despite the fact that he was “a regular applicant for work, and …
always willing to take on anything he could do.”60 Veterans like Patrick
realized that they were disadvantaged and they were angry at being passed
over for open positions. As tensions increased inside the employment
bureaus, the GWVA warned that it could not control its ranks, many of who
had “been brought up to fight.” To prevent a “battle royal” erupting at these
offices, the association called for a divided space. In the GWVA’s view,
securing an exclusive returned men’s office would alleviate tension caused by
civilian men securing the majority of available positions. It would also ensure
that veterans received some sort of de facto recognition of their status as
returned men.
The GWVA did not succeed with its efforts to get the government to
hire more returned men. Its proposals were impractical. Firing employed
workers and setting up a separate employment service to deal with civilians
could not address the major downturn in employment. The extreme nature of
the association’s suggested solutions to the employment issue reflected the
inadequate responses to postwar labour problems. Veterans may have called
for unified employment schemes, but these calls aligned poorly with the
commitments made by the state, or its jurisdictional responsibilities. While
some men may have returned to Canada without having lost their “initiative
or a desire to better [their] position,” this did not mean they had jobs waiting
for them and the struggle and strain of the ensuing decade tested the
generation’s resolve, making it difficult to argue that they were receiving a

60 AO, RG 29-65, File No 1765 [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act], 10 December 1929.
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“square deal.”61 Indeed, as Pierre van Paassen described, men became
increasingly disenchanted with assistance programs:
Officials were assuring men that they would be properly looked
after … There was going to be a gratuity, a bonus; land was
going to be made available for settlement; convalescent camps
were to be established; even broken-up homes were going to be
mended by martial relations boards.
“All of that sounded fine,” van Paassen remembered, except that he had “a
feeling, nevertheless, that I had been the victim of an enormous nonsense.” By
enlisting, men submitted to “an arbitrary fate” that “deprived” them “of
everything that makes for human dignity.” The veterans now raged that men
had thrown their lives away “on the supposition that they were helping to
preserve something precious.” In reality, all they had done “was to clear the
road for the same bourgeois democracy which had unleashed the storm just
stilled, to start all over again.”62
During the Great Depression, difficulty finding work stressed many
veterans to the breaking point. Returned men took particular exception to this
state of affairs. The hardships their generation faced did not reflect the world
for which they had sacrificed and their disenchantment, its relationship to the
war, and their postwar economic prospects was made clear in a series of
articles written by members of the Army and Navy Veterans of Canada, later

61 The GWVA acknowledged as such with its statement: “We have a difficult
position, those of us who are heads in any way of the G.W.V.A. organization. There are two
necessities, one is to see that every returned man gets an absolutely square deal and the other,
which is quite as difficult, is to convince hi that he has got a square deal.” See AO, RG 8-5,
Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”
62 Van Paassen, Days of Our Years, 90-91.
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collected in the volume Unemployment: Canada’s Problem (1935). The principle
authors were Capt. Clement Percy Gilman, M.C., a decorated officer from the
CEF, and Huntly McDonald Sinclair, professor of economics and author of
The Principles of Economic Trade (1932). In perhaps the most detailed
explanation of the economic complaints raised by veterans during the early
1920s, their text argued that returned men were particularly hard hit by the
economic downturn. “Modern economic life,” they argued, “victimized the
returned man more than his contemporaries.” Moreover, for the war
generation,
the process of victimization started in 1914. The patriot, the
idealist, the man of resource, the searcher for adventure – those
who in the past history of mankind had made the greatest
contribution in carrying back the frontier between civilization
and the lack of it, progress and stagnation – these men went
overseas in return for the munificent sum of $1.10 with bad
food, uncomfortable clothing, and primitive housing thrown in.
While they were overseas the slackers, the materialists, the
unimaginative enjoyed the high wages and fabulous profits
associated with wartime industrial activity.63
In Gilman and Sinclair’s analysis, returned men had good reason to be
disenchanted with their postwar lives. They were Canada’s best—its patriots,
idealists, and adventurers—and they had given their all during the war. The
war had cost them dearly and all for the benefit of slackers, materialists, and
others who were not their equal.
The war’s economic and human toll was self-evident. But it was not
the rigors of conflict that sapped men’s spirit. It was the disappointments of

63 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 29.
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the peace. In a striking passage that highlighted the wasted youth of many
men who had gone overseas, Gilman and Sinclair explained why the
generation was disillusioned. No clearer example of postwar waste existed
than the fate of a typical, relatively young returned man:
[He] is … thirty-five, married and with a small family, with
twenty per cent. paid upon the purchase price of a modest
home, who finds himself suddenly out of a job that he thought
secure for life. Startled but not discouraged, he goes out to
search for work. Day after day, week after week, month after
month, even year after year, he searches in vain, as thousands of
others have searched. Optimism gives place to blind despair;
courage gives place to fear; self-confidence to a withering sense
of inferiority. In the end, without further hope, he sinks into the
ranks of those whose spirits have been broken – whose souls
have been wrinkled by too much stretching.64
Gilman and Sinclair’s analysis was critical of the lack of work both for
its economic and its moral and social effects. “The unemployment problem,”
they argued, reached “far beyond … the ranks of the unemployed.” Its
economic shocks were incalculable and were already bringing about
“tremendous” losses in production. Even more damning, however, was
unemployment’s wider repercussions, including its psychological, moral, and
societal impact. Such costs were more difficult to measure than the
unemployment rate, but they represented the most dangerous risks. The price
paid in “loss of courage, in broken spirit, in the abandonment of hope, and
even in the loss of self-respect has been appallingly high.”65

64 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 2-3.
65 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 16.
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According to Gilman and Sinclair, returned men had a special part to
play in the employment situation because of the relationship between the war
and the economy. Or, as they put it, together these men had a “peculiar
interest in the unemployment problem.”66 Men willing to put their lives on
the line for the betterment of Canada had a deep interest in the public affairs
of their country. The generation was also considered more patriotic, more
idealistic, with a “greater interest in the welfare and security of the State,”
than older Canadians. Above all else, however, these men were interested in
unemployment because in their view, the “war [was] the cause of … modern
unemployment.”67 For them, the conflict remained a central reference point in
their lives and anything that pertained to the war—its causes, conduct, or
aftermath—remained important. Its memory was “acute” and anything
associated with it was of “tremendous interest.” The critique did not shy
away from linking the war with postwar unemployment. The men of the CEF
had made sacrifices overseas and it was an “injustice” that they did so while
others stayed home and profited. Even worse was the fact that this
discrepancy continued after the war, especially with the difficulty returned
men faced (re)-gaining employment. Their jobs had been surrendered to
others; their skills were out of date or had been more ably performed by
women; and in some cases, employers were reluctant to fire employees to
allow a veteran to return to work.68

66 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 25.
67 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 26-27.
68 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 31.
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The collective experience of the war had become a reference point
through which these men framed their postwar world. They used it to make
sense of their disillusion and as a way to articulate why they felt isolated from
the rest of society. As Gilman and Sinclair explained, “it [was] difficult to
make people understand how great a contrast to civil life four years of war
activity could be.” The conflict “wrenched” men from their civilian lives and
exposed them to “the ghastly experience of life in the trenches with its
appalling demands on physical endurance, mental placidity, and moral
integrity.” It was not, as a result, “a small wonder that the lives of many were
so revolutionized by the contrast” between their wartime and peacetime
existence.69
Those who had seen the worst of the war were conditioned by the
experience. Returning to their normal postwar lives—if that was even
possible—required years and a myriad of “new adjustments.” Many found
the return difficult, so much so that they rejected their peacetime lives by
taking comfort in the challenges they faced during the war:
In shot and shell
I have been free,
’Tis peace that’s Hell,
Oh God! Help me!70
Given their troubles, it was not surprising that men were disillusioned. They
had gone to war for a set of ideals and it was difficult to maintain such
optimism in the face of continued failures.

69 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 32.
70 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 32.
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In Unemployment, Gilman and Sinclair outlined the direct relationship
between men’s postwar disenchantment and the memory of the war. “Much
has happened in the past few years to disillusion the idealists,” they wrote,
and it could be excused if they readily parodied even the most cherished of
the war’s memories. If John McCrae had written, “They shall not die /
Though poppies grow in Flanders fields,” by the 1930s, Gilman and Sinclair
dismissed such sentiments as the product of youthful idealism. During the
war, men like McCrae had hoped their sacrifices would be remembered. Such
hopes continued even in the Depression, but they were tempered by the
realization that they were just that: hopes. To these disillusioned idealists, it
was now all too clear that the realities of the war’s aftermath were much
darker than anything they had ever expected. They thus repurposed McCrae’s
hopeful lines to reflect the newfound realization:
They had to die;
They aimed too high.
So poppies grow in Flanders fields.71
This re-wording of In Flanders Fields says a great deal about the nature of
these men’s disenchantment. Canada had not failed overseas, but postwar
failures to live up to wartime ideals proved that its youth had in fact ‘aimed
too high.’ The world about which they dreamed had simply not materialized
and this failure was never clearer than with the ongoing employment
challenges faced by so many returned men.

71 Gilman and Sinclair, Unemployment, 25-26.
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Chapter 5
In Search of a ‘Square Deal’
“Many men are returning from the war unfit for carrying on the
ordinary vocations by which they earned their living. Experience in
European countries has shown that much can be done by vocational
training to improve the wage-earning conditions of such of these as
are not completely incapacitated for work. Moreover many young
fellows, whose vocations were not fixed before enlisting, will return
after the war with no adequate preparation for earning a livelihood.
The return of these two classes of soldiers provides a new problem in
vocational education which must be solved.”
- F.W. Merchant, Report of the Minister of Education, 19151

Canada was ill prepared to respond to the postwar economic downturn or its
affect on veterans. The fact that men faced problems re-establishing
themselves was recognized almost immediately.2 Their struggles were widely
reported in the press and soon became the subject of parliamentary hearings
and royal commissions. Veterans associations, the media, and politicians all

1 Ontario, Report of the Minister of Education, Province of Ontario for the Year 1915
(Toronto: King’s Printer, 1916), 58.
2 According to Roger Graham, “the problem of reabsorbing [returned] men into
civilian life was just as new and unfamiliar as the waging of war had been in 1914.” See
Graham, Arthur Meighen: A Biography, 1: The Door of Opportunity (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin &
Co., Ltd., 1968), 245.
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tried to curry favour with a group of men they perceived to be a rising and
influential political force. As Peter Neary argues, it was against this “highly
charged backdrop that Ottawa had to quickly invent and administer a
program of veteran’s benefits.”3 These programs failed and, while veterans
remained proud of their wartime service, the intractability of postwar
problems left many disenchanted with postwar Canada. In the war
generation’s mind, the conflict’s meaning became linked with the realities of
its aftermath, which were directly related to the economic problems faced by
the returned man.
Postwar disillusionment was rooted both in the hopes men had when
they enlisted and in what they learned about war while overseas. Some men
‘joined up’ as a means to return home to Europe. Others were enticed by the
prospect of a dollar a day. Others still believed in Canada’s duty to the British
Empire. Defense of democracy, civilization, and Christianity were common
justifications. For most, the decision to enlist was shaped by a variety of
factors.4 Nevertheless, Canadians rarely enlisted for the defence of Canada.
England may have been threatened but the same was not true of North
America.5 Regardless of motive, enlistment was often driven by idealism, but

3 Neary, “‘Without the Stigma of Pauperism’,” 32.
4 Harold Innis, for example, agonized over his decision to enlist. When he finally
reconciled himself to join the artillery, he wrote his parents a lengthy letter explaining his
decision. It mentions many of the common justifications for enlisting, including a sense of
duty, a desire to assist his friends and peers, religion, and the need to address Germany’s
wrongs. See UTA, B1973-0003 [Hereafter Innis Papers], B1973-0003/02, letter to Otterville, 4
April 1916. See too John Alexander Watson, Marginal Man: The Dark Vision of Harold Innis
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 71.
5 Rowell-Sirois Commission, 89.
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idealism did not equate to naiveté. Daily casualty lists and the increasingly
common sight of returning wounded reminded men of the risks they were
taking. Their diaries, letters, and memoirs reveal that the generation had few
illusions about the conflict.6
To the men in the Canadian Corps, the war was a business, not an
adventure. They took their job seriously and over the course of the conflict
their military developed a reputation for professionalism and success. 7
Canadians, along with their Australian counterparts, became the British
military’s “shock” troops.8 The Corps’ commanders, especially Julian Byng
and Arthur Currie, were known for taking the time to learn from their
mistakes. They respected their men and believed in the importance of
training and innovation.
Such an environment fostered a sense of pride and commitment
among officers and enlisted men, which contributed to their generational
identity.9 In countless cases, collective pride in the development and

6 James Pedley, Only This, 16. See too Steele, I Shall Arise, 15.
7 Fred Bagnall remembered Currie fondly, describing him as a man of “supreme
loyalty and integrity.” See Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 38.
8 Shane Schrieber, Shock Army.
9 Many channeled their pride into the construction of “a pan-Canadian ‘corps
identity’” that proved a “popular way for Canadian soldiers to self-identify during the war.”
See Maarten Gerritsen, “Corps Identity: The Letters, Diaries, and Memoirs of Canada’s Great
War Soldiers” (Ph.D. Diss. Memorial, 2008), 27. Vimy, Hill 70, and a string of successes
during the Last Hundred Days were bloody testament to the skill and determination
required to see the war through to completion. As A.Y. Jackson wrote home to J.E.H.
MacDonald, “You would be proud of the Canucks if you could see them. They have
developed a wonderful army, more Canadian and independent than it used to be, it does

183
achievements of the Canadian Corps mirrored a sense of individual, personal
growth. Men who served argued that the war changed them and many
believed their postwar lives were tied inextricably to the conflict. Some, like
Will Bird, felt “prisoner” to their war memories, although he also found a
silver lining in the war’s camaraderie.10 Others, including Fred Bagnall, felt
strongly that men who lived the war firsthand could never “dissociate”
themselves from the experience.11 The journalist Greg Clark was even more
forthcoming about how the war shaped his postwar life. While Bagnall
believed that no man could leave the war behind, Clark was adamant that the
conflict also engendered significant personal change. He felt his service
transformed his “mind,” “spirit,” and “personality.” Clark attributed his
postwar maturity and self-confidence to the war and he continued to feel he
had returned “greatly enlarged” by the conflict.12
A sense of personal growth was one of many explanations for why so
many of Clark’s peers identified as a distinct generation. But unlike many
veterans, Greg Clark’s experience of postwar re-establishment was
uncharacteristically easy. Upon demobilization, he returned to a secure
position as a reporter for the Toronto Star. Nonetheless, like many, Clark did
not relish starting up at his old job and salary. As a junior officer during the
war, he was forced to take command of eight hundred men when his

most of its own thinking now, and does not have to find out how the old army did things or
that before going ahead.” See LAC, MacDonald papers, Jackson to MacDonald, 6 April 1918.
10 Bird, And We Go On, 342.
11 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 39.
12 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 17, 4th C.M.R., Greg Clark, 2/3.
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superiors were killed in battle. The experience taught Clark that he could lead
while shouldering significant responsibility. Afterwards, and despite a
secure position, Clark was not content to simply “run errands” as he had
before enlisting. About to quit his job, Clark was offered a new post as a staff
writer for the Star Weekly, making him one of the lucky few who successfully
leveraged his war experience into better postwar employment. For countless
returned men, the reality of finding postwar employment was very different.
They had difficulty finding work and many felt they were being punished for
giving the prime of their youth to their country.
Harold Turner’s postwar situation was more common. Originally from
Seaforth, Ontario, Turner enlisted in 1916 and served overseas with the
Canadian Engineers. After demobilization, he was restless and unable to
remain employed. He failed at farming and carpentry, and it was not until
1925 that Turner settled down and re-integrated into civilian life.13 The
difficulty he faced re-establishing himself was a reality the veteran considered
common to “most returned soldiers.” He “found it very difficult to settle
down after the war and kicked around for several years, running threshing
engines in the fall and doing a bit of everything” to make ends meet.14 While
his experience may have been little different from itinerant labourers before
1914, he believed he had common cause with other disgruntled veterans in
the war’s immediate aftermath.

13 Queen’s University Archive [hereafter QUA], QU WWI Additions - 3691.1, Vol. 1,
Turner to Clough, 14 January 1949.
14 QUA, QU WWI Additions - 3691.1, Vol. 1, H.S. Turner to P.O. Churchill, 16
December 1937.

185
Another veteran, Harold Innis, described men’s restlessness as that
“‘fed-up’ feeling” that plagued them after the war. At the time, Innis was in
recovery for wounds received near Arras. He wrote his Master’s thesis on
Canadian veterans and felt that “no man as a rule is physically better through
life in the army.” Innis’ research surveyed hundreds of veterans. He
concluded that the war destroyed men’s initiative, leaving them “incapable of
doing rough vigorous work such as they [had] been accustomed to in pre-war
days.”15 The journalist Pierre van Paassen reached a similar conclusion. The
war “implanted a restlessness in my spirit which filled me with an
inexpressible contempt for the uneventful drudgery of everyday life.”16
George Pearson also believed that veterans were possessed by a “terrible
restlessness.” It was like an “evil spirit,” he explained, an “indefinite
expression of a vague discontent.”17 The restlessness described by these
veterans was a physical and psychological reaction to the stresses endured
during the war. Few received treatment, either during or after the conflict,
however, because Canada’s rehabilitative programs focused almost
exclusively on physical disabilities.18

15 Innis, “The Returned Man,” 8.
16 van Paassen, Days of Our Years, 91.
17 “Fitting in the Returned Men,” Maclean’s, March 1919, 27-8.
18 An exception was F. McKelvey Bell, Director of Medical Services, DSCR. During
an address to the Alberta Medical Association, Bell argued veterans’ war service had left
them with “abnormal” “neurological or psychopathic conditions” that directly affected men’s
“individuality and desire for personal initiative.” See Bell, “Medical Services of the
Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment,” The Canadian Medical Association Journal 9:1
(1919): 34. Bell later resigned his position after a disagreement with Senator Lougheed over
the direction of the DSCR’s approach to medical assistance for veterans. See LAC, RG 26H
[hereafter Borden papers], Vol. 142, 75489-75560.
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When the war started, the country lacked a plan to deal with veterans,
to say nothing of men suffering from physical and psychological trauma. The
Department of Militia, headed by Sam Hughes, was largely unconcerned.
Instead of planning for men’s return, Hughes focused on the challenge of
mobilizing soldiers for war. Yet, men began to be discharged (often because
of medical conditions) as early as their arrival at Valcartier in 1914. No other
government department stepped in to care for returned soldiers.19 Instead, the
gap was filled by private organizations, such as the St. John’s Ambulance and
the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE). While well intentioned,
their offers to assist men and their families rarely extended to veterans and
the leading wartime charity, the Canadian Patriotic Fund, specifically
excluded caring for returned men. The Fund could not afford to care for
returning men as well as help families of serving soldiers.20
The number of men injured during training in Canada was relatively
minimal and haphazard efforts to deal with wounded and returning soldiers
proved sufficient for a short time. Once the troops moved overseas, however,
wounded veterans started returning in considerable number. The need for a
more coherent plan was pressing.21 In June, the federal government created

19 In effect, Ottawa was simply continuing its position on the South African War.
The federal government never took responsibility for their care. See Morton and Wright,
Winning the Second Battle, 11.
20 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 4-6; Morton, “The Canadian
Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” in J.L. Granatstein and Peter Neary, eds., The
Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1998), 16
21 By summer 1915, discharge depots in Canada were dispatching one hundred
invalided soldiers a week. See Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 9.
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the Military Hospitals Commission (MHC). Senator James Lougheed, Prime
Minister Robert Borden’s leader in the Senate (and minister without portfolio)
was appointed head of the commission. The commission’s Secretary, Ernest
Scammell, was appointed after the group’s initial meeting in July. Scammell’s
first task was determining what the federal government could do for
veterans. In 1915, Canada was in recession and the priority was to get
veterans back to work. The MHC Secretary suggested dividing returned men
into four categories: able-bodied veterans who could return to work
immediately; fit men who could work but needed help re-establishing
themselves; the wounded, who could be re-trained; and casualties with
severe wounds needing permanent institutional care.22 The immediate
priority, however, was caring for casualties. Scammell and Lougheed secured
hospitals and convalescent homes. By the autumn the commission oversaw
530 beds. Two years later, it controlled fourteen sanatoria, including
institutions devoted to “incurables.”23 While the MHC was initially
responsible for the “provision of hospital and convalescent homes in
Canada,” its mandate quickly expanded.24 Soon it was also involved in the
retraining and rehabilitation of returned men. The MHC could not act alone,
however. Rehabilitation, hospital care, education, and employment—all areas
where returned men needed assistance—fell under provincial jurisdiction.
Yet, soldiers were the responsibility of the federal government. The prime
minister recognized that the federal government could not implement the

22 Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” 16.
23 Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” 17.
24 LAC, RG 38B, Finding Aid for Military Hospital Commission, n.d.
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MHC without consulting the provinces. Borden called a dominion-provincial
conference for October 1915.
The conference began 18 October at the Château Laurier. All the
premiers, except British Columbia’s Richard McBride (who already
supported the MHC), attended. Canada’s political leaders agreed to put
dominion-provincial jurisdictions aside in favour of a heavily centralized,
federal system. As Ontario’s Premier William Hearst declared, the war was “a
national undertaking” and the provinces had “no desire” to fight over new
responsibilities. Co-operation was the order of the day and Ottawa agreed to
shoulder the costs of rehabilitating disabled soldiers. In exchange, the
provinces promised to establish employment committees and to cover “any
expenditures necessary” to find work for discharged soldiers who were “fit to
assume such employment.”25 The federal government gained the control it
wanted and the provinces were pleased they did not have to pay for extra
programs. Caring for veterans, however, proved to be just the beginning of
Ottawa’s commitments to returned men.
Pensions were also a major responsibility of the federal government.
When it entered the war, Canada’s system of military pensions was
unchanged from the Militia Pension Act of 1901. The law proclaimed that a
private rendered “totally incapable of earning a livelihood” was entitled to a
$150 annual pension. In 1915 two orders-in-council extended pension
payments to men wounded in service of the CEF. The system, however, was

25 Archives of Ontario [hereafter AO], Hearst Papers, RG 3-3-0-106, Memorandum
from dominion-provincial conference, October 1915.

189
ill prepared for the approximately 70,000 casualties sustained by the end of
1916. To reform it, the federal government called a special committee of the
House of Commons to investigate and report on changing pension
requirements. It recommended appointing a Board of Pension
Commissioners. They were responsible for overseeing Ottawa’s new
commitment to pay for all “pensions, expenses for appliances – such as
artificial limbs – and for vocational training, or other advantages” awarded to
members of the CEF or their dependents. This new system, which was
retroactively applied to the first day of the war, introduced a scaled payment
plan that considered a man’s rank, his need, and his medical condition.26
Pension officials wanted veterans to be active members of the labour
force. They did not consider the assistance veterans received to be welfare.
Rather, it was payment acknowledging a man’s debt for his service overseas.
Whether veterans saw their pensions in the same way, however, constantly
worried officials. They were concerned that the regular payments could
undermine men’s sense of initiative and to prevent this the program
encouraged “industry and adaptability.” Pensions could not be reduced if a
man found new work “or perfected himself in some form of industry.” The
committee encouraged men to better themselves beyond what their pension
afforded, reasoning that if a pension was clawed back because of additional

26 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Soldiers’ Pensions: Proceedings of the
Special Committee Appointed to Consider and Report Upon the Rates of Pensions to be Paid to
Disabled Soldiers, and the Establishment of a Permanent Pensions Board (Ottawa: King’s Printer,
1916), n.p. (“Appendix No. 4, Third and Final Report”)
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earned wages, then “a premium would be put on shiftlessness and
indifference.”27
As the pension system expanded, so too did the responsibilities of the
MHC. By 1918, its civilian and military functions were separated, leading to
the creation of the Invalided Soldiers’ Commission.28 This new commission
was short lived and, in May 1918, it was folded into the newly created
Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment (DSCR). Along with the
increased duties of the Board of Pension Commissioners, this new ministry
controlled “all matters relating to the re-establishment [of all soldiers who
had served in the war] in civil life.”29 It was responsible for administering
hospitals, sanatoriums, and outpatient clinics, and the provision of free
medical services and vocational training and re-training for eligible
veterans.30 By the Armistice, the federal government had presided over an
unprecedented expansion of the state’s social welfare system that included
administration of new programs for veterans’ health, education, and training,
all of which was designed to get returned men back to work.
Ottawa’s vocational training programs targeted wounded veterans
and minors who enlisted with the CEF. The DSCR’s approach “pioneered” a
combined program of “occupational therapy, functional training and

27 Neary, On to Civvy Street, 10.
28 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Report of the Work of the Invalided Soldiers’
Commission (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1918).
29 Canada, Public General Acts [hereafter Acts], 1918, c. 42, 137-8.
30 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Soldiers’
Civil Re-establishment (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1919), 8-16.
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vocational training.”31 The programs were designed to ensure veterans
became “self-supporting and independent of Government aid as quickly as
possible.” Approximately 53,953 men received training. The DSCR partnered
with labour and employers in “industrial establishments,” as well as with
universities and technical schools. According to a 1919 report by the Special
Committee on Re-establishment, the program achieved 90 per cent
employment, with nearly 68 per cent securing a job in their field.32 While the
achievements of these vocational courses were impressive, they were limited
to wounded veterans. Able-bodied men, who numbered several hundred
thousand, were not eligible for similar federal assistance. Apart from a onetime gratuity payment, the only federal program that created jobs for
veterans was Ottawa’s land settlement scheme.33
Both Ontario and the federal government considered soldier
settlement the only acceptable program to employ returned men.34 These

31 Robert England, Discharged: A Commentary on Civil Re-establishment of Veterans in
Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1944), 164-67.
32 Report of the Special Committee on Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment, 13. According to
Neary, 52,603 men joined the department’s programs, 43,457 of which completed courses.
His figures for employment also break down differently, including 64 per cent who found
work in their field and 25 per cent in other occupations. See Neary, On to Civvy Street, 15.
33. Repatriation Committee, Returned Soldiers’ Handbook: Contains Valuable Information
and Tells You Where to Get More (Department of Public Information, n.d.), 5. See too Neary,
“‘Without the Stigma of Pauperism’,” 32. While Ottawa did distribute relief grants in the
early 1920s to address veteran unemployment, the federal government maintained
throughout the interwar era that “the question of unemployment amongst ex-service men
has not been assumed by legislation as a responsibility of the Federal Government.” See
DPNH Deputy Minister J.A. Amyot quoted in Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 36.
34 The exception was a series of direct federal grants, administered by the CPF, to
provide season relief from unemployment. As Peter Neary notes, by 1921 this assistance was
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governments recognized that jobs for veterans were critical to the country’s
postwar success and soldier settlement combined support for rural farming
with the need to find work for returned men. Canada’s wartime leaders also
hoped that settling the country’s unpopulated regions would usher in a wave
of postwar prosperity. What neither provincial nor federal government
anticipated, however, was how a rapidly destabilizing economy would
undermine returned men’s faith in the future.
In Canada, the tradition of compensating soldiers with land began
with the Régiment de Carignan-Salières, which was offered land in exchange
for settling New France. It continued during the American Revolution with
provision of land for Loyalists and again with the “vast tracts” of territory
given to British militiamen in the 1870s and 1880s. After the South African
War, the Volunteer Bounty Act of 1908 offered veterans a parcel of 2.3 million
acres in Alberta and Saskatchewan.35 Three years into the First World War,
Ontario was the first jurisdiction in Canada to offer land to the conflict’s
veterans. The provincial soldier settlement scheme was established at
Kapuskasing, west of Cochrane. It was championed by Howard Ferguson,
Minister of Lands, Forests, and Mines, who considered the program the
perfect way to colonize Ontario’s north.
Prime Minister Borden was impressed with Ontario’s initiative and
requested additional information about the scheme. In January 1917, Borden
called an inter-provincial land settlement conference to discuss the possibility
reduced to helping “unemployed pensioners.” Men who could work and who were not in
receipt of a pension were not eligible. See Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 33.
35 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 100.
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of a dominion-wide program offering lands to returned soldiers. A federal
cabinet committee began framing Ottawa’s new legislation, which passed
parliament as the Soldier Settlement Act of 1917. The Act also created the
Soldier Settlement Board (SSB), which was empowered to grant twenty-year
loans, up to $2,500, at five per cent interest.36 These loans could be used for
the purchase of land, machinery, and livestock and could be applied either to
property already owned or to new lands a veteran wished to purchase.
Ottawa’s legislation also opened up all “undisposed-of land” within fifteen
miles of a railway, which was made available to returned men in tracts of 160
acre grants of free land.37
Initial participation in Ottawa’s plan was a disappointment. Between
1917 and 1919, barely 2,000 veterans took part in the program, in part because
it restricted participation to dominion lands in western Canada.38 If potential
settlers east of Saskatchewan wanted to take part in the program, they had to
do so provincially, with only Ontario operating such a plan. “The remaining
Dominion lands,” a 1921 report concluded, “did not afford the necessary
scope for a land settlement policy for returned soldiers.”39

36 Fedorowich, Unfit for Heroes, 63.
37 Soldier Settlement Act (1919).
38 Eayers, In Defence of Canada, 49-50; in his biography of Meighen, Graham describes
the figures as “slightly over two thousand.” See Graham, Arthur Meighen, Vol. I, 246.
39 Soldier Settlement on the Land: Report of the Soldier Settlement Board of Canada, 31
March 1921 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1921), 26.
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In 1919, Arthur Meighen put forward a revised program in an effort to
make the federal scheme “more attractive” to prospective settlers.40 Ottawa
agreed to an increased credit program to assist the “best of [Canada’s]
manhood.”41 To be eligible for the new scheme a veteran had to have served
overseas (or be in receipt of a pension) and he could not have been
discharged “on account of misconduct.” Widows of men who died overseas
were also eligible, as were men who served in the Imperial forces, provided
they appeared before additional committees to determine their suitability.
Those in need of institutional instruction were provided a training allowance,
ranging from ten to sixty dollars a month, depending on the size of a man’s
family and marital status. The total number of men who undertook training
was small, totaling approximately 2,300 by March 1921.42
Once approved, settlers were eligible for free grants of land of up to
160 acres. Financial assistance was provided for settlers who purchased land
through the SSB, to those with lands in the Prairie Provinces, and to qualified
settlers already in possession of agricultural land. In the West, Ottawa
reserved all vacant dominion land within a fifteen-mile radius of the railway.
The railway belt in B.C. was also reserved for settlement. Should speculators
refuse to sell these lands, Meighen’s new Act empowered the SSB to purchase
it “at a price set by the Exchequer Court.”43

40 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 76.
41 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 8.
42 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 46.
43 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 152, 154.
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The new program proved more popular than Ottawa’s initial foray
into soldier settlement. According to surveys conducted in early 1918, nearly
twenty-five per cent of the CEF overseas wanted to settle on the land.
Meighen later revised these figures downward, reporting that of the 273,444
replies received from members of the CEF, 87,771 (approximately 20 per cent)
were interested in “farming and stock raising.”44 Veterans had to prove that
they would make suitable farmers. Men were evaluated on their physical
fitness, military qualifications, general fitness, and agricultural experience.
Applicants could be deemed qualified, unqualified, or qualified but in need
of “further farming experience.” This latter category was eligible for both
agricultural training with another farmer and institutional training at
provincial agricultural colleges.45
Initially, the settlement scheme appeared promising. When Canada’s
postwar economy began to decline, however, soldier settlers faced a series of
setbacks. According to Morton and Wright, “soldier-settlers had arrived too
late for wartime profits, but they had paid wartime prices for land and stock,
and their debts must be paid off as farm incomes plummeted.”46 Subsequent
downturns soon “ushered in a period of failure, foreclosure, abandonment

44 Fedorowich, Unfit for Heroes, 79. It is unclear whether these latter men wanted to
take part in the soldier settlement program, or whether they were simply interested in
farming and stock raising more generally.
45 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 33-34. The vast majority of men whose applications
were turned down were disqualified because they were generally unfit. Seven per cent were
disqualified because they did not meet the qualifications for military service, three per cent
were disqualified for reasons and physical fitness, and ninety per cent were disqualified “on
account of general fitness.” See too Soldier Settlement on the Land, 46
46 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 151.
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and indebtedness which haunted solider settlers and politicians alike
throughout the inter-war period.”47 The costs to operate the new farms
continued to increase just as prices for agricultural products (particularly
wheat) began to decline from artificial wartime highs. Walter Woods, who
worked in the Calgary office of the federal Soldier Settlement Board,
described the overall shortcomings of the settlement policies:
Our conclusion after some years’ experience was that [the debt
loads incurred by settlers meant that establishing themselves]
simply could not be done. Not even if prices remained stable
and the weather was kind to them. The settler’s equity of $500
could be wiped out by the loss of a couple of head of cattle, by a
hailstorm in a matter of minutes, or a drop of a few cents per
bushel in wheat prices, leaving him with an overhead debt for
everything around him. He was bankrupt. So we concluded that
the financial basis of our settlement plan was unsound.
Remedial measures such as revaluation of the land and
writing off some of the debts, extending the term of payment,
waiving of the interest, writing off the debt for stock and
equipment were applied to restore the financially sick scheme.
These acted as palliatives but had the effect of the veterans
losing confidence.48
The federal government’s leading policy to employ returned men was a
failure. By 1924 more veterans left the scheme than were willing to take up
homesteads and the program began a long, slow decline.49

47 Fedorowich, Unfit for Heroes, 81.
48 Walter Woods, The Men Who Came Back (Toronto: Ryerson, 1956), 86.
49 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 204.
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Ontario’s soldier settlement plan was as ambitious as that of the
federal government. It set aside six townships of land off the National
Transcontinental Railway west of Cochrane, Ontario. The scheme planned to
employ veterans while also colonizing the province’s northern region. In
Howard Ferguson’s opinion, this development would spearhead a major
expansion into Ontario’s vast hinterland. It was also designed to address
growing wartime complaints that more “should be done for … returned
men.” As the future premier explained during the inquiry into the colony’s
failure, “the agricultural feature was emphasized in view of the necessity of
production, and that [returned men] should be given an opportunity on the
land.”50 Ideally, Ontario’s settlement program was designed to allow veterans
who wanted to work the land to do so.51 The province never laid out in clear
policy for the colony’s operation, however, and the settlement evolved
without clear direction.
Despite a grand vision for its success, Ontario’s soldier settlement
scheme at Kapuskasing proved an even greater disappointment than
Ottawa’s. It operated between 1917 and 1921 and failed so spectacularly that
Premier E.C. Drury cancelled the program outright. Participating veterans
were frustrated by the scheme’s inefficient administration and poor returns.
Many were disillusioned by the program’s failure to meet expectations and
that the province was unwilling to do more to help them secure postwar
employment. The failure of Ontario’s soldier settlement scheme, like its

50 AO, RG3-5-0-63, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (1), Testimony of Rt.
Hon. George Howard Ferguson, n.d., 33.
51AO, RG3-3-0-78, Soldier Settlement.
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federal counterpart, affected returned men’s views on employment and
postwar Canada in general, foreshadowing the relationship between federal
and provincial approaches to veterans’ policies and their negative impact on
returned men throughout the interwar era.
Many of the veterans who joined Ontario’s program lacked either the
capital or the experience to farm in the province’s north. Nonetheless,
Ferguson’s plan discounted these shortcomings when it promoted the plan to
serving soldiers and veterans.52 In place of experience, the province assumed
that a co-operative organization could sufficiently train and fund the new
settlers. In order to help the new settlers establish themselves, the Ontario
government agreed to provide a communal resource pool of instruments such
as threshers and other “expensive” classes of equipment. Smaller
investments, better suited to the budgets of individual farmers, including
ploughs and horses, could be purchased through loans.53 In addition to
purchasing machinery, Ontario also centralized control of the Kapuskasing
colony under the settlement’s superintendent. He was responsible for the
administration of the colony as well as directing its organization and training.
The province believed it designed the Kapuskasing settlement to allow

52 In 1917 premier Hearst sent Colonel Cecil G. Williams, formerly in charge of
recruitment in Canada, to Europe to pitch the province’s settlement scheme. Williams’ report
detailed life at the front and included letters from serving soldiers concerned about
demobilization and soldier settlement policies. See Chapter Five for additional discussion of
Williams’ report.
53 Soldier’ Civil Re-establishment: Proceedings of the Special Committee appointed by
Resolution of the House of Commons on the 18th of September, 1919, and to whom was referred Bill
No. 10, An Act to Amend the Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment Act, Together with
Certain Orders in Council Relating to the Work of the Said Department, etc., etc. (Ottawa: King’s
Printer, 1919), 712.
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unskilled farmers to prosper and it assumed that because the men lacked the
requisite experience they would need additional direction and supervision.
Unfortunately, none of the superintendents proved capable of controlling the
settlement and its administration deteriorated along with the prospects of the
settlers.54
When the colony opened, settlers had immediate difficulty meeting
their production targets. In exchange for their plot of land, men were required
to clear ten acres. In both 1917 and 1918, however, few were able to meet this
goal. A contract system was implemented to address this shortfall whereby
settlers pooled their labour on each other’s farms. The hope was that working
together would help men meet their objectives. Ideally, each group of farmers
would be led by a more experienced hand, so that they could gain practical
experience while learning how to carry out their work.55
No amount of training could prepare men for the climate in
Kapuskasing. In 1918, for example, the colony suffered frost every month of
the year. Whole crops were ruined, especially potatoes, one of the main
vegetables under cultivation. A harsh climate was not the only reason
Ontario’s settlement scheme failed. The provincial government also
undermined the colony by supporting incompetent or inefficient
administrators. Kapuskasing was isolated and the settlement relied heavily
on a centralized system of stores and lodging. Veterans were angered that

54 Report Commission of Enquiry Kapuskasing Colony 1920 (Toronto: Wilgress, 1920), 9.
Men alleged too that the administrators refused to provide instruction to the men. Capt.
Fishwick even denied providing men to show the works how to cut roads.
55 AO, RG3-5, Kapuskasing Evidence.
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these services, including the provision of food stores, were lacking or
expensive. Colonists also faced delays in the preparation of their land, and,
once prepared, their clearings proved insufficient, “either to provide fodder
for a cow or a team of horses.”56 Worse yet, the province misrepresented the
price for pulpwood and a lack a local employment meant men could not
supplement their meager earnings outside the colony.
When the veterans began to complain about these setbacks a series of
superintendents refused to address the colonists’ concerns, causing the
settlers to lose confidence in their leadership. Rather than address these
complaints, administrators clashed with the colonists. When one
superintendent, Colonel Ennis, discovered that some of the settlers had
attempted to organize a branch of the GWVA at the colony, he ordered it
disbanded and had the “ringleaders” rounded up, placed in a boxcar, and
removed from the settlement.57 By 1920, many Kapuskasing veterans felt that
they had been sold a shoddy bill of goods. They were not making money,
there was inadequate medical care for themselves and their families, and the
stores in the settlement were over-priced and inferior. Moreover, their debts
were rising, rather than decreasing, and the veterans felt the capital they
invested in their homes was going to be lost because they were not worth
projected market value.

56 Watson Kirkconnell, “Kapuskaing: An Historical Sketch,” Queen’s Quarterly 28 (1
July 1920): 276.
57 AO, RG3-5-0-63, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (1), Testimony of Ed
Stephenson, n.d. See too Report Commission of Enquiry Kapuskasing Colony 1920, 10.

201
The deterioration of the Kapuskasing colony contrasted with the rosy
picture the Ontario government painted in its advertisements for the
settlement plan. The province touted the scheme in publications overseas and
at home. Yet, as a commission of inquiry called to investigate the settlement’s
failure concluded, none of these advertisements accurately portrayed the
conditions in northern Ontario. According to the inquiry, this literature
“induced” men to come north under false pretenses. “Faced with unexpected,
but not unusual conditions,” the settlers blamed the government for their
failures.58 They were unhappy with the conditions at the settlement, with
their training, with the scheme’s management, and with the returns they
failed to receive. Ferguson was finally informed about the state of the camp
towards the end of Hearst’s time in office. Instead of dealing with the
complaints, however, he opted to do nothing, and left the matter to E.C.
Drury’s incoming United Farmers of Ontario (UFO) government.59
The new premier was critical of the scheme from the outset. Drury
concluded that Ferguson’s plan was “ill conceived, ill executed, [and]
founded on a mistaken appraisal of the agricultural possibilities” of the
region.60 To rectify matters, the premier met with a delegation from the
Kapuskasing settlement immediately after taking office. Life on the
settlement, men complained, was “intolerable.” They informed Drury that the
situation was near “open rebellion.” The premier agreed and wasted little

58 Report Commission of Enquiry Kapuskasing Colony 1920, 7.
59 AO, RG3-5, Kapuskasing Evidence.
60 E.C. Drury, Farmer Premier (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 97.
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time in appointing a commission of inquiry to study the “administration,
management, conduct, discipline, equipment and welfare of the Soldiers'
Settlement Colony at Kapuskasing.”61 It vindicated the settlers’ claims and
recommended that they be moved out. The government agreed, compensated
every man who opted to leave, and wrote the entire scheme off “as a total
loss.”62
While the Kapuskasing scheme proved unrealistic, its failure was not
entirely the fault of the climate, or the personalities involved. The settlers
were poorly prepared for the rigors of homesteading. Many men who joined
the program were “unsuited to pioneer life.” These veterans based their
interest on idealized notions of farming and domestic life, not on an
experienced understanding of the challenges they would face working the
land in northern Ontario. They placed great importance on spending time
with their families and such colonists “felt that having been overseas for a
considerable time they should now have work such that they could be at
home each night at least.”63 Nonetheless, the scheme was flawed, no matter
how hard veterans were willing to work.
Ed Stephenson, for example, was a colonist with over ten years
experience homesteading on the Prairies. Given his time farming in the West,
he should have been an ideal candidate to succeed at Kapuskasing. Yet, this
experience did little to prepare him for the mismanagement and

61 Report Commission of Enquiry Kapuskasing Colony 1920, 3
62 Drury, Farmer Premier, 96-97.
63 Report Commission of Enquiry Kapuskasing Colony 1920, 8-9.
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disorganization in Ontario’s colony. Stephenson believed that the settlement
compared poorly to the prewar system of federal settlement in the West,
particularly the quality of the land. On the Prairies, homesteaders paid less
for more land and these holdings were “level as a table.” With hard work,
this veteran argued, settlers could have their land cropped in the first year
and Prairie settlers could make a living within three years. This was not the
case in northern Ontario. At Kapuskasing, the men were given 100 acres
compared to the 160 offered by Ottawa, all of it completely unprepared for
cultivation. Under the provincial scheme
the settler … might clear [the] first ten acres himself and receive
an amount fixed by the authorities, or it could be farmed out. At
any rate … then he was obligated to clear another ten acres at
his own expense, and then having put in two seasons of
arduous labor in a rather inclement climate and facing rather
unusual conditions from an agricultural standpoint … he then
came under the Dominion Homestead laws on the same status
as a foreign born immigrant, and at the end of five years he
would have his patent for one hundred acres of bushed land.64
These problems were compounded by incompetent management, which
Stephenson likened to a “vicious form of benevolent autocracy.” The veteran
was incensed that the government controlled every facet of the plan,
including “every inch of land,” and all access, services, and decisions about
its management. Moreover, Stephenson was angry that the provincial
government insisted on maintaining this level of control, despite calls by
veterans to allow them to share in the colony’s administration. The province

64 AO, RG3-5-0-63, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (1), Testimony of Ed
Stephenson, n.d.
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was “jealously” guarding against any attempt by the colonists to form a local
government.65
The veterans who signed on to the province’s settlement scheme did so
with high hopes, but the challenges they faced at Kapuskasing left them
disenchanted. William York, for example, was initially enthusiastic about his
participation in the settlement plan. As he explained to the commission
investigating the scheme’s failure, he “had faith in the country” and he
considered the colony a way to “make good” his peacetime future. York
remained optimistic that the scheme could work if its organization and
administration were changed. Unfortunately, this did not happen and
continued setbacks tested the colonists’ resolve. York warned that if “one
more thing” went wrong, they would be forced to quit.66 These men were
keen to succeed but recognized that they were “steadily [getting] behind.”67
Even if they did not want to stop farming, they concluded that they had to cut
their losses. John Davidson was equally eager to succeed, but after the
scheme’s failure, he was reduced to “hoping to save a loss, as I had all I
owned in my holding.”68 Thomas Boyle’s position on the viability of the
settlement captured the sense of utter frustration: “I most decidedly want[ed]

65 AO, RG3-5-0-63, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (1), Testimony of Ed
Stephenson, n.d.
66 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), letter from
William H. York, n.d.
67 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of
George Dyson, 5 March 1920.
68 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of John
Davidson, 4 March 1920.
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to get out.”69 As George Harrow explained, there were “no prospects of
making farming go.”
Harrow’s disillusionment was made worse because, much like Ed
Stephenson, he had been a farm labourer before the war and believed that
farming was what he did “best.”70 If Harrow and other farmers found the
scheme unworkable, then the Kapuskasing settlement was doomed, a view
shared by William Baker. Baker had farmed in Prince Edward County for
eleven years before he enlisted. Despite his prewar experience, however, the
veteran complained that he could not “make enough to live” at Kapuskasing.
He informed the inquiry that “the farm does not pay. The climate is too cold.
The frost killed all my stuff and my neighbour’s last summer. I do not want to
quit, but I must.”71 Charles Clifford Waterhouse summed up the colonist’s
sentiments. He was “greatly disappointed” with the whole experience.72
The failure of Ontario’s soldier settlement scheme demonstrated the
limits of the province’s program to support returned men and was another
example of the setbacks veterans faced. When this failure became clear, the
province provided limited compensation, but it was unwilling to re-consider
its wider approach to re-establishment, no matter how difficult a time men

69 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of
Thomas. C. Boyle, 5 March 1920.
70 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of
George William Harrow, 6 March 1920.
71 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of
William Baker, 6 March 1920.
72 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of C.C.
Waterhouse, 6 March 1920.
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had re-establishing their lives. The federal-provincial agreement of 1915
divided responsibility for disabled and able-bodied veterans and continued
to shape provincial and federal reactions to re-establishment. If a veteran was
not disabled by wartime service, he was considered a provincial
responsibility and the provincial Soldiers’ Aid Commissions had no power to
create positions for returned men. If veterans had trouble securing
employment, it was up to each individual to take the initiative to find a job.
For many returned men, however, the transition from military life to civilian
society was not so easy.
When men enlisted, they entered a military world defined by
discipline, hierarchy, and orders. Few understood how significantly this
experience would change them.73 After demobilization, neither the military
nor the state made a concerted effort to guide men back towards civilian
independence and any energy expended to this effect focused exclusively on
the rehabilitation of wounded and disabled soldiers. The DSCR recognized
that veterans would face setbacks but its officials expected them to prepare
themselves for civilian life. The department warned able-bodied men that re-

73 Lt.-Col. L.W. Mulloy, “Demobilization,” Reconstruction: Bulletin Published by the
Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-Establishment for the Information of all Interested in the
Welfare of Canada’s Returned Soldiers (December, 1918), 3-4. Walter Segsworth, Director of
the DSCR’s vocational training program explained that when a man enlisted, “everything
was done to make him a small unit in a large organization. He was taught to obey rather than
to think; he was for the most part relieved of the care of his dependents; clothing, food and a
place to sleep were provided for him. If he was guilty of a misdemeanour he was punished,
but he was not deprived of the necessities of life, whereas in civilian life he would have been
discharged. Thus the whole system, for the time being, tended to reduce the action of his own
will and relieve him of all sense of responsibility.” See Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’
Heritage from the Great War,” 21. Pierre van Paassen remembered that veterans had “grown
accustomed to being treated as mere automatons.” Once they got home, men were left
“waiting for the next word of command.” See van Paassen, Days of Our Years, 90.
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establishment was not the responsibility of the government. “Individual
effort,” it advised, had won the war and the same would be true for peace.74
Veterans were disappointed that the state’s demobilization policies
conflicted with commitments made during and after the war.75 The federal
government made public promises to soldiers that they “need have no fear
that the government and the country [would] fail to show just appreciation of
[their] service.” Prime Minister Robert Borden considered it Canada’s “first
duty” to support the troops and he promised them that none would have
“just cause to reproach the government for having broken faith” with its men.
Later, the Union Government made more sweeping commitments promising
to expand state support for veterans. These vague promises included care for
the “maimed,” “broken,” “the widow and the orphan.” According to the
federal government, each would be protected and Ottawa re-assured serving
men that “duty and decency demand[ed] that those … saving democracy
[should] not find democracy a house of privilege, or a school of poverty and
hardship.”76 Borden never revealed what he thought about these

74 Back to Mufti, 4. Returned Soldiers’ Handbook, Containing Instructions and Information
Dealing with Returned Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (Canada: Militia and Defence, May 1918), 52
75 After surviving life in the trenches, Harold Innis believed strongly that the war
sapped men’s sense of initiative, leading to widespread “indifference.” See “The Returned
Soldier,” 6.
76 Scott v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013, BCSC, 1651, Amended Notice of Civil
Claim, http://equitassociety.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/8834829_1_Filed-AmendedNotice-of-Civl-Claim-.pdf
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commitments or how they would be implemented.77 Although vague, soldiers
and the public understood these promises to mean they could expect postwar
social and economic assistance if needed.
Veterans and their families had good reason to believe in such support
because the promises to assist returned men were only one part of a much
wider chorus of voices offering support. All of these commitments remained
vague, but they assured men that in return for military service, they and their
families would be looked after, especially if they needed postwar
employment. Any veteran who read the mandate of the MHC, for example,
would learn that the commission committed itself to the “provision of
employment for returning soldiers and training of disabled soldiers.”78 Public
statements by the commission reinforced this position. Once established, the
MHC quickly assumed responsibility for “taking care of and providing for all
returned soldiers who for any cause are incapacitated for employment, or
who require special training or treatment before being able to undertake
employment.”79 The MHC secretary, E.H. Scammell, was even more direct in
his support for returned men. He believed that the government and the
public needed to ensure that Canadian veterans returned “to a means of
livelihood.” To Scammell, a livelihood meant both the disabled and able-

77 The Prime Minister’s memoirs, for instance, make no mention of how he would
have addressed the commitments. According to John English, however, he may not even
have done so because, by 1918, Borden “seemed to lose confidence in his capacity to govern
Canada” and he turned his attention to international diplomacy. See John English, Borden: His
Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 161.
78 AO, RG3-3-0-95, “Employment and Settlement of Returned Soldiers,” R.L. Borden
to W.H. Hearst, 11 October 1915.
79 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d.
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bodied, and he considered the former an “obligation” which fell “primarily
on the State.” The government’s duty for veterans’ care and livelihood went
beyond a simple cheque and was a responsibility that could not be
“extinguished by the award of a pension from public funds.”80
Provincial premiers were also supportive of Canada’s soldiers. Ontario
Premier William Hearst understood that families expected politicians to keep
their promises to veterans. “As public men,” he explained, “we say to the
Soldier, ‘Go and fight for us and we will take care of you.’” With such
statements of support, Hearst recognized that the state fostered an impression
that it was bound by “a compact, and a most solemn one at that” that
committed Canada to “take care of [its soldiers] to the best of our ability.” 81
Hearst could not foresee that failure to keep these promises would cause
postwar disillusionment, but he did appreciate that breaking them would
affect support for the war effort. The promises politicians made were integral
to recruitment and, in a memorandum on federal-provincial responsibilities
relating to the care of returned men, he explained that if the government did
not act,
men would be justified in saying ‘It is all right to get up on the
platform and tell me to go and fight, it is all right to cheer and
applaud as we go away, but what we want to know is: Who is
going to look after our wives and families or who is going to

80 Sessional Paper No. 35a – 1916, Military Hospital Commission, The Provision of
Employment for Members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force on their return to Canada
and the Re-education of those who are unable to follow their previous positions, 5.
81 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d.
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look after us if we return maimed, or find us work that we are
able to do.’82
To what extent the war generation appreciated that their politicians promised
support in exchange for service is unknown, but the wartime and postwar
record indicates they expected to be ‘looked after’. To veterans, the state had
established a ‘social contract’ and they and their families considered wartime
promises of support to be assurances that they would be cared for after the
war.83
After 1918, when returned men faced difficulty finding work, veterans
expected Canada to “do its duty in caring for them” but all levels of
government resisted responsibility for men’s postwar employment.84 Apart
from the land settlement schemes, however, governments did little more than
direct men to provincial Soldiers’ Aid Commissions, which remained limited
in how they could assist veterans needing employment. The call for postwar
aid was not a surprise, as the provinces had begun studying questions about
demobilization as early as 1917.85 In Ontario, for instance, the provincial
government commissioned a report from Cecil G. Williams, Chief Recruiter
for the Dominion, to determine what the province’s men expected upon their

82 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d.
83 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d.
84 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d. This was
not the case in France and Germany, where governments instituted quotas requiring
businesses to hire veterans. See Morton, “Noblest and Best,” 83
85 A 1915 report to the Minister of Education made this case even earlier, arguing
that “vocational education” for veterans would prove a matter of “utmost importance.”
Report of the Minister of Education, Province of Ontario for the Year 1915, 58.
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return. Williams was struck by the extent to which Ontario’s soldiers were
worried about postwar jobs. He warned Hearst that these men would not just
“seek reward for [their] sacrifice,” but would “aggressively demand what
they esteem their right to support, maintenance and betterment at the hands
of those in authority.”86
Appended to his report were letters from Ontario’s soldiers describing
their desire for postwar work. This correspondence reveals that soldiers were
deeply concerned about the future. They planned to hold Canada’s politicians
to their promises. Private Frank Oldacre, who worked as a printer in Toronto
before enlisting, explained that ensuring there were jobs for returned men
must be the top priority for any re-establishment program.87 He anticipated
that men would emerge from the war both physically and mentally wounded
and he worried about whether the province (or nation) would live up to its
promises. Would veterans be given the opportunity to “earn a decent
livelihood,” he asked? Although he never defined “decent,” Oldacre
explained that veterans wanted to “live comfortably,” to have a chance to
support a wife and family, and to avoid having “to depend on charity.”
Achieving this goal was essential to a meaningful peace and these vague
ideals were the benchmarks by which he measured proposed solutions to the
problems of the returned man.
If a man could not return to work then Oldacre maintained that a new
job had to found for him at least “as good as the one he quit” upon enlisting.

86 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,”
87 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas.”
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For a man invalided home, Oldacre went even further. He had earned the
right to receive full pay while recuperating and, once able to be discharged,
that “a suitable job [be] given [to] him whereby he could earn a decent
livelihood.” Should the state not back up its claims, then Oldacre warned that
Canada’s soldiers risked regretting “standing by the Empire” and the last
thing the government wanted was a postwar world where a man rued the
“day he answered the Country’s call.”88
While Frank Oldacre’s vision of postwar Canada outlined what men
wanted, other veterans who contributed to Williams’ report focused on
soldiers’ worries about the future. Stanley Bennett wrote Williams a lengthy
memorandum on what Canada needed to do to demobilize successfully. He
believed that rather than focus on what men hoped for, Williams needed to
concentrate on what soldiers were concerned about. The latter would tell
Williams far more than the “vague” hopes of a serving soldier. Bennett
argued that dealing with veterans required a holistic approach to
demobilization. He called for a committee to oversee “employment, labour
relations, and demobilized men.”89 Unfortunately, Bennett did not have the
chance to elaborate on his scheme. He was killed in August 1918. His
surviving memo nonetheless laid out a series of recommendations about how
to approach the postwar era. Returned men wanted a “square deal.”
Although also vague, this general sense of a need for fair treatment reflected
the links soldiers drew between the state and its wartime promises, and their

88 AO, RG3-3-0-109, Oldacre to Williams, 23 June 1917.
89 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d.
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concerns over the economy and postwar prosperity. Men were worried that
the war was going to hurt their ability to earn a living, either because of
injury, lost experience, or a lack of training. Bennett believed these fears were
the key to formulating effective demobilization policies because they went to
the “root of the troubles that are going to cause many anxious moments to the
future political parties when in power.”90
Bennett argued that soldiers realized the economy was changing. He
highlighted the fact that businesses were adapting to the wartime economy
and that soldiers feared missing out on the new positions being created. To
ensure that veterans were not disadvantaged in this new world, he
recommended that Ontario create a committee to integrate policies of
employment and demobilization.91 This position reflected his belief that
Canada needed to embrace a comprehensive approach to re-establishing
veterans. According to Bennett, the problems accompanying demobilizing
tens of thousands of men dovetailed with existing social challenges, such as
the need for employment. If they were not treated together, then Canada’s
leaders would make “a jumble” of demobilization. Only a comprehensive
committee could avoid postwar “chaos” and alleviate employment pressures
by ensuring the most efficient use of resources. 92

90 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d.
91 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d.
92 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d. Interestingly, Bennett’s characterization of Canada’s wartime
economy and the potential created for postwar Canada foreshadowed the analysis of the
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Harold Innis was another young veteran who supported a more
comprehensive approach to demobilization. In his Master’s thesis, Innis
anticipated the creation of the Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment
and he called for a “rational” plan to guide men’s return to civilian life. Innis,
who rightly believed that the system in 1918 was haphazard at best, called for
a “Department of Demobilization” that would supervise “all matters in
connection with returned or discharged soldiers, or with the dependents of
deceased soldiers.” Innis did not limit his analysis to ex-service men and he
argued that a successful postwar Canada had to plan for the care of widows
and orphans, disabled soldiers, and able-bodied soldiers as well. Like Oldacre
and Bennett, Innis understood that the economic and personal impact of the
war extended to families and he recognized that securing employment was
not just a concern for men in service.93
While Innis took the long view, Bennett believed that the most
pressing requirement for successful demobilization was caring for disabled
men. He also drew attention to the problem of failed wartime businesses, the
need to plan for the transition from wartime to peacetime industry, the
question of women in the workforce, and the importance of adequate
“political representation” for veterans.94 First and foremost, however, were

Rowell-Serois Commission’s report on the impact of the war. Its chapter on the postwar era
argued that: “the success with which the Dominion Government had organized a peaceful
society for combat showed how governments could alter the conditions of economic and
social life. If governments could organize so effectively for destruction, they should be able to
organize the conditions of the good life for their citizens.” See Rowell-Sirois Commission, 90.
93 Innis “Returned Soldier,” 5.
94 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d.
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the interests of returned men. Any committee established to oversee postwar
re-establishment had to be for their benefit and, in a recommendation that
foreshadowed postwar division between veterans and civilians, Bennett
recommended granting such a committee wide power, including the ability
to compel businesses to justify their employees’ wartime service. His goal
was to ensure that veterans were employed. Returned men, not those who
stayed in Canada, were going to benefit from wartime service. 95
Bennett’s concern over postwar employment was fuelled by fear that
the war’s end would bring about a “retrenchment” of the economy. The
Canadian market had expanded during the war, Bennett warned, and if the
country was going to ensure postwar prosperity, then it had make sure the
economy continued to expand. His solution argued for an interventionist
monetary policy: “Even as we [Canada] were prepared to lavish fast sums of
money for the prosecution of the war, so must we be equally ready and
determined to put our hands in our pockets and spend freely but wisely for
the purposes of reconstruction.”96 In a similar vein, Bennett argued that if
unemployment persisted, the government should be willing to keep men in
the military. This policy of ensuring long-term employment would support
men facing unemployment. Those who had jobs could demobilize and return
to them immediately. Men without work, however, could stay in the service

95 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d.
96 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d.
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and be put “into construction and forestry work until absorbed in factories,
warehouses, railroads and mines as business gradually revives.”97
As Williams’ report made clear, soldiers such as Bennett worried about
postwar employment even before they returned home. They had enlisted as
young men, some just out of high school or early in their careers. These men
did not have jobs lined up for when the war ended and the prospect of
demobilizing without a secure future was frightening. Edmund Malette, for
example, enlisted after graduating from high school. He worried that even if
he was spared by the war, and “not made a cripple,” that a lack of job would
burden his parents.98 John Wordley also worried about his postwar future.
Prior to enlisting he was a locomotive engineer for the Canadian Pacific
Railway, a position to which he hoped to return. If the war left him “unable to
do so,” then he believed his service entitled him to a “chance of learning some
occupation,” as least “as remunerative” as his former profession.99 Harold
Innis was also concerned about men’s postwar employment prospects, which
he considered a problem for all veterans, not just wounded men: “The end of

97 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Stanley Bennett,
“Demobilization,” n.d.
98. AO, RG3-3-0-109, Williams, “Col., C.O.: Reports on the War Conditions Overseas
/ Land Settlement after war, 1917” Malette to Williams, 19 July 1917.
99. The soldier was also concerned for his family’s wellbeing. His prewar position
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family’s ability to cope in his absence. Wordley wanted the state to do more than just ensure
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behind. He was upset by the cost of living increases his family faced and wrote Ontario’s
premier about the “inconvenience and hardship” faced by his wife and other families in
Canada. AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” Wordley to Williams,
3 August 1917.
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the war will immediately present a task of finding employment for ablebodied soldiers.” Innis believed that if the employment problem was not
addressed, it would quickly spread beyond veterans. He sensed that the war
had created an “unemployment problem” more generally and that successful
postwar re-establishment needed to account for returned men and civilians
labourers alike, particularly those in wartime industries.
The postwar recession, combined with a hostile business climate, left
returned men without the support they expected upon demobilization. The
war generation considered this situation a broken promise and the slight was
carried for years after. To their minds, these men were promised support in
exchange for their service overseas and they now felt entitled to assistance
when the jobs they had hoped for failed to materialize.
In his embittered memoir, Not Mentioned in Despatches (1933), Frederick
Bagnall singled out Canadian leaders for failing to live up to their wartime
commitments. Bagnall, who was born in 1889, had enlisted with the First
Contingent in 1914. He believed politicians like Borden when they promised
to help Canada’s soldiers. The realities of postwar Canada, however, made it
clear that Borden and other leaders could not be trusted. They were mere
“orators,” Bagnall raged, who made “impossible promises about the things
the soldiers would get when they got back.” While they may have delivered
slick speeches, they failed to realize that failure to keep their promises left
men “cynical.” Bagnall’s cynicism was rooted in postwar treatment. Those
who had stayed home did not understand what returned men were going
through. When faced with an unemployed veteran, Bagnall explained,
society’s leaders did little to help and he singled out the “middle aged” for
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special criticism, noting that if confronted with a returned soldier they did
not say “‘young man, take my job’. Rather they would show you their fine
places while you would be returning penniless.”100
Broken promises and a lack of help with postwar employment were
two grievances among many. Another was a simple lack of respect. This was
worse than the government’s “lack of support” because it symbolized the
conflict’s wasted idealism. Bagnall claimed that the outbreak of war brought
with it a chance to “make good capital” on the “idealism of soldiers and their
superb and enduring courage.” Such hope was fuelled in part by the heady
rhetoric of politicians like Borden. But the opportunity was “lost” amidst
postwar mismanagement. Instead of prospect and promise, peacetime
Canada was defined by “continual calamities and a succession of lies.”
Veterans lamented that nobody was making allowances for their difficulties.
Certainly the war changed men but how could it have done otherwise? “The
wonder,” wrote Bagnall, “was that [men] didn’t come back vastly different.”
When they served Canada, men had embraced “ideals” and notions of
“sacrifice.” These were not appreciated at home, leading to “a terrible
wastage because of the lack of intelligent interest [in the plight of returned
men] by the most highly educated and by the leaders in business.”101
The fact that their mistreatment was unnecessary angered many
veterans. Despite a series of setbacks, the war generation continued to believe
Canada was capable of living up to its promise to make the postwar world a

100 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 78.
101 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 77.
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better place. “Had the war ended in 1916,” Bagnall lamented, its “promises
might have been fulfilled. There might have been a chance to do something
but there was to be too much war to make any scheme of the kind workable.”
In place of the world he fought for, however, this veteran concluded that the
fighting had achieved the exact opposite. Instead of improving, the postwar
world had gone to “ruin.”102 His memoir summed up his bitterness with a
description of how wounded men, like himself, were treated:
There were many unfortunate lads coming back crippled like
myself. To give them a paltry pension and not to help them to
fit into civilian life was cruel, cruel, as that barbed wire between
the lines. We were to be allowed to carry that crippled feeling
into that interminable vista of civilian life and we would be
calloused by our sense of wrong. When we were to reach
Canada we were to feel this like a blow for the civil life was too
far from the war and its horrors.103
Fred Bagnall was not alone in his criticisms. Other veterans offered
similar critiques of postwar Canada, including Edward Chesley, who first
voiced his concerns about veterans in 1921 when he wrote to the Toronto Star
arguing for a more equitable distribution of the country’s Canteen Funds. 104
Ten years later, on the eve of his premature death, Chesley laid out a
damning evaluation of the problems faced by returned soldiers. In a piece
entitled “The Vice of Victory,” published in Bill Deacon and Wilfred Reeves’

102 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 78.
103 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 131-132.
104 “Disposal of Army Canteen Fund,” Star, 6 December 1921, 6.
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Open House (1931), Chesley explained the consequences of the failure to
address the problem.105
Deacon’s intention for Open House was to give voice to his generation,
especially “the younger writing men of Canada.” The list of contributors
reads like a who’s who of up-and-coming literary Canadians, including
Bertram Brooker, Wilson MacDonald, Merrill Dennison, W.A. Irwin, J.H.
McCulloch, D.M. LeBourdais, E.J. Pratt, John Armitage, and Charles W.
Comfort.106 Deacon considered the book a “symposium of broader scope” that
covered politics, economics, and the arts.107 Salem Bland, Frederick Banting,
Emily Murphy, and other prominent Canadians all praised the book and it
proved a moderate success that received “kind” reviews.108 In Deacon’s
estimation (which should not be discounted given his position in the
Canadian book market), if Open House had had “more efficient
merchandising,” it would have been a best seller. Despite the advertising

105 Edward Turquand Chesley was born in 1894 and grew up in Ottawa. As a young
man, he traveled to Guelph to join the agricultural college. When war broke out, he enlisted
in 1915 as part of the Canadian Field Artillery. Having survived the Somme, he won a
commission and transferred to the heavy artillery. After the war he returned to Guelph to
complete his studies, where he worked as editor for the college’s Review. Chesley then
worked at various editorial and advertising posts at the Globe, with Ottawa’s Central
Experimental Farm, and at Massey-Harris. Six months prior to his death he changed careers
again, this time joining the Ontario government in the Department of Agriculture, where he
headed publicity for the department’s Markets Branch. Outside of work, Chesley was also a
member of the Toronto Writer’s Club, where he met Bill Deacon. See TFRBL, Deacon papers,
Vol. 4, folder 42, clipping “Taken Suddenly Ill E.T. Chesley Dies,”n.d.
106 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 8, folder 12, Deacon to Eisendrath, 14 September
1931.
107 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 3, folder 19, Deacon to Brooks, 6 June 1933.
108 See TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 8, folder 12, Deacon to Eisendrath, 14 September
1931 and Box 3, folder 48, Deacon to Campbell, 23 December 1931.
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campaign’s shortcomings, however, Deacon still considered the sale to have
gone “really well.” More importantly he told Austin Campbell, a
businessman and occasional author, that the book had
caused more talk than any other 1931 book of whatever origin.
With all its defects, Open House has made history; and is leaving
a profound impression. Eaton’s displayed it on their center aisle
on publication, and after three months it is still there. They have
been ordering 25 at a time which is the peak performance for
non-fiction. Libraries everywhere are stocking it.109
Deacon was obviously proud of the book and he reserved his highest praise
for Campbell’s friend, Edward Chesley, whose contribution was an “enraged
and bitter indictment of the total futility of the Great War and of the
indifference of society to those who returned handicapped physically and
psychologically.”110 In Deacon’s opinion, Chesley’s study of returned soldiers,
was “justification” alone for publishing Open House.111
Deacon believed in Chesley’s piece. He liked its style, its contribution
to the debate over veterans, and how it aligned with his personal feelings on
the war, his country, and Canada’s responsibilities to those who served
overseas. “No other contribution [to Open House]” he wrote Chesley, “comes
as near to what ought to go into this book.” The chapter on veterans was an
“important” subject that amounted to a public service. “As one who did not

109 See TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 3, folder 48, Deacon to Campbell, 23 December
1931. Campbell’s best know publication was The Rock of Babylon: Adventure in an Ancient City
(Ottawa: Graphic Publishers, 1931).
110 Clara Thomas and John Lennox, William Arthur Deacon: A Canadian Literary Life
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 175.
111 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 4, folder 41, Deacon to Chesley, 17 April 1931.
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get into the army,” Deacon explained, “I have always felt that I carried a
peculiar burden; that it was up to me, someway, to compensate.” Publishing
Chesley’s piece helped Deacon fulfill this debt.112
“The Vice of Victory” challenged denials of the problems faced by
returned men. It listed specific points of contention, including access to
proper medical care and sanatoriums, inadequate pensions, and the fact that
men were unemployed and left peddling minor goods to survive. Failure to
reach a solution to the “returned soldiers’ problem” was also undermining
Canada’s future.113 As a result, Chesley launched an attack against the status
quo, arguing that Canadians had drawn the wrong lessons from the war and
that the failure to learn from the experience was jeopardizing the nation’s
most valuable asset: its youth. The resulting critique was a major statement of
postwar disenchantment.
Chesley argued that no one was more tired of the debates over
veterans than returned soldiers themselves. Whether in newspapers, royal
commissions, or political speeches, nobody seemed capable of solving the
problem. “For a dozen years now the clamour has swelled or waned
according to political need,” a situation that Chesley blamed on politicians,
profiteers, and those overtly religious or patriotic .114 Their ‘clamour’ lacked
rhyme or reason, however, and their failures resulted in a needless re-hashing

112 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 4, folder 41, Deacon to Chesley, 17 April 1931.
113 Edward Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” in W.A. Deacon and Wilfred Reeves, eds.,
Open House (Ottawa: Graphic, 1931), 26.
114 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 26.
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of painful memories and broken dreams. Whenever their issues were brought
up, veterans found their old wounds “twitching” as they tried to protect their
“quiet homes” from being surrounded by the “froth and dirty debris of war.”
Chesley’s bitter conclusions echoed Fred Bagnall’s belief that Canada had
squandered the optimism and idealism of the war effort. Dredging up
grievances achieved nothing except to remind men of “four years of wasted
effort and lost opportunity for happiness.”115
Chesley did not shy away from tackling the consequences of the war,
unlike many of his contemporaries. Between 1918 and 1939, ex-combatants of
every stripe published books, articles, and pamphlets about the conflict,
which explored a variety of experiences, particularly in the different branches
of military service. Some wrote about the artillery, others about their time in
the infantry or in the cockpit of an early aeroplane. The resulting work (like
the war novels All Else is Folly and Generals Die in Bed) could be extremely
critical of the war, but its focus was the war itself, not the conflict’s aftermath.
Not so with Chesley. He did not shy away from the subject. In fact, he
thought so strongly about the issues of returned soldiers that he considered
them “Canada’s problem.” In his view, the war, commemoration, and
returned men were interconnected, requiring the “maturest consideration.”116
Chesley was clearly an impassioned writer, occasionally at the expense
of clarity. His piece lacked structure and its themes—youth, betrayal, and
duty—were developed haphazardly. He was not blind to these shortcomings,

115 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 26.
116 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 31.
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however, and he admitted that his paper was incomplete. After submitting it,
Chesley wrote Deacon explaining that he would likely come to “regret” how
he had expressed his thoughts. Despite organizational shortcomings,
however, Chesley maintained that his arguments “came straight from my
heart” and, because he refused to tone down his criticisms, he could only
agree to publish his paper anonymously.117 This decision was not taken
lightly, or out of any “fear of criticism.” Rather, Chesley knew his criticisms
of the war and Canada’s treatment of its veterans was provocative. Although
he stood by his opinions, he was barely a few months into a new job with the
provincial government, and at the height of the Depression. He desired
anonymity to avoid the inevitable “complications” his article might create for
his career.118
Chesley asserted that ten years after the war veterans were a lost
cause. Yet, like many of his generation, he believed that Canada still had an
opportunity—even a duty—to learn from their experience. He acknowledged
the disillusionment of returned men and the futility of rehashing their
complaints. These men were bitter for good reason. Their government failed
them repeatedly. With each failure, “bitterness” was “added to bitterness” as
veterans descended into a “chamber of death in agony of mind and body.”119
Inadequate pensions, lack of hospital beds, and all other grievance were

117 The 1933 edition of Fred Bagnall’s memoir was also published anonymously as
Not Mentioned in Despatches by Ex-Quaker. See Bryan Tennyson, The Canadian Experience of the
Great War: A Guide to Memoirs (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2013), 27.
118. TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 4, folder 41, Chesley to Deacon, 22 April 1931.
119 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 31.
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dismissed outright because the sick would “soon die.” According to Chesley,
fair treatment amounted to more than being “generous” or “humane” to
returned men. The only thing that would lead to veterans’ “tranquility of
mind” was if Canadians learned the proper lessons from the war. Then, the
war’s sacrifices would have been worth it.120
Chesley was not optimistic that Canadians could draw the correct
lesson from the conflict. He did, however, see an opportunity in the nation’s
youth. If properly educated, there was a chance the “younger generation”
could avoid their parents’ fate. Teaching the youth the right lessons, however,
required cutting through a decade of misinformation. The young might have
been aware that some returned men were struggling but such awareness
barely scratched the surface. “You are not allowed to know the details of the
suffering of hundreds, yes, thousands, of men,” he explained. Veterans’
troubles were too often brushed under the rug, leaving youths wondering
“what the hell [the war was] all about.”121 Instead of recognizing their
difficulties, veterans were championed as examples of “magnificent sacrifice
for Justice and Right.” As a result, the youth learned that these postwar
struggles were the price required to protect “Freedom, Prosperity, and true
Patriotic feeling.” For Chesley, these were the wrong lessons to teach about
the conflict. Had the nation’s leaders learned nothing? Instead of teaching
youth about patriotism, Canadians needed to guard against such thinking.
Veterans had been destroyed by the war. They had gone overseas a “motley

120 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 31.
121. Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 26, 30.

226
lot” of younger men but had returned shadows of their former selves,
“dulled” and deprived of their pre-war inspiration. Whatever a man’s
experience, those who returned after being “dragged through weary years of
warfare,” did so with one thing in common: “they were thoroughly
disillusioned.”122 In Chesley’s view, returned men could not come through
the war “unscathed.” The conflict tested men’s faith in their leaders and their
religion. “When the end came and the guns stopped,” there was nothing left
but a “weary, disillusioned Canadian soldier [who] waited for the dawn of
the drab day of peace.”123
In making the case for a Canadian Lost Generation, Chesley wanted to
protect future youth from the same mistakes. He and his contemporaries
viewed the war as righteous. While it was waged, enlisting was a matter of
duty, patriotism, and honour: “This was the war of all wars to set things right
in the world to make decency and living the lot of all mankind. … Yes,
indeed, this was a war in which all right-thinking men with a spark of
manhood should take part.”124 But the war generation was ignorant about
what modern conflict would cost. While “many thousands of our best men
and youths” had accepted the call, too many had never returned. Their loss
was not a sacrifice, however. It was simply a waste. Chesley concluded that
the postwar world remained wracked by the same problems as before. In fact,
from the standpoint of the 1930s, the world seemed even worse: “We never

122 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 35-36.
123 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 37.
124 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 32.
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imagined that thoughts of material gain from the struggle could lurk in the
minds of any Canadian worthy of the name.” Chesley admitted that his
generation had been naïve:
We were brought up to hold our fathers and our preachers and
our big business executives in great respect. We had too great a
veneration for the judgment of our political leaders. We placed
mankind generally on too high a pedestal. We did not suspect
the wealth, luxury and power would be bought in blood. We
had been fed on romantic history of war, songs of war, glories
of war.125
Support for the war was misplaced and, in many ways, the dead were lucky
they never lived to see the betrayal. They were spared having to bear witness
to the “jackals of greed and gain that would soon feast fat upon these human
sacrifices.”126 These men squandered the best Canada had to offer. They had
been “manhandled by numskulls; weakened in spirit; deadened in faith;
injured in body; and finally sent under woeful leadership into the mud and
filth, to fall at last, riddled with poisoned iron, upon the thorny last resting
place of barbed wire.”127
War destroyed the promise of Canada. The loss of so many promising
minds left the country “beggared for want of leadership and inspiration.”
Society’s elders offered no solution. They may have tried to carry on, but
inevitably they found themselves lamenting the passing of the “flower” of
Canada’s youth. What about the younger generation? Surely it offered hope

125 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 33.
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for the future. In light of the direction of postwar Canada, however, Chesley
was skeptical. He feared that the war had also sapped the prospects for
youth. After all, they were “fathered by weary men” who had lost the “bright
hopefulness and eager spirit” of the pre-war days. Disillusion and skepticism
now abounded, “poor food” for the country’s youth to live on. Canada had
not emerged from the war unscathed. It was now a “horror,” in a world filled
with despair:
The men who returned from the war take little part in the
country’s affairs. Many are physically or mentally unable to do
so. Others are disinclined. They had their day when the fighting
was keen for a better world. Now they starve quietly, struggle
on for the means of existence, laugh bitterly, get drunk when all
else fails, and are at times querulous over little things connected
with their comrades’ wealth.128
When so much was at stake, how could men not be disillusioned by
their treatment? Chesley tried to protect future Canadians from a similar fate.
If they were not taught the proper lessons about the war, then they too were
ripe for similar sacrifice. He pleaded that Canada listen to returned men.
They knew the horrors of war first-hand. More importantly, they knew the
disappointments of peace. If war did come again, as it looked like it could,
Chesley hoped Canada would learn its lesson. When the fighting broke out,
the country needed to do more than just start to plan for the future; it had a
duty to start the right kind of planning “for equality of loss, equality of

128 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 38-39.
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suffering, and equality of material gain.” Doing otherwise would all but
ensure that the sacrifices of the Great War generation were for naught.129
These critiques of the place of returned men in Canada were based on
more than personal experiences. They were part of a larger story, shared by
those who lived the war and its aftermath. Veterans who discussed their
disillusion felt secure taking a stand because they considered their personal
experiences representative of their generation. Fred Bagnall, for example, felt
his views were worthy of record because his experiences were
“representative of a phase of life in a condition of war, the effects of which are
still close to us in our problems.” He compared his experience with those of
his peers: “[although] many of my remarks are made just in passing I know
hundreds of thousands have passed along the same way.130
Chesley’s generational identification was equally strong. In a letter to
Bill Deacon, he explained that he grappled with questions about the
representativeness of his views and the diversity of men’s experiences: “My
main trouble, and what caused me to hesitate & ponder often was this point:
it is so difficult to interpretate [sic] the feeling of such a varied mass of
humanity as our returned men.” Yet, he was confident in his conclusions:
I truly believe that I have struck the truth in the main. Whether
acknowledged by many an individual or whether declared ‘the
Crank’, it appears to me that a vast army of men now a’carrying
on ‘at home’ are not capable of the same inspired thought or

129 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 39.
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action that would have been theirs if war had not dulled and
hurt their minds & bodies.
The rest of the paper, it seems to me, will be
acknowledged as close to the truth by all decent thoughtful
minds that are not the tools or playthings of the fool “patriot” or
the cruel money barons.131
On 14 June 1931, Edward Chesley fell ill. Thinking he was suffering
from indigestion, he went to rest and slipped suddenly into a coma. He died
before his friends could reach a doctor. They attributed his death to his war
experience.132 Like countless veterans, it burned Chesley out. Yet, he joined
the conflict freely and continued to believe in its purpose. Living in its
aftermath, however, sorely tested these beliefs. What set Chesley apart was a
willingness to discuss this aftermath and its affects. While his peers were
rarely as open about their disillusionment, Chesley refused to remain silent in
the face of failed policies and a series of broken wartime promises. He
believed he spoke for his generation and, as the embittered letters from
thousands of veterans in Canada’s canteen records demonstrate, he was not
wrong.

131 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 4, folder 41, Chesley to Deacon, 22 April 1931.
132 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 3, folder 48, Deacon to Campbell, 15 July 1931.
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Chapter 6
Returned men and the Promise of the Canteen Funds
“[The] health of almost everyone who served throughout the war was,
to some extent, adversely affected. Men may not have been wounded
nor have suffered from any illness, but I do not believe that any man
could go through the campaigns of the Great War without his power to
resist disease being minimized. It might be difficult to say that an
infection of the lungs, or heart or nerves is unquestionably attributable
to war service, yet a man would have to be superhumanly wise to say
it was not.”
- Sir Arthur Currie, 21 April 1927.1

Wartime life strained the physical and psychological health of those who
served. The resulting side effects manifested themselves differently in every
individual. Often, however, as Sir Arthur Currie attested, these traumas went
undiagnosed or untreated.2 For those eligible, pensions were the most

1. Currie, cited in Cook, Shock Troops, 603. According to Morton and Wright, Currie
“was hardly a typical veteran, but he symbolized the physical cost of war service. The robust
commander of 1919 had … become a stooped, white-haired man of fifty-four.” See Winning
the Second Battle, 207.
2. According to Cook, the former Commander of the Canadian Corps suffered from
“undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder.” See Shock Troops, 603.
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common means through which wounded men received assistance. Between
1919 and 1935, the number of pensioners increased from 19,000 to 78,040.3
Despite this growth, thousands of men battled with their own government
over pension issues and over two-thirds were informed they were not eligible
for assistance. These same injuries also undermined their ability to retain
work and thousands struggled to find long-term employment throughout the
1920s and the Great Depression.
Returned men spent much of the early postwar period looking for a
solution to these employment and health-related problems. Their first effort—
a call for a postwar bonus—split the nascent veterans’ movement. The largest
group, the GWVA, sided with the federal government, which rejected calls
for a bonus. Other groups, including the United Veterans League (UVL),
backed the bonus campaign. When the fight failed, veterans’ organizations
ceased trying to act on behalf of all veterans. Instead, the leading groups
(including the GWVA) focused on specific policies (particularly pensions) as
a means to improve the lives of wounded and disabled men. The federal
government responded positively to this more targeted advocacy by calling
successive commissions to address veterans’ concerns.
The most significant effort to reconsider the veterans’ assistance
system in the 1920s was the Commission on Pensions and Re-establishment,
headed by J.L. Ralston. The commission was convened to examine complaints
raised by the GWVA and “questions relating to pension, medical treatment

3. Cook, Shock Troops, 606.
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and re-establishment needs” of returned men.4 It was the first time the
Pension Board was held to account. The commission’s first report agreed with
the GWVA that the board paid more attention to the treasury’s purse strings
than to the “rights and benefits” of veterans or their dependents. Ralston also
found it “striking” that the Pension Act did not allow for appeals. As his
interim report concluded, the Pension Board was free from “appeal, control
or effective review by any outside body” and he insisted that a reformed
system had to include appeals.5
The Ralston Commission altered how veterans interacted with the
pension system but it was neither the first nor the last attempt to do so.
Between 1919 and 1939, the Pension Act was amended sixteen times.6 The
most important revision was the War Veterans’ Allowance Act, passed by
Mackenzie King’s Liberal government in 1930. Better known as the ‘burnt
out pension’, the War Veterans’ Allowance (WVA) was designed to assist
“aged and permanently unemployable veterans.” Applicants had to be at
least sixty years old, a pensioner, or a veteran of a theatre of war. Some men
younger than sixty were also eligible for assistance, but only if approved by
the WVA Committee established within the DPNH.7 The WVA, however,
was never intended to address the problems returned men faced during the

4. J.L. Ralston, Royal Commission on Pensions and Re-establishment [Hereafter Ralston
Commission], Final Report on Second Part of Investigation (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1924), 7.
5 See Ralston Commission, First Interim Report on Second Part of Investigation (Ottawa:
King’;s Printer, 1923), 12 and Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 167-68.
6 Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 33.
7 Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 35.
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Depression and it was unable to address widespread unemployment
amongst veterans.8
The Canadian Legion began a concerted effort to address veterans’
unemployment in 1931. By the middle of the decade, the organization lobbied
Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, calling on him to recognize that
the plight of ex-service men “constituted a special case within the general
crisis” of the Depression. The federal government responded by calling for an
inquiry, headed by J.D. Hyndman, President of the Pensions Court. The
Committee, which submitted its report in 1935, found that Ottawa had not
shirked its duty to returned men but there were “unemployed veterans who,
though not eligible for pensions, had been handicapped by their war
service.”9 Hyndman estimated that at least twenty-percent of veterans
without a pension were unemployed and concluded that because “no single
scheme would be suitable for the whole body of the employed,” a Veterans’
Assistance Commission should be established to address unemployment.10
Of the sixteen recommendations suggested by Hyndman, most were
“readily accommodated” by the DPNH, including increased pension
payments, the hiring of more administrative workers, and the need for better
co-operation with municipalities. The committee’s seventh

8 By 1933 only 5,790 veterans had qualified for the new allowance.
9 Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 37, 39-40.
10 J.D. Hyndman, Report of the Committee Appointed to Carry Out an Investigation into
the Existing Facilities in Connection with the Unemployment of Ex-Service Men and Care and
Maintenance while Unemployed, and to Report Thereon with such Suggestions and Recommendations
as may be Deemed Advisable (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1935).
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recommendation—a call for Ottawa to supplement municipal relief efforts for
non-pensioned veterans—was “flatly rejected.” According to Peter Neary,
what “led an essentially cautious and conservative committee” to make such
a recommendation “was the shocking distress it found among many
unemployed” veterans. The federal government was not willing to provide
assistance to returned men whose “service did not disable them.” 11
When Mackenzie King’s Liberals swept back into power in Ottawa in
1935, the government rolled many of the proposed changes to the veterans’
system from Bennett’s tenure into a Special Committee on Pensions and
Returned Soldiers’ Problems, chaired by Charles “Chubby” Power. When
Power’s committee finally presented its findings in 1937, it again rejected the
call for Ottawa to fund local relief payments for unemployed veterans. Power
argued that war service did not “establish a claim on the Canadian people for
special treatment beyond that given to ordinary civilians” because
implementing such a policy amounted to giving “a pension or payment of
some kind for every man who wore a uniform simply because he served in
the Canadian army and not because he incurred any disability during that
service.” In terms of men who were unemployable, Power committed only to
further consultations with veterans’ organizations in hopes that an agreeable
solution could be found.12

11 One departmental report described the plan as a “radical departure from
Canada’s policy in providing for her veterans.” See Neary, “Without the Stigma of
Pauperism,” 42.
12 Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 51.
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The series of interwar recommendations presented to Ottawa to
address the veterans’ assistance programs did help some returned men.
While lowering the age of eligibility for the WVA assisted those old enough
to qualify, however, it did little to assist younger men deemed ineligible for a
pension. These men continued to struggle throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
The failure to acknowledge their claims left them hoping for an alternative to
the pension system, which many believed they had found in the promise of
the country’s canteen funds.
During the First World War, the British government centralized the
provision of supplies for its soldiers. The resulting Expeditionary Force
Canteen (EFC) handled the procurement and sale of goods. It was operated
by the Canteen and Mess Society (CMS), a co-operative organization that
served the Empire’s soldiers, rather than shareholders. By 1917, the CMS
morphed into the Navy and Army Canteen Board (NACB), which operated
over two thousand canteens. The sale of its goods eventually amounted to 223
million francs. When the war ended, the profits from these sales were
transferred to the British Army Council, which, in accordance with the War
Service Canteens (Disposal of Surplus) Act, were then allocated to the United
Services Fund, under the direction of Lord Byng.13 Colonial units, including
the Canadian Corps, were permitted to opt into the program and Canada’s
share was overseen by Sir George Perley, Sir Edward Kemp, and the
Canadian Chief of General Staff. After 1918, the funds were slated for division
between the dominions.

13 John Fortesque, A Short Account of Canteens in The British Army (Cambridge:
Cambride University Press, 1928), 45-53, 72.
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Wartime estimates expected the Empire’s canteen funds to total over
£13,000,000, although the total amount was debated. According to the British
Legion, any account of these profits also had to include an additional
£2,000,000 provided by the Army and Navy Canteen Board and another
£1,000,000 from the War Office. If the £13,000,000 figure proved accurate,
Canada was due upwards of $35,000,000.14 The existence of outstanding
debts, including paying for the material lost during Germany’s Spring
offensive in 1918, made exact estimates difficult. These and other losses
remained un-tallied and they had to be deducted before any disbursement of
canteen profits could take place. Nonetheless, the prospect of a multi-million
dollar payout left returned men with high expectations. Moreover, having
been disappointed in their push for a victory bonus and better pensions,
many veterans hoped these profits would finally provide them with their
monetary due.15 Again, they were to be disappointed.16

14 “35,000,000 to Vets From O’Seas Canteens,” Star, 18 December 1919.
15 General John A. Clark, the MP for Burrard, B.C., wished, despite the impossibility
of doing so, that the canteen funds had been distributed prior to demobilization. Since this
was not practicable he hoped returned men would be appointed to the boards of trustees.
“All the soldiers want,” he believe, “is an even chance with those who remained at home
during the war.” See “Make it Easier for Warriors to Own Farms,” Globe, 22 June 1922, 2.
16 According to Robert England’s study of demobilization and re-establishment,
Discharged: A Commentary on Civil Re-establishment of Veterans in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan,
1944), 315: “there are few subjects which cause so much dissatisfaction amongst ex-Service
men than that of the disposal of the canteen funds. The amount of money involved is not
great when compared with the large sums that are expended in the assistance given to a
Service man, but the canteen is always the subject of criticism and scrutiny by a soldier. He
always expects the worst and if funds are lost the annoyance caused may be out of all
proportion to the amount involved. This interest of the Service man continues among
discharged men, and throughout the years canteen funds have proved to be a frequent
subject of enquiry and hardy perennial at all ex-Service men gatherings. … The ex-Service
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When eventually distributed, the canteen money failed to live up to
expectations. Returned men were also disappointed at the pace of
distribution, which was supposed to happen in 1919 or 1920, but did not
formally take place until 1926. But the time it took to disburse the canteen
money was only one aspect of the failure. Debate over how to divide the
funds proved divisive and was often exasperated by disagreements over
veterans’ postwar financial compensation, including the failed bonus
campaign, the bankruptcy of the GWVA, and a sense that returned men were
not getting a fair postwar deal. Nor did trouble end once the funds were
distributed. By the end of the 1920s, veterans in Alberta, Nova Scotia, and the
Yukon leveled complaints against the trustees overseeing their share of the
canteen money. In Ontario, disagreement over who was eligible to use the
funds was even more contentious.
As the product of soldiers’ labour, the canteen funds were held in high
regard. Canada’s soldiers had “spent freely” from their relatively respectable
salaries of $1.10 a day because they believed they were “spending money in
their own stores.” In a postwar interview, J. Harry Flynn, president of the
United Veterans League, explained that it was simply “understood” among
serving soldiers that they would share in the canteen’s profits.17 Men did not
see this money as another government fund. They had paid into it
throughout the war and considered it an earned reward. As such, canteen
money was different from other types of social assistance emerging in
man rightly feels that these monies belong to Service men and if there is any loss of
maladministration or misdirect expenditure, the subject becomes a catalyst which encourages
the crystallization of all the grievances of ex-Service men.”
17 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” Star, 18 December 1919, 30.
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interwar Canada. Most notably, the fund did not carry the social stigma of
employment assistance. Gaining access was not easy, however, and as the
management and disbursement of the funds became mired in bureaucratic
and human failings, anger and frustration mounted. The story of the canteen
funds contributed significantly to veterans’ sense of disillusionment.
Returned men did not expect that accessing their canteen funds would
prove difficult. They assumed they would collect their money as soon as the
war ended, and certainly by the end of 1919. Veterans returned home not just
at the end of the conflict but throughout the war. Many were facing
difficulties and the canteen money was expected to help them in the short
term. The quick dispersal of the funds was widely recognized as a “most
acceptable and well deserved Christmas present” that would cap off
Canada’s victory overseas.18
Expectations were also high because the Empire’s canteen profits were
projected to total tens of millions of dollars. Rumours shaped expectations
about the eventual size of the fund’s profits and, in the immediate aftermath
of the war, huge sums were bantered about. Indeed, many Canadian
newspapers reported that returns on the canteens were going to lead to a
massive windfall. Both the Toronto Star and the Globe reported that Canada’s
share of the total Empire fund amounted to $35,000,000.
Returned men agreed to divide the funds equally amongst themselves.
They called on the federal government, which controlled the funds until 1926,
to distribute them equally to all ex-service men. In December 1919, the UVL,
18 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30.
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which supported the Bonus Campaign (unlike the GWVA), was inundated by
a “stream” of calls, letters, and telegrams from its members calling on it to
lobby the government. The association responded and its directors wrote the
Minister of Militia, Sydney Mewburn, whose department was then holding
the funds:
returned soldiers of Toronto and Ontario request that the profit
of the Canteen Fund be paid directly to the soldiers who served
in France and England; also that the fund be distributed equally
and paid as far as possible before Christmas.19
The UVL’s call to divide the money tapped into a sense of brotherhood and
shared experience. By pushing for control of the funds, however, veterans
wanted more than just recognition of their service. They were demonstrating
increased skepticism as to the government’s willingness to assist them.
Lobbying to keep the money within the control of the former CEF was
intended to protect their wider interests and the aggressive push for
compensation revealed that the issue was already adding to postwar
discontent.
Returned men called on the government to use all funds available to
assist them. Some groups, including the Army and Navy Veterans (ANV),
wanted to pool all assistance funds available, which could then be
administered by the Canadian Patriotic Fund. According to ANV estimates,
the resulting lump sum would yield $2,500 for every ex-service man.20 The
patriotic fund was a civilian organization, however, and many veterans were

19 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30.
20 “Army and Navy Veterans’ Demands,” Globe, 23 July 1919, 8.
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angered at the prospect of civilian control of their canteen money. They were
adamant that the group could have nothing to do with the fund. Whatever
the proposals, veterans believed that the canteen profits belonged to them
and not to the government or another benevolent organization. The funds
were the “property of returned men” and no government had the right to
transfer control of them to another organization. “Anything short of a direct
and equal distribution” of the canteen profits amounted to “robbing the men
of money which is justly and legally theirs.”21
Not all veterans opposed the Patriotic Fund administering the canteen
funds. One former branch president of the Tubercular Veterans Association
was disheartened that the group was scaling back its operations and
suggested that the canteen profits be handed over to the CPF so it could
continue with its “good work.” Even supporters, however, believed that
canteen assistance was only for ex-soldiers who were not disabled.
Furthermore, the Dominion Veterans Alliance (DVA) needed a soldier
representative on the board of the fund.22 As one GWVA Secretary explained,
handing administration of this money to any other group—whether
government or civilian—“would be disastrous.”23
Even if returned men gained control of the canteen funds, they still
had to decide how the money would be used and who was eligible to receive
it. Should every man in the CEF get a portion of the funds or just those who

21 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30.
22 “The Canteen Fund,” Star, 3 February 1923, 6.
23 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30.
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served overseas? Did distinctions between officers and enlisted men matter?
What about dependents of those killed? Were they also worthy of assistance
from the fund? With an estimated $35,000,000 payout on the line, these and
other questions motivated significant debate and disagreement about how to
use the canteen profits.
The largest veterans organization—the GWVA—argued that
disbursement had to account for the dependents of those killed. Families
suffered unimaginable loss and, as one of the executive noted, even “a little
may go a long way.”24 In terms of organizing the distribution of the money,
the GWVA’s various branches favoured committees to oversee disbursement.
The federal government, however, preferred a plan to distribute the money to
each province. The association’s branches held such proposals in “contempt.”
Instead, they preferred entrusting the fund’s handling to returned men who
had served overseas (or to the dependents of those killed). Regardless,
veterans were adamant that “no civilian organization” could be “entrusted”
with the handling of the funds.25
Debate on dividing the money soon spilled over into the newspapers.
Men wrote to papers across the country with suggestions. Edward Chesley
recommended that the funds be split into two blocks. The first would benefit
widows, orphans, and other needy dependents. The rest of the money could
then be collected in a lottery and divided up among returned soldiers. This
proposal gained traction among the paper’s readers and, in 1921, many wrote

24 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30.
25 “Returned Men Require Man on Control Board,” Star, 19 December 1919, 22.
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in support of the idea.26 Admittedly, Chesley did not know if his plan was
legal, but he considered it a “satisfactory method” of dispensing the funds. As
he put it, those who won would gain something worthwhile, while those
without “would probably be no worse off than they would be under any
other scheme.”27
Returned men were not the only ones requesting access to the fund.
Parents of men who had died overseas also believed themselves entitled to
support. The provincial secretary of the GWVA may have agreed with equal
distribution for returned men and their dependents, but he stopped short of
sanctioning the fund’s dispersal to every living relative of deceased or
returned men. “Only the claims of the dependents of those who were killed,”
he believed, “will have to be remembered, along with those who came back.”
One mother of fallen soldier disagreed:
Many of those so very near and dear to the fallen soldiers are
left much worse off financially than the dependents. Many of
the fathers and others are left now, since the war has ended,
broken in health and spirit. In some cases fathers have died
leaving young children with no means of getting schooling.
Those fathers getting up in years have no sons now to lean on as
old age creeps on.

26 The idea obviously resonated with others. A week later another returned man, this
one formerly of the 19th Battalion, wrote in support of Chesley’s proposal. What appealed
was that it provided a definite way of ensuring support to between six and seven hundred
men, who would certainly get “a nice little nest egg.” See “Disposal of Canteen Fund,” Star,
12 December 1921, 4.
27 “Disposal of Army Canteen Fund,” Star, 6 December 1921, 6.
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“Why,” should those who “suffered so much through long days of anxiety
and dread be called upon to bear this insult?”28 Her questions went
unanswered but they pointed to the ever-increasing sense of entitlement that
Canadian families affected by the war were feeling, especially when faced
with the prospect of real monetary returns from the canteen funds.
Chesley’s plan to use a lottery to distribute the canteen profits
highlighted one of the major issues: there was no easy way to distribute the
money. With over 420,000 soldiers who served overseas, and another 200,000
in Canada, it was impossible to find a single solution to satisfy over half a
million men.29 The first step to divide the money was not, however, taken in
Canada. In 1919, the British Army Council asked Lord Byng, soon to become
Governor General of Canada, to lead the distribution of the Empire’s funds.
He agreed, provided he had “freedom” from government control.30 A Council
of Management was subsequently established, made up of a representatives
from ex-servicemen organizations. They divided Canada into ten areas and
tasked over 2,500 local committees with determining the wishes of returned
men. Although designed to canvas veterans, these committees did little to
reach out and returned men not were consulted about their preference for the
use of the canteen funds.

28 “Hero’s Mother Replies to Turley,” Star, 27 December 1919, 6.
29 To discourage calls for per capita distributions, the DSCR explained that each man
would only secure $3.50 and that the disbursement itself would be prohibitively costly. See
“Suggest Four Plans for Canteen Profits,” Star, 12 November 1921, 14.
30 Ralston Commission, Final Report on Second Part of Investigation, 143-44.
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A decision on disbursement was slow in coming. By 1921, the federal
government had been grappling with problems of re-establishment—
including distribution of the canteen funds—for nearly three years, far longer
than other members of the British Empire. In Britain and Australia, the funds
were divided by 1920, with the latter splitting the money according to
military district (an administrative division of the country also used in
Canada). Australia’s Canteen Fund Act stipulated that these funds were the
property of ex-service men and should be disbursed “irrespective of other
grants or provisions of repatriation.” 31 Canada took note and tried to hasten
its allocation of canteen money by grafting the decision to distribute the
funds onto an existing Special Committee called to address questions of
veterans’ pensions, insurance, and re-establishment. This committee
examined the approaches taken in Britain and Australia and solicited further
suggestions from the Canadian veterans organizations.
The Discharged Solders and Sailors’ Federation wanted the money
used to enable “the transportation of the mothers and widows of the men
who died overseas to visit the graves of their soldier sons and husbands.” 32
Lord Byng suggested that there was “no better” use for it than funding rest
homes for ex-service men.33 The Dominion Command of the GWVA wanted
the funds headed by trustees and devoted to scholarships for the children of

31 The A.E.F. Canteens’ Fund Act, 1920, cited in Special Committee (1921), 404.
32 Special Committee (1921), 527.
33 “Canteen Fund for Soldiers’ Homes,” Regina Morning Leader, 11 October 1922, 3.
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returned soldiers.34 Colonel J.L. Regan, director of pay services in the
Department of Militia and Defence, agreed with the GWVA. In addition to
entrusting the fund to trustees, however, he preferred distributing it along
military lines, as occurred in Australia. But, rather than distributing the
money for educational purposes, the “trustees should be appointed to
distribute [the funds] to the needy cases of ex-members of the forces, or their
dependents.” Regan also stipulated that administration of the money
required strong local representation by returned soldiers.35 No clear plan for
how to distribute or administer the funds materialized, despite increased
consultation. In fact, confusion about how the government’s role originated
with the very committee tasked with finding answers to the canteen fund
problem. When asked by committee member and New Brunswick MP,
Arthur Copp how the canteen funds were to be spent, Regan replied: “That is
up to your Committee.”36 Such uncertainty reflected a lack of information
about how much money the fund entailed, but it was also a result of
disagreement over its purpose and the difficulty of determining how veterans
actually wanted their contributions distributed.
Prior to 1921, veterans protested loudly against the fund being
administered by civilian or political organizations like the Patriotic Fund. 37
According to the Toronto World, it was always understood that soldiers “were

34 Special Committee (1921), 404.
35 Special Committee (1921), 408.
36 Special Committee (1921), 404.
37 “Soldiers Demand Canteen Profits,” Toronto World, 19 December 1919, 7.

247
to receive a direct share in canteen profits.”38 The newspapers reported that
men wanted a direct payment. The UVL demanded that the fund’s profits “be
paid directly to the soldiers who served in France and England.”39 After three
months of deliberation, the committee recommended a combination of the
approaches put forward by Regan and the GWVA. It recognized that the
funds were for the “benefit” of returned men and their families and that the
government needed to carry out a full investigation to “determine the balance
now held in trust.”40 Accordingly, the committee suggested the government
further consult with the major veterans organizations to determine the “best
method” to dispose of the funds.41
In November 1921 the DSCR convened a Canteen Funds Disposal
Committee to try to determine the method of distribution.42 The committee,
headed by deputy DSCR minister F.G. Robinson, sought additional input
from veterans. The department and the leading veterans organizations agreed
to conduct a plebiscite on the use of the canteen funds. 555,000 ballots were
distributed with four suggested options:
1) Establishment of memorial workshops for the provision of
sheltered employment and home employment for disabled exservice men, including the tuberculous;

38 “Soldiers Demand Canteen Profits,” 7.
39 United Veterans League telegram, quoted in Toronto World, 19 December 1919, 7.
40 Special Committee (1921), xxiv.
41 Special Committee (1921), xxiv.
42 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 190.
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2) Establishment of a non-competitive industrial enterprise
jointly owned and operated by ex-service men;
3) Provision of scholarships of other educational facilities for the
children of ex-service members of the Forces in need of such
assistance;
4) Provision of burial facilities for ex-members of the Canadian
Forces who die in indigent circumstances.
In addition to choosing among assistance for employment, children’s
education, and burial options for the indigent, there was also space to add
additional suggestions. The ballot did not offer an option to use the funds for
veteran unemployment, a serious omission in light of the postwar recession.
When the votes were counted, only 22,974 men replied. Of these 5,764
opted for option One, while 3,574 added that they wanted the fund
distributed as cash payments. The responses were weighed using a
transferable vote, producing 11,565 votes for the first option. The Special
Committee, having reconvened in 1922, rejected the plebiscite because it did
not yield “conclusive results.”43 In so doing, it attempted to determine why
veterans’ responses were so low. No definite answer emerged. Grant MacNeil
of the GWVA explained to the committee that the poor turn out was
“absolutely inexplicable,” but he wondered how different it was from the
general electorate that did not vote on Election Day.44 What was clear was
that the ballot options had not motivated returned men.

43 Special Committee (1922), xv.
44 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 149.
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The decision to further delay distribution merged the canteen profits
issue with the larger debates over how the state was addressing (or failing to
address) the problems of returned men. During pension debates, for example,
the canteen money was invoked as an issue alongside the failed bonus
campaign and a myriad of other veterans’ complaints. In November 1920, the
money was linked to a disagreement over wartime salaries. In what became
known as the “eight million dollar exchange question,” returned men battled
the federal government for what they deemed to be unpaid wages. During
the war, the pound sterling decreased in value. Canada’s dollar, however,
remained relatively strong. Because men had been paid based on the
exchange rate, many now believed that they had been shorted considerable
amounts of pay. The missing funds were estimated to approach eight million
dollars. The solution, many veterans hoped, was that their salary claims
could be added to the ample profits from the canteen funds.45
In 1921, the GWVA called on the recently elected Liberal government
of Mackenzie King to put the canteen funds to use. It presented the federal
government with three options: distribute the funds among the provinces,
establish an old-age pension fund, or use them for child education.46 The
objective of these proposals was to distribute the funds to help alleviate the
downturn in the economy while also limiting the government’s handling of
their money. Unemployment had been rising since 1920 with conditions
“particularly severe” in the Maritimes. All told, real wages dropped fourteen

45 “Ask Exchange Difference for Orphan Kiddies,” 10 November 1920, 6.
46 “Premier is Told Soldier Claims,” Globe, 11 March 1922, 7.
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percent in two years.47 As an added incentive to address these economic
challenges, the GWVA offered to help coordinate employment relief.
“Organized co-operation,” the association’s Grant MacNeil explained, “will
undoubtedly do much to eliminate the necessity for unemployment relief on
the part of the Federal Government.”48 In exchange, the leading veterans’
organization, which was financially-strapped, asked for an advance on the
canteen funds to shore up its coffers.
The government responded. On 5 July 1921, it authorized a $50,000
payment from the canteen funds for the GWVA. Three months later an
additional $120,000 payment was made. This second payment was split
among the twenty-two ex-service men’s organizations, with the GWVA
receiving the lion’s share ($80,000), bringing their total assistance to $130,000.
These canteen payments were considered an advance “for the purpose of
extending the scope and usefulness” of the GWVA. The Order in Council
authorizing the plan recognized that the employment problem for returned
men demanded “immediate attention” and allotted the money to deal with
unemployment.
Despite taking action, $200,000 could not solve the unemployment
problem for returned men and allegations that the GWVA improperly
handled its advance added to veterans’ growing frustrations. Instead of
setting up a separate account to administer its allotted canteen money, the
GWVA deposited its payment into its general account, making it impossible

47 Rowell-Sirois Commission, 113-114.
48 MacNeil, cited in Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 188-189.
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to trace. As MacNeil explained to a 1925 Senate Committee examining the
handling of the canteen funds, the GWVA considered the money, which had
been allocated for the benefit of ex-service men, synonymous with its own
goals. As a result, it did not need to distinguish between its funds and those
advanced by Ottawa. Captain J.T. Shaw, a sitting MP from Calgary West who
represented the GWVA at the federal hearings investigating charges of
mismanagement, noted the association considered the purposes of the two
sums to run “concurrently with the purposes set out in the [Canteen Fund]
Orders in Council …” and that “the purposes of the G.W.V.A. are exactly in
line with the purposes for which the money was voted.”49 Not everyone
agreed. According to the audit conducted of the GWVA’s books, between
July 1921 and August 1922, the GWVA spent its entire canteen fund allotment
on “general” expenses, particularly on salaries and the publishing costs of its
magazine, The Veteran.50 The committee further concluded that it did not
appear that “any portion” of the money was spent on unemployment relief.51
This mismanagement would not come to light until 1925, but in the interim,
veterans were deprived of relief measures.
The GWVA spent its canteen money by 1922 and this fact did not bode
well for unemployed veterans who, after losing out on pensions and a bonus,
now faced a third setback. The co-incidental establishment of the Ralston
Commission, called to investigate issues relating to insufficient pensions,

49 Special Committee (1925), 29-30.
50 Senate Committee (1925), 6.
51 Senate Committee (1925), 6.
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however, offered another opportunity to decide how to disburse the funds.
Ottawa asked Ralston to consider how the canteen money should be
administered. As head of a federal commission, Ralston was concerned about
whether the federal government had authority to dictate how the fund was
administered or whether the money was the property of the individuals who
paid into it.52 His commission also considered how the funds should be used.
After a series of consultations, it concluded that Ottawa did have the right to
dictate dispersal of the money. The two major issues for ex-service men were
assistance for their children’s education and relief from “distress” among exservicemen and their dependents. The commission determined that assistance
could not be divided among individuals because it would be “impossible” to
determine the appropriate share each contributor would be issued. As a
result, the report recommended dividing the fund along provincial lines, with
the money administered by groups of trustees. The commission concluded
that this would be the most effective way to help individuals because it
would “increase the facilities for securing an intelligent expression of opinion
from ex-service men and make the administration of the money more
effective by direct interest.”53
A lack of provincial enlistment data made determining the percentages
allocated to each province highly contentious. The commission considered a
combination of provincial enlistment, discharge, and pension records as the
fairest method to estimate the proportion of men in any one province. It

52 Ralston Commission, Final Report, 143.
53 Ralston Commission, Final Report, 146-147.

253
further determined that the government should make “reasonable efforts to
ascertain the wishes of the beneficiaries, and if any consensus of opinion is
obtained to conform therewith.”54 The report addressed veterans’ concerns
about eligibility and the government’s responsibilities to them. It stipulated
that any use of funds for relief purposes should be limited to men to whom
no other source of relief was available. The goal was to ensure that the fund
did not “relieve the State of any responsibility devolving on it.” Ralston’s
report recommended that use of the fund be limited to men or their
dependents. It advised that the funds not be spent immediately. Ideally, the
funds would be “used over a period of fifteen years” to help provide enough
time to accommodate those affected by the war and to give their children
assistance in “particularly distressing circumstances.”55
The move to allocate canteen money to the GWVA was immediately
opposed by other veterans groups. The Discharged Soldiers and Sailors’
Federation protested the decision by the Conservative government of Arthur
Meighen to grant the funds to the largest veterans’ organization and
demanded that MacNeil’s group return all money advanced, plus 6½ percent
interest because the prime minister acted without a legal mandate. Meighen
took the brunt of their anger and his actions were compared to “Prussian
Kings.”56 Robert H. Harrison, former V.P. of the Ontario Command of the
GWVA, disagreed with the federal government’s decision to advance canteen

54 Ralston Commission, Final Report, 143, 147.
55 Ralston Commission, Final Report, 149-150.
56 “Says Cabinet Illegally Used Canteen Fund,” Globe, 2 September 1921, 5.
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money to his own association. “Although I am a member of the G.W.V.A. and
proud of my connection with that body,” Harrison explained, “I believe that
the government has made a grave error in agreeing to turn over this fund.” In
his opinion, the association was not a representative organization. Until one
was created, any move to advance the GWVA such funds was “illegal.”57
The decision to provide the GWVA with a portion of the canteen funds
was criticized during the federal election campaign of 1921. Election literature
for the Liberal candidate, A.T. Hunter, openly addressed the Union
government’s handing of the canteen funds. “Isn’t it the [funniest] thing” one
editorial wondered, how the Tory candidates for the so-called soldier city
(Toronto) “do not include a single soldier?” Perhaps this omission explained
why the government proved so inept at determining how to distribute the
canteen profits. Rather than divide the money amongst those to whom it
belonged, Ottawa used the funds to bribe returned men “to keep out” of the
election. The canteen funds, it was pointed out, were held by the government
with coffers running “into seven figures.” Were the Conservatives really
above doling out money to veterans’ organizations for political gain? “What
body of veterans,” the paper wondered, “looking for the interest in their own
money would think of voting against the echoes of an administration that has
the power to dole or withhold?”58
Pressure to divide the canteen funds was increasing, in large part
because it was now apparent that the $35,000,000 many expected was greatly

57 “Canteen Fund Gift is Called Illegal,” Star, 3 September 1921, 20.
58 “The Spotlight,” Star, 29 November 1921, p. 6.
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exaggerated. As early as 9 January 1920, efforts were underway to clarify the
workings of the canteen funds. The Department of Overseas Military Forces
of Canada (OMFC) issued an explanatory statement in hopes it could quell
expectations of a windfall. It emphasized that the tally was still underway
and that any attempt to estimate the total was “impossible.” According to the
Globe, and contrary to press reports, the OMFC wanted Canadians to know
that no British Dominion had yet received its funds and it would not be until
at least the end of the year before they knew how much money Canada
would receive. It was “premature” therefore to estimate the total returns,
especially because there was no account of canteen losses sustained at the end
of the war, costs that needed to be recouped before any money could be paid
out.59 Rumour of the fund’s value continued to circulate widely, however,
despite such clarifications.
Some newspapers did attempt to attribute figures to specific officials,
but the idea that Canada would receive millions of dollars persisted for years
after 1918.60 By late December 1920 the government decided to address the
canteen fund rumours directly. The $35,000,000 so widely reported was
deemed a “fairy tale.”61 The Star was similarly blunt, calling the figure a
“dud.”62 By early 1921 no specific total existed, but the government made it
clear that men would not be receiving huge sums in return for their service.

59 “No Account Yet to Government of E.F.C. Profit,” Globe, 9 January 1919, 7
60 “$35,000,000 to Vets from O’Seas Canteens,” Star, 18 December 1919.
61 “$35,000,000 Story is Hoax, Ottawa Hears,” Star, [Dec 19/20?].
62 “Canteen Nest-Egg of War Veterans is Two Millions,” Star, 25 November 1920, 1.
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The Montreal Gazette reported that the fund had shrunk from this expected
£13,000,000 to only £7,000,000. Canada’s share was still hoped to be
“substantial,” but disappointment was mounting.63 Five months later, with
funds still held by London, the Regina Morning Leader suggested that Canada
would receive nearly £100,000. The final sum eventually amounted to
$2,402,586.02.64
The administration of the central fund was now subject to allegations
of corruption. What made matters worse was that the mismanagement was
happening in Britain, far beyond the control of the Canadian government.
According to news reports, the British Navy and Army canteen board was
guilty of “amazing charges of waste and fraud.” The board, which formed a
monopoly on the supply of canteens, was said to have accumulated fourteen
million pounds. The United Services Fund, formerly headed by Sir Julian
Byng, before he was appointed Governor General, had managed to secure
this entire sum from the War Office for distribution to ex-soldiers. Upon
Byng’s departure for Canada, however, the government procrastinated and
evaded handing over the profits. In the process, it had “muddled” away,
either through mismanagement, or outright loss, close to ten million of the
total, leaving only four million available to transfer.65

63 “Canteen Fund Shrinks,” Montreal Gazette, 10 June 1922, 1.
64 AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Ontario Canteen Fund – Misc., Report on activity of B.C.
Canteen Fund 1926 to March 31st, 1935 with supplementary figures as to Disbursement to
December 31, 1935.
65 “Millions Wasted of Canteen Fund?” Star, 23 July 1922, 3.
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The Board was incorporated under Sir George May, with a reserve
estimated at £10,000,000. It was these funds that were in dispute between
Canada and Britain. Canada claimed a proportional share of the profits. The
British, however, contended that because Canada was not a partner in the
board, it was only eligible for the ten percent rebate already provided.
Canada argued that the reserve was the product of accumulated profits that
should have been included in the rebates. The question was eventually
submitted for arbitration.66 In 1922 the British Parliament finally passed an
Act ratifying payments already made between the dominions, totaling
£363,450, which also made provision for the distribution of future funds. 67
Ottawa further delayed its decision for another four years, however, only
dividing the money between the provinces in 1926.
Once again returned men were disappointed. The Ralston commission
did not produce a clear plan to distribute the canteen money. It only placed
limits on how the funds could be used. The commission continued to call for
consultation with veterans in hopes of securing consensus on disbursement.
This assumption was naïve. Returned men were not a unified body. The
divisions in the ranks still existed in the postwar era and, as a meeting of
veterans at Massey Hall in Toronto demonstrated, divisions among officers,
enlisted men, and different veterans’ associations remained contentious.
Under the front-page headline “Veterans in Anger Cry Down Speakers and
Refuse Hearing,” the Globe reported that a large group of unemployed

66 “Canteen Nest-Egg of War Veterans is Two Millions,” Star, 25 November 1920, 1.
67 Ralston Commission, Final Report, 142.
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returned men disrupted an April 1922 veterans meeting. Most of the speakers
could not make themselves heard over the “hooting and booing” from the
crowd. Enlisted men explained that they were fed up with the legion’s
leadership.68 During the raucous meeting, the canteen funds were called into
question. The crowds called for investigations into the handling of the
Canadian Patriotic Fund and the accounting of the canteen profits. Some
called for abolishing all veterans’ organizations because they were controlled
by officers.69
Sir Arthur Currie, the former commander of the Canadian Corps,
criticized Ottawa’s desire for a unanimous consensus on how to distribute
the canteen money. He rejected the need for unanimity among veterans as
“useless.” Personally, he felt the money should be spent on education for
returned men, but regardless of these opinions it was clear to him that the
government was not proving a capable administrator of the funds.70 Currie
was skeptical about the use of trustees to administer the funds. “For five
years” he declared,
no Government has been able to [decide how] these funds
should be devoted, and now it is proposed to ‘pass the buck’ to
a board of trustees in each Province who not only are to
determine to which the funds shall be devoted, but to create the
machinery for the funds disposal.

68 This is the Globe’s reference to ‘legion.’ It is unclear from the article which
organization the paper was referring to, though it could well have been the GAUV in light of
later references to that association. See “Veterans in Anger Cry Down Speakers and Refuse
Hearing,” Globe, 11 April 1922, 1 and 14.
69 “Veterans in Anger Cry Down Speakers and Refuse Hearing,” 1.
70 “Fund Withdrawals Without Authority, Currie’s Contention,” Globe, 11 July 1924.
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If no government could decide what to do, Currie concluded that “the task
will hardly be found easier by a board of trustees.” All the government had
done was to shift responsibility away from cabinet to the “poor” trustees.
Currie criticized the use of the canteen funds up to that point, arguing that
the monies spent should have come out of government coffers, not from the
fund itself. He considered the withdrawals “without authority or legal right,”
and openly wondered whether the government would be topping up the
fund to its original amount.71
The GWVA was equally skeptical of Ottawa’s intentions. Its members
echoed Currie’s concerns and were particularly disturbed that officials
appeared to be looking to the canteen money, rather than the government’s
own coffers, to pay for commitments made to veterans. For many returned
men this was outrageous. They viewed the canteen profits as their property
and it was up to the government to raise additional funds to cover expenses,
not to raid veterans of their hard won proceeds. As Grant MacNeil explained,
many in the GWVA suspected that the government was trying to use the
canteen funds to pay for programs to assist veterans:
I know that an effort was being made in many instances to
devote this sum to enterprises which should be properly
financed by the state. The general opinion of ex-service men is
that this money should be devoted to enterprises
supplementary or apart from post-war measures for ex-service
men.72

71 “Fund Withdrawals Without Authority, Currie’s Contention,” Globe, 11 July 1924.
72 Special Committee on Pensions, Soldiers’ Insurance and Re-establishment (1922), 148.
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These were pointed criticisms of the government’s handling of the canteen
funds but by 1925 they had little effect. Due to a series of scandals, the
GWVA secretary lost all credibility when it came to the question of canteen
money.
MacNeil’s trouble was rooted in the GWVA’s chronic funding
shortfall. The problem dated back to 1921, when the Meighen government
decided to bail the association out with a canteen fund advance. The
association’s meager membership dues could not support its national
lobbying efforts. Additional federal money was not forthcoming, thanks in
part to the organization’s criticisms of federal policies regarding veterans.
Indeed, between 1919 and 1924, the GWVA had become a troublesome critic
on the issue of the government’s handling of veterans’ issues. The
organization pushed back against the fight for a bonus campaign but this was
the exception that proved the rule. By 1924 the GWVA was increasingly an
organization led by the ‘other-ranks’, bent on populist solutions to the
grievances of returned men. This interpretation did not sit well with members
of the Senate or the government. The Liberals nonetheless understood that
they risked political problems if they openly attacked the GWVA and its
leadership. By spring, the government seemed to have come up with a
solution that both addressed concerns with the GWVA and would assist
returned men. Ottawa would advance the veterans’ association another
portion of the canteen fund while also disbursing them along the lines
outlined by the Ralston commission.73

73 Morton, “Resisting the Pension Evil,” 218.
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The federal government was fed up with the canteen funds. In 1924 the
debate and proposals put forward had reached the point where MPs were
sufficiently satisfied that the government’s legislation had the requisite
support of returned men, at least as “represented by their organizations.”
This did not mean the GWVA would escape criticism. Chubby Power, the
future minister of Pensions and National Health, called for the veterans’
association to account for the money it had already been advanced. Power
wanted to know whether the GWVA had used its share of the canteen funds
to help returned men or, as many suspected, to pay the salaries of its officials.
According to the Globe, the MP “regretted” that no Minister could account for
the use of these funds. He also remained critical of the government’s
oversight of the money, agreeing that it was unclear how much had been lost
through mismanagement “or worse.”74
Three days later, on 17 July, the Senate killed the Liberals’ canteen bill,
denying veterans and a hopeful GWVA any access to the canteen money.75
Without the expected canteen money, the GWVA was now desperately short
of cash. It suggested that the government turn to a long forgotten
Disablement Fund to help the association cover its expenses. The Minister of
the DSCR, Henri Béland, agreed. According to Desmond Morton, however,
neither MacNeil nor Béland anticipated the actions of the DSCR’s deputy
minister, Ernest Scammell. Unbeknownst to his minister, the “dutiful civil
servant” engineered a “trap” for MacNeil. If the government lent just the

74 “Commons Approves Plan to Disburse Canteen Profits,” Globe, 15 July 1924, 1.
75 “Canteen Funds Bill Defeated in Senate,” Globe, 18 July 1924, 1
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GWVA money from the Disablement Fund, then the other veterans’
organizations would surely be up in arms. To prevent discord, Scammell
suggested that the loan be made out to the Dominion Veterans Alliance
(DVA), a loose organization of the returned soldiers’ associations. Scammell
realized that the “quarrelsome” DVA would not willingly pass money on to
the GWVA. MacNeil was also aware of the problem. Scammell’s solution
doomed MacNeil. The deputy minister suggested that because MacNeil was a
member of DVA as well, he could personally cash the cheque. Having done
so, “the trap closed.” Rightly or wrongly, word quickly spread that MacNeil
was stealing from veterans.76
When rumours began circulating that a new grant was authorized to
the DVA, the other veterans’ organizations began to complain. The
Amputations Association of Canada (AAC) protested to Mackenzie King,
Arthur Meighen, and Henri Béland that the decision be deferred. It was the
only organization that represented disabled veterans and it called the
decision to assist the DVA “not representative.” In place of a loan, they hoped
the money would be administered by a “responsible and independent”
board.77 The critique had merit. If the government could portion out a loan to
the DVA, why not disburse the funds properly? The government was
sensitive to such rumours. It moved quickly to quell any idea that the DVA

76 Morton “Resisting the Pension Evil,” 218-219.
77 “Canteen Fund Grant Subject of Protest,” Globe, 26 February 1925, 12.
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was receiving assistance and Béland offered the house “definite” assurance
the government was not entertaining a proposed advance.78
MacNeil was in hot water. In the Senate, Brig.-Gen. W.A. Griesbach
called for an investigation. The resulting inquiry undermined the GWVA’s
existing leadership and laid bare its supposed wrongdoing. The association
claimed that the non-judicial inquiry was “charging” it with misconduct and
tried to limit the scope of the investigation. MacNeil and others argued that
the GWVA’s use of funds before 1921—including use of its earlier canteen
fund loan—need not be scrutinized since their general purpose was “exactly
in line with the purposes for which the money was voted.”79 The argument
did not fly. Even if it had, however, it was revealed that between 1 July 1921
and 31 August 1922 eighty-five per cent of GWVA expenditures used money
allocated from the canteen fund.80 When published, the inquiry’s report found
that the GWVA had mismanaged the canteen funds and that it could not
properly account for their use. It recommended that the remainder of the
fund be paid out as soon as practicable. The authors of the report further
argued that the money in the canteen fund belonged to “all ex-solders” of the
CEF and that it should “only have been expended in whole or in part, in such
a way as to confer a direct benefit upon all ex-service men.”81

78 “Canteen Funds Plan Satisfies Veterans,” Globe, 27 February 1925, 2.
79 Senate Committee (1925), 30.
80 Senate Committee (1925), 43.
81 Senate Committee (1925), 6.
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By March 1925, debate was again underway to determine how to
disburse the fund. The federal government finally acknowledged that there
would be opposition regardless of what decision it made. The main concern
was to get the funds out, preferably under the direction of trustees who
included ex-soldier representation.82 In May, the Bill received a second
reading in the House of Commons. Béland, prompted by MP Robert Manion,
revealed that Sir Arthur Currie was now willing to stand as a Chairman of
the Central Board of Trustees. Veterans’ organizations would nominate the
second appointment and the third would come from either the Canadian Red
Cross or Canadian Patriotic Fund. There was still division over the use of
canteen funds for an adjustment bureau, however, with MPs Manion and J.
Arthurs both protesting against the decision.83 Despite their concerns the Act
respecting the disposal of the Canteen Funds became law on 27 June 1925.
Returned men would finally get the chance to access their contributions to
the fund.
Gaining access to the canteen fund profits proved an unexpected
challenge. In 1918, Canada’s veterans believed that the money would be paid
out by Christmas. None realized it would take nearly a decade before the
federal government authorized its disbursement. This failure to distribute
canteen money added to veterans’ growing sense that too little was done to
assist them in the war’s aftermath. What few realized was that their struggles
were far from over. As applicants to the long-awaited provincial canteen

82 “Plan is Explained for Canteen Profits,” Globe, 25 March 1925, 6.
83 “Canteen Fund Bill Read Second Time,” Globe, 2 May 1925, 2.
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associations soon learned, securing the assistance they believed themselves
entitled proved an equally disillusioning experience.
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Chapter 7
“Right up against it”: The canteen funds and Ontario’s war
generation
“In connection with your application for assistance from the Ontario
Canteen Fund please be advised that the provisions of the Canteen
Fund Act, 1925, do not permit the Fund to be used for the assistance of
persons who are in receipt of pensions, pay and allowance or War
Veterans’ Allowance.”
- Ontario Canteen Fund form letter

Ontario controlled Canada’s largest canteen fund program, which began
operating in late 1927. The province’s returned soldiers waited nearly a
decade for their share of the funds, longer than any other veterans in the
country. When these men finally gained access to the money, however, they
learned that their trustees had instituted policies denying assistance to
veterans with pensions as well as to any applicant who was unemployed.
Such limits were never part of the debate over the distribution of the funds
and Ontario’s veterans were outraged. For the war generation, the canteen
funds were a means of last resort, to be used to help shoulder the financial
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burdens brought on by their war-related deteriorating health. The resulting
uproar among returned men denied assistance (a situation made worse by
the onset of the Great Depression) is echoed in the tens of thousands of letters
that survive in the fund’s case files. They number over 26,000 and
demonstrate just how unhappy the province’s returned men were in the
war’s aftermath. The canteen fund issue, combined with their wider
treatment by the veterans’ bureaucracy and society more generally, added to
their growing sense of frustration and discontent in postwar Canada.1
Seven years after the war ended these disappointments were still
simmering. The postwar struggle had not been easy, but the country’s
veterans were pleased that the 1925 Canteen Funds Act had finally detailed
how the country’s canteen profits were to be divided and administered. The
amount for disbursement reached approximately $2,500,000 and was a
combination of funds from the British War Office, the proceeds of canteen
sales in the CEF, Canada’s share of the profits of Britain’s War Office
Cinematograph Committee, and the Royal Canadian Navy’s allocation from
the British Admiralty. The money was distributed by the Receiver-General for
Canada for the “benefit” of ex-soldiers and their dependents.2 In keeping
with the Ralston Commission’s recommendations, the Act stipulated that the

1. The records are now located at the Archives of Ontario. Their holdings represent
the surviving portion of the original OCF files and only include the cases of men who
successfully gained assistance from fund. Many of these contain notices of denial for earlier
claims, suggesting that the total number of men who applied is in excess of the 26,000 figure.
2. Act respecting the disposal of the Canteen Funds [Hereafter Canteen Fund Act], 1. See
Appendix I.
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money be distributed among between the provinces and territories.3 The
amount distributed was determined by an equation that considered
enlistment, discharge, and pension figures.4 Each province and territory
administered its portion through a board of trustees. These boards were
appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of each province (and the
Governor in Council in the Yukon). The boards comprised three appointees,
except in Ontario, which was given five appointments because of its
disproportionate share of the total allocation.
Table 2. Provincial Distribution of Canteen Funds, 19255
Province

Per cent.

Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Nova Scotia
Ontario
Prince Edward Island
Quebec
Saskatchewan
Yukon Territory

7.8
10.9
10.7
4.1
5.6
41.2
0.7
11.6
7.2
.3

Data derived from The Canteen Fund Act

3. Canteen Fund Act, 3.
4. Ralston Commission, 148.
5. Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.
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The Act placed few restrictions on the use of the funds.6 As a result,
Ottawa empowered the provincial Lieutenant-Governor (or territorial
Governor) to regulate them, provided these regulations took into account the
“wishes” of the fund’s potential users. Once it was decided how to divide the
money, the board was free to administer its portion of the fund, as well as
“such other things as may be indicated in the Order in Council.”7 Any
expenses incurred in the administration of the programs were to be charged
to the fund. Vacancies on each provincial board could only be filled by the
Lieutenant-Governor or Governor.
The one limit imposed by the Act on the trustees was the definition of
what constituted service in the armed forces. Ottawa stipulated that to be
eligible for assistance, a veteran had to have served overseas, either in
England or in France.8 The canteen legislation also provided general
guidelines to administer the fund. The Act made it clear, however, that
Ottawa did not want to limit the powers of the provinces. It limited its
recommendations to a list of three “general principles” governing the
distribution of the canteen profits:

A) Any plans formulated should be based on the
assumption that there will be prospective beneficiaries for
several years to come;

6. QUA, Location Number 2150 [Hereafter Power papers], Box 12, folder 12.E787,
Power to Owen, 17 November 1937.
7. Canteen Fund Act, 1925, 3.
8. Canteen Fund Act, 1925, 1.
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B) Any use of the fund for relief purposes should be limited
to the class of case for which no relief is then available from
governmental sources, and in particular to specially
meritorious cases;
C) If the provision of scholarships in schools and
universities is undertaken for specially promising children of
ex-members of the forces or of members of the forces who
have died this should not necessarily be confined to the
higher grades.9
With these guidelines in place, Ottawa disbursed the funds. By March 1926
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia
received their allotments. Ontario had yet to form a committee, however. Its
share of the canteen proceeds were held in trust in the interim.10
The delayed distribution of the canteen money left many returned men
disgruntled. One veteran denounced the fate of the canteen funds and the
resulting “apathy” the delays caused. Men who were facing unemployment
and war-related health issues needed help and, although the total sum in
question was significantly reduced, decisions about its use deserved “the
most careful and serious consideration.”
Many of our comrades through no fault of their own are objects
of charity and during the past winter have been forced to seek
the shelter of police stations. This state of affairs should cease to
exist among men who were willing to pay the supreme sacrifice
in trying to make this a more safe and better world for mankind.
It is to be hoped veterans in the interest of these men will spare
a few moments of their time, and advise the government that no

9. Canteen Fund Act, 1925, 4.
10. “Canteen Fund Distribution,” Montreal Gazette, 19 March 1926, 3.
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action be taken until such time as a consensus of opinion be
obtained from the veterans as a whole as to the best method of
disbursing this fund … whatever is decided on in regard to the
fund should be in the best interests of veterans now in need and
those who will need care and attention as the years go by.11
Despite the lengthy delay in distributing the funds, veterans never
forgot what was owed to them. Interest in the administration of the canteen
funds was a popular topic of discussion, which packed local halls and
theatres. Such was the case in Hamilton in March 1926, when several
hundred veterans turned out to Lyle Theatre to discuss recommendations for
the fund’s distribution. They gathered because Ontario finally named a
committee to distribute its share.12 The meeting, however, proved “stormy.”
Men debated appointments and how the money was going to be distributed.
They were concerned with healthcare, housing, and education, and laid out
four uses for the money: funding for the Brant Hospital to be used as a home
for old soldiers, setting aside hospital beds for ex-service men, assisting
veterans through low-interest loans to build homes, and establishing
scholarships.13
A month earlier, Ontario Premier Howard Ferguson began negotiating
with representatives of the various veterans’ organizations regarding the use
of the funds.14 The premier hoped the money would be used for educating
children and that the appointed trustees would be champions of “integrity,

11. “Veterans ‘Shun’,” Star, 8 April 1925, p.6.
12. “Committee is Named to Distribute Funds,” Globe, 4 January 1926, 3.
13. “Blaze Threatens Hamilton Block,” Globe, 8 March 1926.
14. “Premier and Veterans Discuss Canteen Funds,” Globe, 15 February 1926, 10.
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ability and sympathy for the soldier movement.”15 To help canvas opinion
about distribution policies, the province’s Canteen Fund Association sought
out the views of returned men. It asked whether veterans wanted their share
of the funds immediately or if they should be expended on relief measures,
education, or for establishing a provincial memorial home.16 In an effort to
reach as many men as possible, the association commissioned a poll to
determine how to split the province’s nearly one million dollars. Ballots were
printed in the major newspapers, including the Globe, Evening Telegram, Star,
and the Mail and Empire. Respondents, who had to list their name, address,
unit, and serial number, were presented with these options.17
The five trustees appointed were Maj-Gen. Victor Williams, Percy
Bould (the only enlisted man on the board), Capt. J. Jules Ferry, Capt. W.S.
Haney, and Lt.-Col. B.O. Hooper. In addition, Maj. Alex C. Lewis, clerk of the
Ontario Legislature, was selected as Secretary Treasurer. The board
considered the results of the provincial ballot in conjunction with the
recommendations of the Ralston report and the directions included in the
Canteen Fund Act. Ontario’s trustees also devoted considerable study to the
approaches in other provinces, as well as the United Service Fund of Great
Britain. They agreed on three priorities: to assist in the education of children,
to offer medical assistance for ex-service men not in receipt of pension, and to

15. “Radio Places War’s Victims in Touch with Wide World,” Globe, 23 February 1926,
1.
16. “Seek Suggestions on Canteen Funds,” Globe, 25 February 1926, 12.
17. “To Take Vote of Veterans On Use of Canteen Fund,” Globe, 11 March 1926, 12.
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assist widows and dependents of returned men not in receipt of pension who
were in need of urgent (primarily medical) help.18

Figure 5. Ontario Canteen Fund Ballot
After selecting the trustees and deciding on priorities, the board next
outlined its investment strategy. Ontario’s portion of canteen profits
amounted to $950,000. This amount had been invested in Ontario Treasury
Notes at five per cent interest, netting an annual return of $47,000.19
Additional investments were made to separate trusts and savings accounts,
but these contributions were considerably smaller. The trustees’ plan also
shifted a portion of its investment return to the capital fund. This was
planned “for the next two or three years” so that the capital fund could reach

18. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Ontario Canteen Fund – Minutes from First Five
Meetings, 1927-1929, 21 September 1927.
19. “Ontario to Invest $950,000 Canteen Fund,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 February 1927, 1.
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one million dollars. As a result, the trustees also agreed to use just over
$48,000 in the first year. At this time, the capital fund would receive an
additional $10,000. Another $10,000 was put aside for assisting special cases
involving children’s education. $7,500 was allocated for the relief of urgent
cases and an equal amount was earmarked for the relief of widows and
orphans. The balance of $13,681 was to be used for administration and to
cover “unforeseen emergencies.”20
With the OCFs investment strategy ratified by the province, the federal
Canteen Fund Act now governed the trustees. Its vague stipulations mandated
that Ontario’s policies had to provide for “prospective beneficiaries for
several years to come,” that relief must be limited to those ineligible from
other sources of assistance, and for the provision of scholarships for
promising children.21 Ontario’s trustees interpreted these guidelines
according to the needs of the province. In February 1928, the board laid out a
four-point policy for the administration of the province’s fund. Its first three
regulations aligned closely to the federal legislation. They were designed to
help those not in receipt of federal aid, such as pensions. The rules stipulated
that the OCF could be used for the education of returned soldiers, the relief of
urgent cases resulting from sickness (provided the ex-service man was not a
pensioner) and for the relief of widows and orphans of former members of
the CEF who, again, were ineligible for a pension. The fourth point, however,
proved to be a major point of contention. It stipulated that no relief would be

20. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Minutes from First Five Meetings, 2 March 1928.
21. Canteen Funds Act (1925), “Canteen Committee Ratifies Bond Issue,” Globe, 3
February 1927, 14.
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granted for “conditions resulting from unemployment.”22 As the chairman of
the trustees explained to the board, no relief would be granted for the
unemployed because such a move would “seriously deplete the fund.” In the
view of the OCF trustees, unemployment relief remained a matter of
“municipal responsibility” and the board believed that the OCF should not
be used to supplement existing government commitments to returned men.23
By 1928, the provincial canteen funds were operating across Canada. The
unemployment issue, however, ensured that the process of disbursement
would remain a matter of contention for veterans.
In order to receive assistance from the OCF, men (or their dependents)
had to apply. Each applicant listed their biographical details, employment,
health, and family histories, military service, and any debts owing. The
majority of those eligible had enlisted in their late teens and early twenties
and over sixty-percent of the men who applied were born between 1890 and
1900, with over ninety-percent born after 1880.24 Applicants could apply
directly to the OCF from its office at Queen’s Park or by mail. In either case,
they were encouraged to indicate the reasons for seeking assistance. Many
men were directed to the fund by means of another veterans’ organization or
via the Department of Pensions and National Health (DPNH), the federal
successor to the DSCR.

22. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Ontario Canteen Fund, Annual Report, 1928.
23 “General Williams Announces Policy for Canteen Fund,” Globe, 9 March 1928, 1.
24. See Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Age of Ontario Canteen Fund Users

Veterans applied to the fund as soon as it was operational and the
numbers increased rapidly. By 1929, total applications reached nearly a
thousand. Three years later, the number applying increased to over thirteen
thousand. Applications peaked in 1936, when more than twenty thousand
men sought assistance from the fund. During this same period, monetary
payouts totaled slightly more than half a million dollars. In two of the worst
years of the Depression (1931-32), the payouts reached their zenith. While
detailed records on the number of applicants were not kept for each year the
fund operated, the surviving data suggests that the total number of users
matched the proportion of money expended. Between 1928 and 1932 the
number of applicants climbed in proportion to disbursements. A similar
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trend existed between 1934 and 1937, indicating that OCF payouts continued

Total amount spent in CDN Dollars

to respond to demand.25
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Figure 7. OCF Users and Total funds distributed, 1928-1939

During the first decade of operation, grants to returned men were the
largest draw on the Fund’s coffers. The OCF paid $422,735 to these veterans.
Dependents of returned soldiers received $155,292 and grants for education
totaled $131,363 during the same period.26 Individual payments averaged
between ten and twenty-five dollars. Some were issued as installments for a
larger sum to help cover monthly costs; others were one-time grants. A single
family never received more than $200 – $300 over a lifetime. This limit was

25 See data in Figure 7.
26 AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Ontario Canteen Fund – Miscellaneous, “Canteen Fund
Brief,” n.d.
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arbitrary, however, and there was no standard for how much a family could
receive. In the middle of the Depression, for example, the trustees turned one
widow down after receiving nine grants totaling $171.27 Another was denied
further assistance after eleven grants, totaling $183,28 whereas a third was
turned down having received $226.29 Each of these grants totaled over $150,
but even this was not a reliable benchmark. Other applicants were turned
down after receiving as little as $125.30 In this latter case, the family was
informed by the trustees that they had received “more than the amount
usually granted in one case.”31
The trustees did not track the actual use of the funds. The surviving
case files indicate that the majority of grants were issued to alleviate
healthcare costs. These varied widely, ranging from physical to psychological
aliments. Many of the men who applied to the fund were living with limbs
that had been crushed, often resulting from injuries sustained serving in
military labour units—an important reminder that not all casualties were the
result of combat. Psychological cases were also present and generally referred

27 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1578 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 21 December 1931.
28 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1529 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
29 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1519 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
30 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No 1678, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 9 May 1939.
31 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No 1678, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 10 July 1939.
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to as cases of bad nerves or mental instability.32 Unlike the federal pension
board, the fund recognized that these were legitimate health issues which
were often related to the war.33
Men sought assistance for a variety of reasons, but most did so to cover
expenses for health care costs or household debts. Families turned to the fund
for assistance because it was considered the property of all veterans. As one
dependent explained, the canteen money belonged to “our soldiers.”34
Herbert O. told the trustees that he preferred to draw on canteen money
because it was the “property of returned men.” He wanted his “share”
because he was more comfortable asking for something that belonged to him
rather than to “ask for Charity.”35 The veterans were, not surprisingly,
protective of the fund. But when they did find it necessary to apply, they
expected it to be there for them. “I have had so much sickness,” William R.
wrote in his application that he was “almost to the end of my rope.”36

32. See for example AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1785 [Name withheld under the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 7 October 1936; and AO, RG29-65,
B161739, “File No. 3175, [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection
of Privacy Act], 6 November 1933.
33 Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow.”
34. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No 3506, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 10 July 1939.
35. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2139 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 February 1930.
36 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1473, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 24 August 1929.
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This sense of desperation was common. Many, including Stanley Y.,
considered themselves “right up against it.”37 Samuel G., who applied for aid
in 1930, was so stressed that he was seriously considering robbing a bank. “I
am out of work and in a state of extremity,” he declared. He wanted at least
one hundred dollars to help him overcome his debts, but the OCF trustees
discovered that Samuel lied on his application for aid. He was in receipt of a
small pension and he realized that if the board found out, he would be turned
down. Only “honest” men, he declared, were doomed to be “left behind.” To
Samuel, the OCF was his last hope. If it could not help him, then he would be
forced to have to take matters into his own hands:
I am resolved [I’ll] not walk about in dejection like the countless
thousand British Empire Subjects are doing because they are to
cowardly to strike in Armies and strike quick. [I’ll] solve my
own Problem. But I prefer the honest way if it can be got.38
What was particularly frustrating for veterans was that they were being
denied assistance from a fund that profited from their wartime service. These
men had been wounded overseas and granted a pension in recognition of
their losses. Now that same pension, which was insufficient to support their

37. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1794, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 4 March 1937; Arthur S. used the same
expression as Stanley Y., telling the OCF “I am right up against it.” See AO, RG29-65, B108762,
“File No. 1934, [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act],” 12 January 1930; so too did George S. See AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2134,
[Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 9
October 1934.
38 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2944 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 4 September 1930.
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livelihoods, was being used as justification to deny them further assistance
from a program they considered themselves entitled.
Ontario’s trustees were sympathetic to the plight of returned men.
Their concern ensured the fund stayed solvent for decades to come. It was
their responsibility to ensure that eligible returned men had access to
assistance throughout their lives. They feared that if they opened the OCF
coffers to every returned man, they risked depleting the fund for the future.
The trustees realized that the war generation would likely “break down
physically at an age when they should still be in good physical condition.” To
ensure these men had assistance when they most needed it, the OCF board
structured disbursement policies so that it could continue to provide for men
as their health declined, provided, of course, that their illness could
“truthfully be attributed to some extent to their overseas service.”39
Federal legislation mandated provincial use of the funds. The scope of
the Act, however, provided provincial board members with considerable
flexibility. The federal act only defined the requisite period of the fund’s
solvency as one decade, rather than the projected lifespan of returned men.
By overestimating how long the OCF would need to care for returned men,
the trustees’ attempts to provide assistance for returned soldiers ended up
denying them the very assistance they needed to combat the effects of the
Great Depression.

39. “General Williams Announces Policy for Canteen Fund,” Globe, 9 March 1928, 1.
The Soldiers’ Aid Commission also recognized the importance of accounting for “the need
for aid of the disabled soldier ageing prematurely,” and the continuity between the two
bodies’ positions is likely reflected by the fact that they shared several of the same members.
See “Discuss Imperial Pensions,” Star, 12 May 1927.
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For a board so concerned about the long-term solvency of their fund,
the OCF could not have started operating at a worse time. For many men,
employment remained seasonal. The fall and winter of 1929 and early 1930,
for example, placed particular strain on returned men as they struggled to
find work in an increasingly depressed economy. These years unfortunately
coincided with the operation of the OCF, placing it under considerable (and
unexpected) strain. In the face of the Depression, the demand on the canteen
fund exceeded anything its trustees anticipated.40 None of the planners
intended the fund to act as a form of relief and the desire to provide longterm help to returned men compelled the trustees to turn away many who
applied. The situation was made worse by the policies denying aid to
pensionable and unemployed men, which caused the OCF board to turn
down thousands of applications a year.41
The veterans were furious at being denied assistance. They considered
themselves deserving of aid, both because of their service and because they

40. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Soldiers’ Aid Commission Administrative Records,
Ontario Canteen Fund, Financial Statements (1929-1938), 1930 Annual Report. Similar
statements were made throughout the decade, evidenced by the following from the 1932
Annual Report, which stated “The demands on the Fund during the year continued to reflect
the condition of want throughout the country consequent upon the prevailing lack of
employment” and that from 1936: “The demands on the resources of the Fund continue to
show a large increase from year to year.”
41. A full accounting of the number of rejected applications is not possible because
only successful applications were kept by the OCF. Many of these files date from the 1960s,
but they also include rejections dating from the interwar era, indicating that these same men
who successfully received assistance after the Second World War had also been turned down
on multiple occasions before 1939. This suggests that the OCF initially kept records for cases
they did not fund. These unsuccessful records have not survived as part of the SAC material
at the AO. Establishing how many applications were turned down is also complicated by the
incomplete recording by the OCF trustees and the lack of documentation about how many
applications were received/funded in a given year.
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had paid into the fund while overseas. Ontario’s government faced the brunt
of the criticisms. James Robinson, a self-described “unemployable pensioner”
blamed the Ferguson government for the handling of the fund. “What
authority,” he wondered, did the provincial government have “to hold the
canteen money of the returned veterans?” Robinson was adamant that the
funds belonged to “the veterans, not the country.” As far as he was
concerned, the trustees’ decision to focus only on employed, non-pensioned
men meant that while those “sick and absolutely unable to work” were
getting assistance, it resigned poor pensioned families to dire circumstances.
There were, he explained, veterans with large families who were “on the
verge of starvation, just eking out an existence from charity.” As far as
Robinson was concerned, these families were entitled to aid as well, but they
were unable to receive it because of a shortsighted government.42
Robinson saved his harshest criticism for the province’s treatment of
single men. A line of single, unemployed men waiting for charity was
embarrassing; the fact that they were also veterans who had sacrificed for
their country was disgraceful. “Go down to the abandoned church on
Parliament St. any night,” he told the Star. There the paper would find more
than a hundred homeless men, most of them single ex-soldiers: “They’ll tell
you a thing or two about how fair the Ferguson government is in distributing
the canteen fund.” The federal government of Mackenzie King gave the
canteen money to Ferguson “for distribution.” The premier was failing in his
responsibility. James Holmes, another veteran, was equally fed up with the

42. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” Star, 19 September 1930,
2.
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province’s handing of the canteen profits. Ferguson was not doing anything
to help his former comrades. “I have seven children and four of them are sick
with infantile paralysis,” he noted. Yet the government was not doing “a
thing for me.”43 “I’m one of the men to whom the government refused to give
a share of the canteen funds,” John Moss told the Star. When he applied for
aid, Moss was informed that he was ineligible because the fund was “only
sharing the money with sick men - and I was only unemployed.” The fact that
his wife had been ill for six years made no difference. “It didn’t do any good,”
Moss explained. “I’ve been taking treatments at Christie St. hospital since
February. It isn’t fair.”44
Single men felt particularly isolated and ignored. They were often the
first to go to war, but when they returned, they faced a barrage of “married
men first” initiatives. As one destitute man wrote, “the single man has no
claim for relief. … Have not [they] a right to live?” He did not begrudge
married men, but he felt the focus on families left him, and other men “who
fought for [their] country,” without a “square deal.”45
For its part, the OCF made no effort to define its mandate or explain
who could and could not apply for assistance. According to its early financial
statements, the OCF’s purpose was broadly defined as providing assistance
to returned soldiers and their dependents when there was “no other fund

43. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” 2.
44. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” 2.
45. “Unmarried Veterans,” Star, 15 October 1930, 6.
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available to furnish such relief.”46 Generally, this restriction meant canteen
money could not be used for the “assistance of persons who are in receipt of
pensions, pay and allowance or War Veterans’ Allowance.”47 Yet, this
interpretation of its mandate was both inconsistent and contradictory.
William D., for instance, was told that the fund was not available for
distribution “in a general way.” Instead, it was for “granting assistance to exservice men or their dependents in cases of urgent need resulting from
illness.”48 It makes sense that Gilbert M’s widow received $25 from the fund
for her doctor’s medical bills.49 At the same time, however, George D. was
informed that the fund could not be used to pay “either hospital or doctor’s
accounts.”50
Pensioners in need of additional assistance were the first to complain
about these inconsistencies. In 1929, the Globe reported on their anger and
how the OCF was operating. Pensioned men could not understand why
Ontario had decided to exclude them. As they pointed out, the boards in both
Alberta and British Columbia allowed pensioners relief. Why not Ontario?
G.J. McDonagh, Dominion President of the Canadian Pensioners’ Association,

46. AO, RG29-165, B408253, OCF Financial Statement 1929.
47. Wording belongs to an OCF form letter commonly distributed among all case
files. See for example AO, RG29-65, B108762, File No. 1472 [Name withheld under the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
48. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 3361, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 November 1930.
49 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1578, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
50. AO, B161739, “File No. 2909, [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 October 1931.
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claimed that he could not see “why pensioners should be barred from
receiving relief or economic assistance from this fund.”51 The fund, after all,
was not “charity.”52
By the end of 1929, the criticisms from pensioned men were increasing.
They were angry that they could not access the very funds they had paid into
overseas. Many of the most vocal were returned soldiers in receipt of small
pensions that hardly covered the costs of their hardships. These men found
themselves in a difficult position. Their disabilities often prevented them
from working full time but their pensions were insufficient to cover the
difference in lost wages. Howard H., for instance, was a returned man who
applied for OCF assistance in August 1930. He had enlisted in 1916 at the age
of 19.53 He was in receipt of a small disability pension but he had been out of
work since the previous January. Howard explained to the trustees that he
was struggling to support his wife and five children, and they had been
living on “two meals a day.” Their clothes were “pretty shabby” and he
hoped the fund might help with his family’s “distress.”54
Howard blamed the war for his present troubles. When he enlisted, he
was a big man, standing nearly five-foot-ten and weighing roughly two

51. “Disabled Veterans Receiving Pensions are Seeking Relief,” Globe, 18 November
1929, 15.
52. “Disabled Veterans Receiving Pensions are Seeking Relief,” 15.
53. Howard H.’s Attestations Papers.
54. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2873, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
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hundred pounds.55 More than a decade after war’s end however, he weighed
little more than one hundred and thirty pounds and he considered himself to
be a “mere shadow” of his former self. The most difficult part was the strain
on his family:
I am turned down with every employer as I shake so much with
my nerves and it is heart breaking to my wife to see me turned
back with my dinner bucket in hand not able to land a Job
Making over old clothes for the children for the past two years
and no sign of a silver cloud for a good while yet.
Howard H. assured the OCF that he was a responsible breadwinner and that
it was his circumstances that had forced him to seek assistance. “[W]e are
living economical as anybody possibly can,” he explained, but his tax burden
and medical bills simply exceeded the meager wages he was able to bring
home. Howard feared that if he did not get help soon, he and his family
would be forced from their home. He assumed that he was a good candidate
for canteen assistance because large portions of his debts were related to his
war service.56 His application, however, was denied because of his pension.
Another veteran unhappy at being turned down because of a small
pension was Ernest R. He was a patient at the Christie Street veterans
hospital and had already been admitted twice that year “for major
operations.” As a result, Ernest was not able to work. His son drowned in the
summer of 1929 and his work dried up. Without employment, and because of
his time in hospital, he was forced to move. He needed a month’s rent. Ernest

55. Howard H.’s Attestations Papers.
56. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2873, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
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knew his pension made him ineligible for OCF assistance but he wrote to the
trustees in hopes that the board would be willing to make an exception,
especially for veteran with a “small pension & so much sickness.” To help his
case, the veteran even offered to repay the OCF “as soon as I am able” and he
pointed out that—despite his eligibility for a pension—he was not presently
receiving one. The trustees took his appeal under advisement, but informed
him that “much as we may sympathize with your need for assistance, the Act
under which the Fund is administered does not permit us to assist men who
are in receipt of a pension.”57
By the 1930s, the OCF received thousands of applications from
unemployed men who were denied pensions.58 The letters demonstrated
their growing sense of futility which translated into a fundamental
questioning of the value of the war. The strain of the trenches continued to
affect veterans long after the war ended. “Any man who lived in the filth and
horrors of active service,” McDonagh explained in an interview with the
Globe, “did not return to Canada in the same condition in which he left it.”
Those who had not gone overseas, it was pointed out, and who were of the
same age and social standing, were not “suffering from this breaking up.”
The war was the reason for their problems. As a result, it was vitally

57. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1874, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” Multiple pieces of correspondence.
58. “Relief Immediately from Canteen Fund Urged by Veterans,” Globe, 21 November
1929.
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important that these returned men be given access to the fund. Doing so was
nothing less than a “duty resting on the shoulders of the Canadian people.”59
McDonagh knew that calling for increased assistance challenged
prevailing ideas about a man’s responsibility to support himself and his
family. If every returned man in need of employment could get assistance
through the OCF, where was his incentive to work? As a result, he carefully
hedged this call for canteen assistance for pensioned men. McDonagh made it
clear that he supported the male breadwinner model and that his criticisms
did not mean that every man was ‘owed’ assistance. Rather, he believed that
assistance should be given only “where it can be shown, without too much
humiliation and red tape, that the man has done his part to re-establish
himself, and is not, in the vernacular, ‘swinging the lead’.”60
To prevent abuse of the system, McDonagh called for yet another
conference to sort out the issue. He believed that governments had a
“responsibility” to repay the debts owed returned men. McDonagh
considered veterans’ problems far larger than any one government’s
jurisdiction. Their problems were Canada’s problems and thus a social
responsibility that all Canadians—their governments included—needed to
recognize before anything could improve. The goal was to determine how to
share the burden. “There was a tendency on behalf of provincial and
municipal governments to shift responsibility for the matter to the feet of the
federal government. “Surely,” McDonagh figured, “this is the wrong point of

59. “Relief Immediately from Canteen Fund Urged by Veterans.”
60. “Relief Immediately from Canteen Fund Urged by Veterans.”
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view,” especially because it ran counter to the position taken by Canadians
“during the days of enlistment.”61
In September 1928, and again in May 1929, the OCF trustees met to
discuss their controversial decision to refuse assistance to unemployed men
or veterans in receipt of pensions. Section 10.b of the federal legislation
mandated that “any use of the fund for relief purposes should be limited to
the class of case for which no relief is then available from governmental
sources, and in particular to specially meritorious cases.”62 Men with minor
pensions argued their meager payments were insufficient and, as a result,
they believed themselves ‘meritorious cases’. The Ontario board considered
revising its position but in the end decided to remain firm. “Pensioners,”
were already “eligible for assistance from the relief fund administered by all
local representatives of the Department of Pensions and National Health”
and they were not eligible for two types of aid.63 Moreover, the board argued,
the OCF’s policy was no different from other sources of assistance, which had
similar restrictions. The trustees avoided responsibility for its decision by
pointing to the federal Act, claiming it did not give them “authority” to
amend the policy because of its provisions under Section 10.b.64 They
maintained that returned men who were out of work should seek assistance
from their municipalities. The problem for the OCF was the positions taken in

61. “Relief Immediately from Canteen Fund Urged by Veterans.”
62 Canteen Fund Act (1925), 4.
63. AO, RG29-165, B408253, Minutes from First Five Meetings, 28 September 1928.
64. AO, RG29-165, B408253, Minutes from First Five Meetings, 29 May 1929.
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other provinces. The boards in Alberta and British Columbia did not interpret
the vague federal legislation as stringently as Ontario’s and, as OCF
applicants were aware, in these western provinces men with meager pensions
were not denied aid.
By November 1929, two years after the fund started, many returned
soldiers remained unaware that the program was even operational.65 The
decision to invest money in place of a direct payout also came under
criticism. In September 1930, unemployed returned soldiers demonstrated
their anger at the province for opting to have the money administered by a
group of trustees. Men who gathered outside the Church and Adelaide
employment bureau in Toronto told reporters from the Star that they had a
“definite dislike” of Premier Ferguson, whom they blamed for “unjustly”
holding and denying access to the canteen funds which were the “property”
of returned soldiers.66 Similar complaints were made at the fourth annual
convention of the Ontario Command of the Canadian Legion. The canteen
funds were debated for over two hours. A.C. Soloman from Windsor took
issue with the decision to invest the money, claiming that it contradicted the
“spirit” of the fund:
There is no sense that I can see in leaving the funds in the bank
to multiply for posterity. We feel as veterans, that we have done
enough for posterity on ensuring them some measure of

65. “The Canteen Fund,” Star, 2 November 1929, 6.
66. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” Star, 19 September 1930,
1.
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freedom. If ever there was a time when the burned-out veterans
need help it is now.67
Criticisms of the management of canteen money were not limited to
Ontario. Saskatchewan’s Canteen Fund, for example, faced a financial scandal
in 1940. Over $40,000 of the fund’s money was illegally disbursed, leading to
the creation of a Judicial Commission of Inquiry and a Regina city inquest.
The former investigated allegations of blackmail, among other charges. The
latter uncovered that one of the province’s trustees, Capt. A.H. White,
committed suicide after suspicion of stealing from the canteen fund.68
Elsewhere on the Prairies criticism of the financial management of the
province’s canteen fund emerged almost a decade earlier than in
Saskatchewan. In 1932, the Alberta Canteen Fund (ACF) was singled out for
criticism for its decision to invest the funds. During an annual Legion
convention, a Calgary alderman offered up what the Lethbridge Herald
dubbed a “verbal broadside” when he demanded that the fund’s trustees
provide statements of its finances. Veterans were not convinced that the ACF
was using the canteen money in the best interests of Alberta’s men. When
asked to provide the information requested, the trustees directed Russell to
the Alberta government. This rebuff did not sit well and the alderman
rebuked the ACF board for exceeding their mandate and for misinterpreting
the federal Canteen Fund Act:

67. “Col. J.K. Mackay Ontario Legion Head,” Globe, 23 August 1930, 22.
68 See “Hint of Blackmail at Canteen Probe,” Montreal Gazette, 31 January 1940, 2,
“Story of ‘Loot’ of War Not Black, Sinister One,” The Evening Citizen, 1 December 1950, 18,
and “Trustee of Fund Died by Cyanide, Inquest Decides,” Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 5 January
1940, 3, 5.
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the board admits having invested in different enterprises. The
Canteen Fund Act gives no authority for investing this money.
We would like to have a board of trustees who spend the
money in alleviating the suffering of ex-servicemen. We don’t
want our money tied up in investments.69
Such critiques illustrate how debates over the canteen funds shifted
between war’s end and the onset of the Depression. In 1919, veterans were
furious that the canteen profits were not distributed among all returned men,
as a pseudo-replacement for the failed bonus campaign. By the 1930s, former
soldiers remained unhappy with how the money was being used but they
were no longer pushing for direct distribution. Instead, their criticisms were
directed at how the money was being managed and the failure of provincial
trustees to adequately provide for veterans struggling in the depths of the
Great Depression.
For their part, the blanket criticisms of returned men often rested on
frustration rather than legitimate grievances, reflecting how invested veterans
were in the promise of the canteen money. Critics often misinterpreted the
purpose of the fund and there was consistent confusion over the role of the
federal and provincial governments. They also failed to understand that the
federal government had transferred its control of the funds to the provinces
in 1926. Community leaders, for instance, continued to suggest ways for
Ottawa to use the money long after it had any involvement. In 1932, for
example, Joseph Fulton was president of the Earl Haig Memorial branch of
the Canadian Legion. Like many, he considered the funds a fair way to assist
men who could not find work. Fulton wanted Ottawa to use the canteen

69 “Canteen Fund Under Fire at Legion Meet,” Lethbridge Herald, 21 July 1932, 14.
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money as preliminary payments for unemployment insurance. To him, the
“Dominion government” should use these resources “on behalf of
unemployed veterans.”70 Such suggestions were typical of the confusion
surrounding governmental control of the canteen money, which mistook
which government administered the money and the limitations that groups
like the OCF trustees had placed on the fund’s use. The same confusion,
however was evident within the shifting debate over the state’s responsibility
for the unemployed.
Press coverage of the canteen fund issue subsided once the provinces
began distributing the money. For its part, the OCF did a poor job at
explaining its mandate and how to gain access to its assistance.71 This lack of
press coverage did not go unnoticed. In 1931, a veteran of the First Division,
CEF wrote the Star wondering when returned men were going to receive an
updated account of the canteen funds. He wanted a statement indicating how
much money the province received, the overhead expenses of the board of
trustees and their salaries, the state of the fund’s principal deposit, accounts
of any interest earned, and whether either political party had received any
help from the fund.72 He never received an answer because the OCF annual

70 “Workless Insurance Urged by Veterans,” Star, 6 July 1932, 3.
71 The OCF was not alone in this problem. It was also an issue for the SAC, which
shared several personnel with the administrators of the province’s canteen fund board.
Towards the end of the war the aid commission recognized that it was not adequately
publicizing its services to the public. Its solution was to take up advertising in the papers in
hopes that the commission’s work would be “appreciated by the returned soldier and brough
to the notice of the public.” See AO, RG 29-165, Soldier’s Aid Commission, Minutes of the
Soldiers Aid Commission, 14 February 1917 and again a similar note from 17 January 1918.
72 “Canteen Fund,” Star, 22 July 1932, 4.
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reports were not distributed and they received little to no attention in the
media.
To some extent, the OCF board was aware of the communication
problem. They did not have an easy solution, however. One trustee
wondered if their troubles might be alleviated if they could secure more
media coverage. The trustees also recognized that veterans’ organizations
needed to be more aware of the OCF’s mandate and to stop directing
ineligible men to the fund.73
The lack of information about the OCF’s official operations, combined
with unceasing demand for the canteen money, resulted in a rumour mill that
only caused further confusion. Three years into the Depression, the fund was
seriously strained. The trustees reluctantly dipped into the capital fund to
shore it up, but it was not enough. By 1932 the board recognized that it was
“expected” that some of the fund’s capital would be required “each year” if
the OCF wanted to meet the “necessary legitimate expenditures in the way of
relief and educational assistance.”74 Veterans misunderstood the reduction in
the OCF account. They assumed these changes were the result of inefficient
administration at best, and corruption at worst, and many believed that the
fund had depreciated because of the board’s decision to purchase securities.

73 Correspondence between OCF trustees located in AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No.
1794 [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 30
December 1929. It states in part, that “it is most surprising the number of returned men who
are under the impression that the Ontario Canteen Fund amounts to the tens of millions of
dollars, and for that reason should help all and sundry.”
74 AO, RG 29-165, Soldiers’ Aid Commission administrative records, Ontario
Canteen Fund, Financial Statements. 1932 Annual Report.
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The Secretary of the fund, Alex Lewis, vehemently denied these
charges. “The assertion is quite unfounded,” he told the Star, before pointing
out that the OCF had been invested in government bonds from its inception.
“Our reports are available to show how the original sum was invested and its
disposition since that time.” Where these reports were kept, or how returned
men could gain access to them, was never made clear. The lack of
transparency and accountability prevented the OCF from distancing itself
from its critics.75
The press only appeared interested in the canteen fund question when
it related to federal scandals. The Star, for example, tended to combine the
coverage of the canteen fund issue with pensions and responsibility for
unemployment generally. The newspaper wanted to highlight the plight of
returned men during the Depression and it ran corresponding stories
profiling their struggles. During winter months, the federal ministry of
pensions and national health provided supplementary relief for pensioners to
ensure that the destitute had access to medical care. These men were
identified as ‘Class Two’, and were typically disabled and unemployed. A
1932 report from the Star highlighted the case of an ex-service man,
Christopher D. Mann, whose difficulties typified the struggles veterans faced.
Mann was thirty-six years old and had served with the 159th Battalion. When
he was evicted from his home after failure to pay rent, he and his family
sought assistance from the leading veterans assistance sources, including the
Poppy Fund, which raised money to assist veterans through sales of poppies,
and the OCF. In each instance he was denied because of his pension. Mann
75 “Canteen Fund Rumor is Strongly Denied,” Star, 8 September 1932, 4.
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recounted his story for the paper, describing how he was physically fit before
the war but that upon returning, his legs gave out. He was forced to move to
Toronto for treatment. “I had to take any kind of a job,” he explained. Soon
the family was out of money and he was forced to seek out a meager pension.
Doctors were of little help. Some diagnosed him with neuritis, others with
sciatica. The crux of the matter, however, was that they refused to attribute
his troubles to his war service. “The doctors figure my condition is not
directly attributable to war service,” Mann lamented. What most upset him,
however, was that his physical state was jeopardizing his position as father
and breadwinner for his family. “It is not myself,” that he worried about, “but
the kiddies … when I’m lying in the hospital I’m all right, but I lie in bed
worrying, not knowing whether the wife or kiddies have enough to eat or
not.”76
Mann’s troubles highlight the issue of a veteran’s inability to receive
credit for war related injuries. One former soldier, writing in the Globe under
the pseudonym “Fourth Battalion,” criticized the assistance situation. It was
wrong that pension boards privileged men’s service records, which unfairly
assisted men who served in ‘safe’ jobs in Canada or overseas. Those who
served at the ‘sharp end’, faced significantly more risk. Moreover, while men
behind the lines could easily report medical issues, those at the front did not
have the same luxury. When they were ill, they received basic treatment and
then ordered to return to the line, often without a record being kept: “No
record would be on [the] medical sheet, which was kept at base.” The same
went for the men at discharge. Having spent years in the front lines, they
76 “Relief Only Temporary Ottawa Officials Say,” Star, 13 June 1929, 3.

298
were only too eager to get home. To avoid being held up for medical reasons
many indicated that they were “Fine” upon discharge. So many were in a
hurry to be discharged that doctors would often examine as many as 160 men
an hour. It was only when they arrived home that the toll of their service was
evident. “We discover we have heart trouble, chest trouble, and
nervousness,” Mann recounted. As A1 men they were note eligible for
treatment. Their only recourse was the pension board. Without a record of
their injuries, however, they were turned down.
The solution was to consider men’s service as holistically as possible. If
returned men could not get access to assistance due to a lack of records, then
why not expand the documents under consideration? Battalion records,
including war diaries, were kept extensively during the war. If a man’s record
was lacking, could his claims not be compared to what his battalion “went
through during the time [the man was] in it?” What they did in the battalion
and how long they were there one veteran explained, mattered as much to
overall victory as a missing form. A man’s service was what mattered and
“any man who served in a line battalion for a year [was], at the very least,
entitled to treatment.” This veteran recognized that the repeated
disappointments men endured meant that “most returned men [had] given
up any hope of ever receiving justice under the present system and [had
sunk] into a slough of despondency.”77
Other returned men laid out even longer lists of grievances. One
veteran complained of the raw deal men were receiving and wrote off the

77 “Agrees with Sir Arthur Currie,” Globe, 6 December 1929, p. 4.

299
whole veterans’ assistance system as a “washout.” The fact that men were
being turned down due to prior illness was particularly galling. Why, he
asked, were these men accepted at recruitment stations if their disabilities
were so debilitating? How was it that a man who spent the war on the
exhibition ground because of poor health received a full pension, while
holding down a government job, when a wartime amputation case had his
pension cut twenty percent when the board discovered he held a job with the
City of Toronto? The veterans’ organizations were of little help. “They pass
these resolutions every year,” he complained, but “what have they yet
attained?” The Canteen Funds did not escape his ire. How was it, he
wondered, that Premier Ferguson gained “control” of the fund? How could
returned men have a say about the money when it was controlled by so few?
“If every employer of labor in Toronto had the veterans’ interests at heart and
employed them … there would not be so many handicapped men seeking
employment.”78
The postwar situation of ad hoc financial aid, when combined with the
physical and emotional trauma, and the economic distress of the 1920s and
1930s, left returned men “right up against it.”79 Without a reliable income,
and often facing obstacles and barriers from pension boards, veterans
increasingly turned to the OCF. The organization found itself swamped with
applications for assistance and the resulting strain on its finances caused the
fund to tighten its purse strings. This tightening only increased the desperate

78 “Fragments from France,” Globe, 6 December 1929, p. 4.
79 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2134 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 9 October 1934.
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plight of veterans, which in turn increased their frustration and
disillusionment.
A major point of frustration among Ontario’s veterans was that
approval for canteen assistance bore no relation to their need. Men or their
families had to provide doctors’ notes, bills, or other documentation
supporting their claim for aid. Yet, this material was no guarantee that a
man’s application would be approved. In John B.’s case, his doctor backed up
his claim and he wrote to the OCF in support of his patient. “[B.] was
wounded at Battle of Amiens in back on Aug 8th.” The doctor “treated him
from time to time for muscular pain … which has at times rendered him
unable to work – I have no doubt that there is muscle or sheath ligamentions
injury here which renders him partially disabled after doing heavy work and
at seasonal influence.”80 Thanks to his doctor’s intervention, John’s
application was successful, but later calls for aid were turned down.81
Archibald M. wrote to the OCF in support of another returned man,
John W., who had served with the Horse Auxiliary. John was born in 1890
and enlisted at Kingston, Ontario early in the war. In 1915 he was decorated
for service.82 While overseas he was “slightly gassed” and, ten years after the
war ended, he faced a few “minor debts.” John was under medical care. He

80 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1768 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” John B.’s doctor to OCF trustees, 26 December
1929.
81 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1768 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” John B. to OCF trustees, 11 January 1930.
82 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1678, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
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included a note from his doctor in his application for assistance who
explained that John had “done his bit” and was more than “worthy of being
helped [if] at all possible.” Unlike John B., however, one of the OCF’s trustees
agreed. This trustee made inquiries into the veteran’s worthiness, concluding
that he was “satisfied” John’s case was genuine and that there existed “an
urgent need for assistance.” 83
Such investigations into men’s applications occupied a significant
amount of the OCF’s attention. The trustees feared that men would try to
manipulate the system and they expended considerable effort working to
ensure that only those who met their strict guidelines would be successful in
their applications. Yet, despite their concerns, carrying out investigations for
the hundreds of applications received each month was far beyond the board’s
ability. To help lessen the load, the board turned to the Soldiers’ Aid
Commission of Ontario and the service bureaus operated by the Ontario
Command of the Canadian Legion. In the latter’s case, the OCF financed the
bureau’s work at a cost of approximately ten thousand dollars per year.84
Between November 1930 and April 1931, the SAC carried out at least 134
investigations on behalf of the OCF.85 These investigations resulted in
hundreds of men being found ineligible for assistance each year.

83 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1678, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
84 AO, RG29-165, SAC Minute Book, 19 November 1930.
85. AO, RG29-165, SAC Minute Book, 19 November 1930.
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In such cases, the commission and the OCF tried to make
arrangements for men to obtain assistance from other assistance programs.
The most common referral the trustees made was for those ineligible for
canteen funds to seek out a war veteran’s allowance.86 Veterans who had
commuted pensions were unaware that they could apply for the allowance
passed after 1930. “I am in receipt of your application for assistance for the
Ontario Canteen Fund,” wrote a board member to a man applying for
assistance. As a “former pensioner you are eligible for assistance from the
Department of Pensions and National Health and should make your
application to Mr. Anderson at Christie Hospital.”87 Similar referrals were
also suggested by other veterans’ agencies for men to seek aid from the OCF.
Such was the case for Percival J., a returned man who, in 1929, found himself
at the end of his financial rope. Percival had worked for several months and
was now struggling to support his wife and two children. He was
corresponding with a DSCR employee in Hamilton who informed him that he
was unable to help because Percival was not in receipt of a pension. The
employee did, however, enclose the contact information of the OCF in hopes
that the fund might be able to assist him.88

86. AO, RG29-165, SAC Minute Book, 19 November 1930. See too RG29-65, B168859,
“File No. 4868, [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act], 15 August 1931; and B161739, “File No. 3077, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act], 17 January 1931.
87 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1951 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 January 1930.
88. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2168, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 15 February 1930.

303
Returned soldiers and their dependents were appreciative of these
efforts to secure assistance. In many cases, however, the OCF’s policies
denying aid to the pensioned and unemployed left men and their families
even more frustrated because they had not been made aware of these policies
ahead of time. Even worse, it often seemed to Ontario’s veterans that the
various agencies were not fully informed about each other’s regulations. In
some cases, employees at different organizations were clearly confused by the
details of men’s eligibility for assistance. Officials from the federal DPNH, for
example, often misdirected unemployed men with medical expenses to the
canteen fund, despite the fund’s regulations stipulating against such claims.
The federal department’s employees were under the impression that only
non-pensioned men were ineligible for medical aid from the fund.
Accordingly, pension officials advised returned men to apply to the canteen
fund because it was used “for the relief of those not drawing pension.” As the
fund’s trustees concluded, this was “to a certain extent true,” but also
“misleading” because it did not accurately reflect their regulations. 89 Such
errors proved an annoyance to veterans. Indeed, as one OCF board member
wrote, the problem was so serious that angry men risked disrupting the
fund’s operation and they became “obstinate and unreasonable to deal
with.”90

89. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1794 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 12 December 1929.
90. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1785 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 7 October 1936.
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Most applicants to the OCF assumed they were entitled to its
assistance and being turned down was not an easy pill to swallow. Men such
as Samuel G., who considered his refusal “twisty,” interpreted their denial as
proof that the fund’s trustees were duplicitous.91 Others were simply “hurt”
by their denials. What they could not understand was why the fund was
turning them down in their hour of need. As Herbert O. asked the trustees,
surely “no man would ask for anything like this when he is working and able
to keep things going on his wages.”92 Veterans were apt to assume the
trustees were turning them down for other reasons. William V. believed that
the trustees were out of touch with the plight of returned men. “You who has
never known what it is to be hungry and not have anything to eat,” he
angrily wrote the Board, before closing with a final plea to the trustees.
William begged them the reconsider their decision. “I would not ask if I was
not in dire need,” he explained. “I have struggled along all these years. but
[sic] now I am down and out. so [sic] please [help me] for God’s sake if not
for mine.”93
Pleading for help was not easy. The war generation was raised in an
era when men were supposed to be self-sufficient. Asking for help from the
canteen fund was a matter of desperation. W.S. wrote the trustees that his
inability to support his wife and two children cost him “the affection &

91 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2944 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 4 September 1930.
92 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2139 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 February 1930
93 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 3506, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
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respect of my family.”94 Yet, need for aid overcame even the proudest of men.
They were willing to beg, if need be. As Jason W. wrote the Board, he knew
the canteen fund was supposed to provide “[a]id where there is sickness in a
Ex Soldiers[’] Family.” He was a veteran and he needed help. If he had had a
job, he would not have been asking for assistance: “If I was in Employment it
stands to reason I would not ask for Aid.”95 This veteran did not want food.
He was already receiving assistance through his municipality. What he
needed was assistance for medical bills. “Who, I ask you, can I appeal to
when there is sickness and the need is very urgent,” he asked the trustees,
especially when the fund “is for such a purpose for us Ex service men.”
Although unemployed and sickly myself I have never asked for
anything for myself like a good soldier I tried to carry on under
my own steam. But sometimes one must ask for help and when
it is for sickness well, who can I apply to, But the Canteen
Fund[,] which I understand does help in Cases of Sickness etc.
does one have to be at deaths door before help is given we need
lots of things in the Medicine Line etc need them badly.96
The challenges this veteran faced were a sad indictment of life in postwar
Canada and the failure of the canteen fund to meet veterans’ expectations for
aid.

94 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2863, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
95 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File 3545, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
96 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File 3545, [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”
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The repercussions of these failures undermined more than veterans’
sense of entitlement. They also forced returned men to question the meaning
of their service, a reality summed up in the cases of Robert L. and John B.
Robert was a farmer near Cornwall, Ontario. In 1916, he attested with the
CEF at age eighteen. He survived the war, married and had four children. In
1938, Robert wrote to the fund asking for assistance. He was on relief and
believed his war service entitled him to additional help.97 Like many of
Ontario’s veterans, he was denied assistance because he was unemployed.
When Robert received the news, he was furious and penned a blistering letter
to the trustees. It lambasted the canteen fund for its inequity and bitterly
questioned the purpose of his war service:
I thank you very much for what I have resived [sic] from yous
[sic] since I came back from Over-Seas, As for unemployment
I’m just working to keep myself from crawling on my knees to
you people I think I earn’t anything that I ever got. But I do
notice that just certain class of people can get the Canteen Fund
that is the ones that went as far as England. I been taking
Doctor’s medicine for a year and half. The time you get the
Canteen fund is when your deid [sic] thats’ when we need it
most.98
Robert believed strongly that, despite his unemployment, he had worked for
a living and, as a result, he did not consider his time on relief representative
of his work ethic. He informed the fund’s trustees that he was not a slacker,
having “earn’t [sic]” everything he had achieved. Furthermore, Robert was

97. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1876 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 15 December 1938.
98. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1876 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 December 1938.
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not asking for charity. What he wanted was due recognition for his time
overseas. This, he explained, was why he had been ill for a year and a half.99
When men like Robert L. were turned down for canteen assistance
because they were unemployed, it undermined their belief in the war’s wider
meaning. These men believed they were entitled to OCF assistance and took
pride in the fact that they could turn to it in place of government charity.
Denying them access further entrenched their bitterness and left men
disillusioned with the postwar peace. John B., for example, was a general
labourer, born in 1882, who enlisted in late 1915. He served overseas with the
19th Battalion, CEF, arriving for duty in France in October 1916. He served in
the field until August 1917, when he was granted ten days leave to Paris.
While on leave he contracted a mild case of gonorrhea, which kept him in
hospital until November. Once fit for duty, he returned to his unit. He
distinguished himself on at least two occasions and was appointed acting
Corporal in January and then full Corporal in July 1918. He also received the
Military Medal for his actions in August 1918. Later that month he was
wounded. According to his service file, John was “blown up by a mine,”
suffering injuries to his head, his back, and right hip. He was subsequently
treated for contusions to his back and diagnosed neurasthenic, with particular
susceptibility to noise. In 1919, he was discharged as unfit for duty with
“partial loss of function of [the] nervous system” and 183 days for his War
Service Gratuity.100

99. Lara Campbell, “‘We who have wallowed in the mud of Flanders’,” 128.
100. All information obtained from John B.’s service file.
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After the war, John B. held seasonal jobs. In December 1929, he was
facing serious hardship and applied to the OCF for help. His application
complained that while his jobs paid enough during the summer, his wages
were never sufficient “to keep my self in the winter.”101 “I am writing without
anything to eat, and have no coal to keep my sick wife warm,” he explained
in his application. John was in debt, partly because of the medical costs he
faced as a result of wounds sustained overseas. Although he received some
canteen assistance, he was eventually turned down. John’s family was
outraged that he was denied assistance. The believed that his war service
entitled them to help:
my husband went when the call came and fought bravely for
his country and I do think they are doing the right thing with
him, he was a strong healthy man when he enlisted but he has
not been the same since he came home. I think it is a shame you
cant help us, we simply cant live this way.102
John also blamed the war for his plight. “I would not ask you for anything if I
was as good as before The War,” he wrote the trustees, telling them “I dont
[sic] think it is up right for me to be paying doctors bills over this great war,”
and that “I served my King and country, and this is what I get for it.”103 John,
like so many of his generation, was left disillusioned in the Great War’s
aftermath.

101. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1768 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 12 December 1929.
102 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1768 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 22 January 1932.
103. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1768 [Name withheld under the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 December 1929.
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Returned men who applied for OCF assistance had at least a decade’s
experience of dealing with Canada’s nascent veterans’ system and, however
grateful they were for its existence, they never felt it worked for their benefit.
Some older veterans received a war gratuity but that was the extent of the
state’s general aid for military service. A lesser number were eligible for a
pension, although the majority of these were often meager, especially in the
war’s immediate aftermath. By the 1930s, veterans had several options to
which they could turn, including the War Veteran’s Allowance, provided
they were old or disabled enough to qualify. For able-bodied men deemed
employable by this system, however, the only substantive alternative
remained the canteen fund.
The applicants to the OCF served as enlisted soldiers and, unlike the
war’s writers, many were borderline illiterate. These veterans were not happy
they had to apply for assistance, but they were proud they could turn to the
fund in place of municipal aid. Nonetheless, applicants felt compelled to
justify their need. In addition to lengthy explanations that detailed what these
men required, their letters also explained how they had struggled after war’s
end. The veterans were clearly affected by their war experience, a situation
made worse by failing health and the challenge of widespread
unemployment. These setbacks undermined men’s idealized roles as
veterans, fathers, and breadwinners—struggles that influenced the meaning
of the war. 104 Faced with nearly two decades of trial, returned men inevitably

104 Lara Campbell’s work with the letters sent to Ontario’s premier suggests that
veterans corresponded with their government more readily than we have previously
assumed. See Campbell, Respectable Citizens: Gender, Family, and Unemployment in Ontario’s
Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
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questioned their service and sacrifice. The result was a deep sense of
disillusionment that marked a generation of men.
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Conclusion

The outbreak of another global conflict in 1939 did not change the fact that
untold numbers of the war generation believed themselves “psychological
and physical casualt[ies] of the last war.”1 These men came of age with the
Great War and believed it was a formative experience. The most influential of
the generation, including men such as A.Y. Jackson, Will Bird, and Bill
Deacon, described the conflict as a generational catalyst. It was not just elites
who identified generationally. Ordinary men, including A.W. Cooke, an
artillery gunner from Hamilton, also cited the war’s generational influence. 2
So did Matthew MacGowan, a veteran of the 1st Battalion, CEF. He too
believed in the war’s formative influence. “Our generation” matured because

1 Harold Innis, cited in Watson, Marginal Man, 90.
2 A.W. Cooke clipping scrapbook, author’s collection.
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of the conflict, MacGowan explained. The war brought “a definite change in
everybody, in his mind,” because you grew from a “boy to a man.”3
P.L. Kingsley was just as adamant that the war shaped his generation.
He enlisted in August 1914 and served throughout the conflict, seeing action
at Second Ypres, Festubert, the Somme, Vimy, Passchendaele, and during the
last Hundred Days. At the age of eighty-five, Kinglsey wrote his memoirs,
describing them as a “tale of the youth of my generation.”4 While the war that
these men lived through amounted to a “kaleidoscope of events and
experiences,” they agreed that the conflict remained a fundamental part of
their collective identity for the rest of their lives.5
Yet, as indelible an impression as the Great War left on a generation,
the conflict was not the only event that shaped them. Its aftermath also left its
mark. Upon their return home, many struggled in the face of failing health
and economic hardship, experiences that came to define the war’s meaning in
the years and decades that followed. This was not what these men signed up
for when they enlisted; the failure of the peace to meet wartime and pre-war
expectations was a major disappointment. But Canada’s war generation did
not give up easily. It fought its ‘second battle’ for years after, advocating both

3 LAC, RG 41, Vol 7, 1st Battalion folder, M.C. McGowan transcript, tape 2/2. The
transcription inaccurately names him McGowan. See Service File for Matthew Campbell
MacGowan, CEF Service number 6243, for the correct man.
4 Percy Leland Kingsley, The First World War As I Saw It: From Valcartier in Quebec and
on to Armistice Day and the March to the Rhine [1972] (Privately published by Patricia Anne
Thomas, 2013), 1.
5 Tim Cook, Fight to the Finish: Canadians in the Second World War (Toronto: Allen
Lane, 2015), 11.

313
publicly and privately for improved treatment. Although often victorious on
the battlefield, this peacetime struggle ended in defeat. The bonus campaign,
better access to healthcare, a less exclusionary pension system, and easier
access to their canteen funds eluded returned men throughout the 1920s and
into the 1930s. In time, setback upon setback eroded the generation’s beliefs
about the war and its sense of purpose.
Canada’s war generation was further embittered that its governments
failed to keep their promises made to veterans. The country’s leaders assured
Canadians that they would support their troops, both during the war and
after. Despite such claims, few returned men felt that the postwar reestablishment system was sufficient. Its hallmark programs were the pension
system and the soldier settlement plan. Neither succeeded. These failures
were only two of many reasons why veterans felt their future was
undermined by poor planning and broken promises. While the pension
question often dominated debate, the failure of the soldier settlement scheme
represented an even bigger setback because it was the only way federal and
provincial governments willingly assisted ‘able-bodied’ veterans needing
postwar employment.
It was a different story for the wounded. For these men, a series of
government agencies, including the Military Hospitals Commission and its
subsequent reincarnation as the DSCR and DPNH (and finally the DVA),
helped shoulder the war’s burdens. Not so for the so-called able-bodied. If
they encountered difficulty, then the only option for those unwilling (or
unable) to turn to municipal aid were the soldiers’ aid commissions and
provincial canteen funds. Veterans in this position felt rejected and, while it
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pained many to admit it, the challenges they faced in the 1920s and 1930s left
the war generation increasingly disenchanted.
Questions about whether Canadians were disillusioned have been
largely ignored by historians. Moreover, rather than asking how postwar
discontent forced the war generation to reconsider the conflict’s meaning,
studies have instead focused on the veterans’ movement and the war’s social
memory. While both form part of the Great War’s legacy, without proper
appreciation of the trials endured after 1918, this picture is incomplete.
Efforts to publicly commemorate the war were part of its aftermath, but
they were not the only way Canadians made sense of the conflict. Nor did all
Canadians believe an idealized history of the Canadian Corps, with its record
of “co-operation, tolerance, selflessness, and unity,” was the answer to the
social and economic discord of the 1920s and 1930s.6 At its heart, the war’s
constructed memory was a debate about how the conflict should be
remembered, not how its memory informed the present. For the war
generation, however, commemoration was not an all-encompassing
explanation of the conflict. These men lived the war firsthand and did not
need ceremonies to understand its meaning. To the veterans who made up
the generation’s ranks, the war was a matter of personal experience and it
could be re-evaluated, especially when postwar life failed to live up to
wartime ideals.

6 With its example of “co-operation, tolerance, selflessness, and unity” and,
according to Vance, if this project worked, the “memory of the war could act as a citizenship
primer for children and immigrants … it could even reconcile the seemingly unreconcilable
and forge the basis of unity between Canada’s founding peoples.” See Vance, Death So Noble,
224.
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As a highly literate generation, the question of postwar
disillusionment became a matter of serious literary debate, particularly in
Britain and the United States. Within Canada, however, the generation
published little about its discontent. Nonetheless, some veterans, such as
George Drew, Robert Manion, and Frank Underhill, did expand on why they
were disenchanted with the postwar peace. They were disappointed that
disarmament was failing and that Canada risked sliding into another ‘futile’
slaughter. Their critiques reflected deeply personal positions that did not fit
the public discourse of the war’s memory.
While few memoirs directly addressed veterans’ economic setbacks,
concerns over postwar employment began long before the so-called ‘war
book boom’. In fact, men started to worry about jobs as early as 1917. These
soldiers, including Frank Oldacre, Edward Malette, and Stanley Bennett
believed that a secure position was a critical part of the ‘square deal’ they
hoped for in postwar Canada. Federal and provincial soldier settlement
programs were designed to address the demand for postwar work, but they
were never intended to employ all veterans. The failure of Ontario’s
Kapuskasing colony foreshadowed the wider problems with Canada’s
settlement schemes and the limitations of state sponsored employment for
veterans. While Ottawa and the provincial capitals planned for reestablishing the disabled, the able-bodied were another matter entirely.
Postwar recession, combined with widespread and prolonged unemployment
undermined their chance at re-integrating into Canadian society. The
difficulties these men faced left many veterans feeling ‘right up against it’. As
the struggle to find work dragged on, they grew increasingly embittered. The

316
record of this discontent is not part of the war’s social memory, but as the
letters Ontario’s veterans wrote to the province’s canteen fund make clear,
these men were disillusioned in the war’s aftermath.
All the applicants to the Ontario Canteen Fund were ‘average’ soldiers,
a group that remains underrepresented in histories of the conflict’s aftermath.
Like the war generation more broadly, these men were born in the decade
and a half before 1900. They came of age with the conflict and never expected
postwar life would be defined by economic strife. The strains they endured
after returning home placed a heavy burden on their personal and family
lives, trials made worse by the precarious state of their physical and
psychological health. While their correspondence with the OCF trustees did
not address questions of remembrance or commemoration, the meaning of
the war was central to their pleas for assistance. These veterans remained
proud of their service, in part because it entitled them to use the canteen
fund. Yet, as their appeals to the Fund’s trustees reveal, these men continued
to re-evaluate belief in the war’s value, especially in reaction to severe
challenges in the postwar labour market. Far from a memory of purpose, for
too many of these veterans, the war’s meaning was tainted by dashed hopes.
The Great War ended in November 1918 but its legacy cast a far longer
shadow. The worst of its horrors haunted the living for decades and Canada’s
war generation spent a lifetime trying to understand its impact. For these
men, the conflict was a central reference point that defined their
understanding of the tragic events that shaped their lives. While men’s
experiences between 1914 and 1918 are central to any explanation of the war’s
meaning, postwar disillusionment remains an equally integral part of this
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legacy. It was a result not just of war, but of its aftermath and it endured long
after the guns fell silent.
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Appendix I
The Canteen Fund Act
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Harrison, Charles Y.

Acland, Peregrine
Dawson, Coningsby

Beames, John
Dent, Walter Redvers
Godwin, George

Harrison, Charles Yale
Roberts, Leslie

Gray, Archie William
Cowen, William Joseph

Neil, Stephen
Cobb, Humphrey

Filion, Laetitia
Cowen, William Joseph

Niven, Frederick
Child, Philip

Vinton, V.V.
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1929

1930
1930
1930

1930
1930
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1934

1934
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1935
1936

1936
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1939

Generals Die in Bed
All Else Is Folly: A Tale of War and Passion
The Unknown Soldier
An Army Without Banners
Show Me Death!
Why Stay We Here?
Generals Die in Bed
When the Gods Laughed
The Towers of Mont. St. Eloi
Man with Four Lives
All the King's Men
Paths of Glory
Yolande, la fiancee
They Gave Hime a Gun
Old Soldier
God's Sparrows
To the Greater Glory

1850-1921

1878-1944
1898-1978

1897-1941
1886-1964

1876-1947
1899-1944

18961886-1964

1898-1954
1895-1980

18891900-1963
1889-1974

1891-1963
1883-1959

1898-1954
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Acronyms
AAC

Amputees Association of Canada

ANL

Army and Navy League

ANVC

Army and Navy Veterans of Canada

ANZAC

Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

CAMC

Canadian Army Medical Corps

CBC

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

CEF

Canadian Expeditionary Force

CPR

Canadian Pacific Railway

CPF

Canadian Patriotic Fund

DPNH

Department of Pensions and National Health

DSCR

Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment

DCM

Distinguished Conduct Medal

DVA

Dominion Veterans Alliance

GWVA

Great War Veterans’ Association

MHC

Military Hospitals Commission

OCF

Ontario Canteen Fund

SAC

Soldiers’ Aid Commission

SSB

Soldier Settlement Board

TCL

Toronto Civic League

UVL

United Veterans League

WVA

War Veterans Allowance
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Newspapers and Journals, and Magazines
Back to Mufti: A Magazine in the interests of Canadians who have been ‘Over There’
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